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Global climate mitigation analyses have been used to evaluate the challenges of 
reducing greenhouse gases and to inform climate change policymaking for over 30 
years.  Studies traditionally focus on projections of greenhouse gases over the 21st 
century based on key drivers such as population growth, economic growth, and the 
rate of technological change especially in climate mitigation or energy technologies.  
Any one of these factors can have an appreciable impact on emissions levels and the 
cost of mitigation particularly in the face of stringent mitigation targets.    One area 
that has not been sufficiently studied is the impact of different rates of technology 
diffusion of advanced energy technologies between high-income and low- and 
middle-income countries.  This is the topic of this dissertation.  The standard 
approach in climate economic modeling is to assume that all technologies are 
  
available at the same time and rate across countries with different incomes and 
technological capabilities.  This study applies the literature related to economic and 
technological convergence to first develop new estimates of technology diffusion for 
energy-related sectors across 112 countries of varying income levels.  Then new 
greenhouse gas scenarios are developed with the Global Change Assessment Model 
(GCAM) to test the importance of different assumptions on technology diffusion 
versus other key modeling assumptions.  The modeling results from this research 
show that the cost of meeting the same climate target could be as high as 60% to 80% 
in marginal cost terms and about 30% greater in total policy costs when different 
assumptions on diffusion rates of climate mitigation technologies between countries 
are used.  These results clearly point to the need for greater evaluation on the 
importance of technology diffusion in climate mitigation modeling and also in the 
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1. Motivation for Research 
 
1.1. 
According to the latest full assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), “most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since 
the mid-20th century is very likely (over 90% probability) due to the observed 
increase in anthropogenic [greenhouse gas] GHG concentrations.  It is likely (over 
66% probability) that there has been significant anthropogenic warming over the past 
50 years averaged over each continent (except Antarctica)” (IPCC, 2007a).  
Climate Change Scenarios 
 
Figure 1-1 below illustrates important issues in climate change science and policy, 
two physical and one political.  The temperature scale on the left is adjusted so that 
zero is benchmarked relative to 1990 which is also the year many climate negotiators 
use for settling on GHG reductions.  The first physical issue that many people do 
understand is that if society does not dramatically reduce GHG emissions, global 
temperatures will increase.  Depending on population and economic growth, energy 
efficiency, and technology change and diffusion, temperature growth from 1990 
could be between 1.5ºC to 4 ºC (the top of the range could go as high as 6 ºC if the 
climate system is highly sensitive to increasing GHG emissions). 
 
It is also worth noting that all of these trajectories are still increasing at the end of the 
century, i.e., they are not stabilization trajectories.  However there is a second 




if society were to completely stop all GHG emissions now, global temperature will 
continue to increase for the remainder of the century.  This is illustrated by the lower 
orange line, which is the result of running climate models with today’s GHG levels 
and shows continuing temperature increase due to positive feedback and inertia in the 




Figure 1-1: Projected global surface warming.  
Solid lines are multi-model global averages of surface warming (relative to 1980–1999) for the 
scenarios A2, A1B and B1 which are various projections of how human society might develop over the 
21st century from more to less greenhouse gas emitting. Shading denotes the ±1 standard deviation 
range of individual model annual averages. The orange line is for the experiment where concentrations 
were held constant at year 2000 values (IPCC, 2007a). 
 




The political or public policy issue is the following: The European Union has stated 
that its official climate change target is “to limit global warming to no more than 2°C 
above pre-industrial temperatures.” (EC, 2007).  To show what this target means on 
the above IPCC projections I’ve added a reference dashed line for pre-industrial 
temperatures which were about 0.5°C less than today.  To today’s warmer world we 
can then add the warming that is in the system (barring any attempt at cooling the 
planet through geoengineering) and see that we are automatically headed for at least 
1°C above pre-industrial temperatures without any action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.   
 
While the science of climate change enjoys a degree of consensus, the same is not the 
case for the economics of climate change.  In this second field, there is quite a degree 
of nonconformity on the question of what the cost is to mitigate or reduce GHG 
emissions.   The principle reason why there is this difference in consensus is that 
climate science is based on the natural sciences which count on many fundamental 
relationship in atmospheric chemistry and physics that can – by and large – be 
empirically tested. Climate economics, on the other hand, is primarily dealing with 
human socio-economic systems that are fundamentally more uncertain.  In addition, 
the estimates of the cost of GHG mitigation are based on economic models of the 
world economic system which run scenarios out in the very long run, i.e., 50 to 100 
years.  Leading economic institutions attempt to harmonize the economic inputs, 




but at the same time there are many important assumptions about how the world 
operates, which technologies are implemented, and ultimately how societies respond.  
 
Figure 1-2 illustrates the differences in economic cost of GHG mitigation from some 
of the most recent global analyses evaluated by the IPCC in its 2007 report (IPCC, 
2007b).  The graphs show the relationship between GHG concentration targets in 
terms of part per million (ppm) carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq) and related costs 
both in terms of a change in economic output (GDP) and a carbon price.  As the GHG 
targets are made more stringent, the costs of achieving those targets increase slightly 
more than linearly. For example, for the often sought target of 450 ppm CO2 eq, 
which is roughly consistent with the 2°C target mentioned above, GDP losses could 
be up to 4% of global output and the associated carbon price could increase to 
$200/tCO2 (which would add about $90 to a barrel of oil and $1.90 to a gallon of 
gasoline) .  
 
There are many assumptions in the models that have an important influence on the 
results, e.g., future projections of population, economic growth, adoption of low-
carbon technologies and their costs.  One of the more important assumptions in the 
models regarding low-carbon technologies is that the diffusion of advanced 
technologies is instantaneous, that is, all new technologies are essentially 
homogenous in performance across all the countries of the globe.  Table 1-1 provides 
the names, developers, and key characteristics of selected climate economic models 




Blanford, 2006).  The second column identifies the basic model type as either: (1) 
multi-sector general equilibrium models that include the inputs and outputs to a 
number of economic sectors in the economy, (2) models that consider only the 
aggregate economic output produced by the economy, or (3) market equilibrium 
models that include market supply and demand conditions for a number of energy and 
non-energy sectors of the economy.  The third column indicates whether a model 
deals with current production and investment decisions based on current prices of 
inputs and outputs, and includes an intertemporal optimization that considers the 
prices over the lifetime of possible investments.  These two model characteristics are 
often, but not always, found together in economic models given that it is 
computationally easier to solve an intertemporal optimization algorithm when 
economic output is aggregated.  The last column, and the main focus of this research, 
shows how the various models treat the diffusion of technology between countries, 
mainly from high-income (more industrialized) to low- and middle-income countries 
(less industrialized).  For most of the models, technology diffusion is treated ad hoc, 
that is, there does not seem to be a common basis in the modeling literature to base 
rates of technology transfer or patterns of technology diffusion.  Many models simply 
allow new GHG mitigation technology to be available instantaneously across all 
regions of the world.  Notable exceptions include: the Japanese AIM model, which 
counts on expert elicitations to help assess when certain technologies become 
available; the MIT EPPA model, which allows the model to endogenously determine 




each region; and EPRI’s MERGE which applies an exogenous assumption to delay 


























Figure 1-2: Mitigation costs across models. 
Results from various climate economic models showing relationship between the cost of mitigation 
and long-term stabilization targets (radiative forcing compared with pre-industrial level, W/m2 and 
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Table 1-1: Key Characteristics of Selected Climate Economic Models.    
Table adapted from Weyant, de la Chesnaye, and Blanford, 2006. 
 
 
The importance of the assumptions on technology diffusion for global emissions and 
climate forcing have not yet received sufficient attention in the modeling community 
and could be significant in climate mitigation analyses for two reasons: First, the 
actual performance of low-carbon technologies, e.g., a new generation wind turbine, 




models, the rate of technology transfer or diffusion is assumed to be instantaneous or 
very fast. This second issues helps to keep the modeled global costs of GHG 
mitigation down since it is assumed that GHG mitigation take place where it is the 
most cost effective as soon as policies mandate reductions.  It is this second 
assumption that is the focus of this research.  
1.2. 
This dissertation is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides an assessment of the 
needed scope and level of technological change and technology diffusion between 
different groups of countries for stringent climate mitigation targets.  This illustrates 
the magnitude of the challenge but does not guide how that technology diffusion may 
occur.  For that understanding, Section 3 relies on the body of literature related to 
economic and technological convergence to develop new estimates of technology 
convergence for energy-related sectors across 112 countries of varying income levels.  
With that historical basis to build on, Section 4 describes the modifications to the 
Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) – developed at the Joint Global Change 
Research Institute at the University of Maryland—to test the importance of different 
assumptions on technology diffusion versus other key modeling assumption.  Section 
5 presents the results of the new scenarios and finally Section 6 offers some 
concluding observation and implication for modeling climate mitigation targets based 
on this new work.   




2. Assessment of Technological Change and Diffusion 
 
2.1. 
This section provides a technical assessment of the needed technological change by 
focusing on the implications for the global electric power sector under a stringent 
climate change target. It is a robust finding in the climate mitigation literature, 
including all the mitigation reports of the IPCC, that in order to reduce global GHGs 
to avoid dangerous climate change there needs to be a whole transformation of the 
global energy system. The two main sectors in the energy system are electric power 
generation and transportation, which account for about 25 and 11 percent of global 
GHG emissions, respectively, in 2000 (WRI, 2009).   
Technical Assessment of the Magnitude for Change 
 
To gain a better understanding of the possible need for technological change or 
transformation, the analysis conducted here focuses on the global electric power 
sector power given its importance and the modeling ability to broadly estimate the 
number of power plant changes which can be easier to intuitively understand.  The 
analysis evaluates the changes in the electric power sector power in both Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries for a 
climate target that limits the increase in global average surface temperature to no 
more than 3°C above pre-industrial levels (or 1850).  The main modeling scenario for 
this analysis is from a published study coordinated by the Energy Modeling Forum 
which included many of the leading integrated assessment models (Clarke et al, 
2009).  Within that study, the overall economy-wide and total energy system data for 




model (Blanford et al, 2009).  For the analysis presented here, further work was done 
with MERGE to disaggregate the results specific to the electric sector for the OECD 
and non-OCED countries by major power generation technologies, i.e., fossil fuels, 
nuclear power, and renewables. 
 
MERGE is a model for estimating the regional and global effects of GHG mitigation 
and is classified as an integrated assessment model (see Manne et al, 1995 for more 
details). It quantifies alternative pathways for various mitigation scenarios and 
contains a significant level of detail for electric power generation technologies.  
MERGE includes submodels for the domestic and international economy, energy-
related emissions of GHGs, non-energy emissions of GHGs, and a reduced form 
representation of the global climate system.  The model can disaggregate the global 
economy into various regions (e.g., OECD and non-OECD) and is consistent with a 
Ramsey-Solow model of optimal long-term economic growth.  Price-responsiveness 
is introduced through a top-down production function. Output depends upon the 
inputs of capital, labor and energy. Important for this analysis, energy-related 
emissions are projected through a more detailed, bottom-up perspective. Separate 
technologies are defined for each source of electric and nonelectric energy. Each 
period's GHG emissions are translated into global concentrations and in turn to the 
impacts on mean global indicators such as temperature change. In order to meet a 
new climate change target, the model solves for a least-cost solution by making 
changes to the global energy and economic systems. The changes to the electric 




below.  It is important to state here that the material presented below is only from one 
model for only one long-term climate target.  There are significant uncertainties in 
projecting the future global economic system, the energy system, and attempting to 
model long-term developments in technologies, including their costs and associated 
policies, e.g., the future of nuclear non-proliferation policies.  For the purposes of this 
assessment, using one model does make it possible to focus on the electric sector, its 
key technologies, and the nature of technological change, and technology diffusion.  
The insights gained from this analysis should be broadly consistent across many of 
the leading climate economic and integrated assessment models used today. 
 
A good place to start this technical assessment of the needed technological change in 
the global electric power sector is to first appreciate what the reference case (i.e., no 
climate policy) holds for global CO2 emissions and electric power technologies.  
Figure 2-1 shows historical and projected CO2 emissions from the OECD and non-
OECD countries, latter split between the three dominant developing countries, Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China (BRICs), and the rest of the world.  Although the OECD 
emissions have been the largest source up until the first decade of the 21st Century, 
non-OECD emissions, especially from the BRICs are projected to dominate in the 
future. 
 
A few stark contrasts can be made by comparing a key driver of CO2 and other GHG 
emissions, population, with the share of historical global emissions to a modeled 




where it is easy to see that the emissions pathway for a stringent climate target will 
require a dramatic transformation of the world’s economy and energy system. 
 
As stated above, electricity generation from fossil fuels, mainly coal, is the single 
largest source of global GHG emissions.  Coal is abundant and relatively a much less 
expensive fuel that other sources of power generation, mainly natural gas, nuclear 
power, and renewable power which includes solar, wind, and biomass from 
agriculture.  If there is no climate policy that internalizes the environmental cost of 
continuing to use fossil fuels, thereby changing the relative prices of the fuels so that 
fossil fuels become more expensive to use, then there should not be much of a change 
in the projected continued and accelerated use of fossil fuels for power generation.  




Figure 2-1: Projected reference case CO2 emissions.  
Source: Blanford et al, 2009.  
 
 
Figure 2-2: OECD and non-OECD population and emissions.  
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As populations and economies continue to grow in the non-OECD countries, 
reference electricity generation from fossil fuels, and emissions, continue to growth 
and is identified as non-OECD Ref (solid red line). It is important to note that 
although increasing over time, there is an endogenous improvement in electricity 
intensity or technology over time which means that less and less electricity is required 
to produce economic output. But even with this autonomous energy efficiency 
intensity improvement the growth in fossil generation in the non-OECD is dramatic. 
 
With the imposition of a 3°C target and a hefty carbon price on fossil generation that 
continues to increase at a 5 percent discount rate, there is an equally dramatic shift in 
fossil generation.  With the policy starting in 2010, the retirement of conventional 
fossil generation begins quickly and is identified as the orange (non-OECD) and light 
blue (OECD) dashed lines.  As the old technology is retired, new advanced fossil 
generation technology must take its place.  New generation technology is modeled to 
be Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plants with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) of CO2. This is a combination of two new technologies which are just 
now starting to be tested at-scale for power generation. The expected growth in these 
new technologies is identified as the red (non-OECD) and dark blue (OECD) dashed 
lines.  Given that most of the current development work on IGCC-CCS plants is 
being done mainly in Canada, Europe and the U.S. (although China has started 
making recent progress), the significant growth in advanced fossil generation in the 




from the OECD to the non-OECD countries in the coming decades.  At least that is 
the conventional thinking and theory embodied in current integrated assessment 
model and climate change negotiations in the UNFCCC meetings. 
 
The objective of this section was to assess the need technological change or scope of 
technology transfer by estimating how many new electric power plants would be 
required by region.  Using the same scenarios describe above, it is possible to 
approximate the number of plants for both fossil generation and nuclear power.  
Figure 2-4 provides estimates for the number of fossil fuel power plants, both 
conventional and advanced technologies, for the OECD and non-OECD countries.  
To estimate the number of plants (units really), the number total TerraWatt hours per 
year were divided by proxy typical plant with a generation capacity of 500 
MegaWatts (MW) per hour running 90 percent of the year. In the past, units were 
smaller than 500 MW and in the future they are expected to increase in size.  The 500 
MW size in an average and also is intended to provide a perspective given today’s 
typical generating unit.  The same pattern as is shown in Figure 3 shows up in Figure 
4 but now it is easier to get a sense of needed number of physical units and more 
importantly the transformation in technology from conventional fossil generation, 
about 1,500 units by 2040 to a switch of about equal numbers, about 250, for 
conventional and advanced fossil generation.  Not only is there a significant change in 
fossil generation technology, there is also a more dramatic away from fossil 




Figure 2-3: Historical and projected electricity generation from fossil fuels.   
TWh means Terra (1012) Watt Hours. Sources: Historical data, IEA, 2009; 
Projections, Blanford et al, 2009. 
 
 
This shift to a different technology is presented in Figure 2-5 which follows the same 
methodology to estimate the number of nuclear plants.  The main difference is that 
here the proxy typical nuclear plant with a generation capacity double that of the 
proxy fossil plants or 1GigaWatts (1GW = 2 X 500 MegaWatts) per hour running 90 
percent of the year.  This approach while not exact provides a reasonable benchmark 
as the same calculation yields 100 plants for the U.S. where in reality there are 104 
current operational nuclear plants (EIA, 2014a).  Globally, there are 436 current 
operational nuclear plants (IEA, 2009), which is consistent with the date presented in 
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Figure 2-5.  Evaluating the difference between the non-OECD reference case and the 
3° C non-OECD target provides an estimate of the needed technological change and 
technology transfer which is easier to see than in the fossil fuel plant estimates. The 
reference case of non-OECD (solid red line) shows a steady increase in nuclear power 
plants until about 2050 with about 160 plants which then start to be de-commissioned 
mainly because the model project that conventional fossil generation will outcompete 
nuclear based on cost.  However, in the 3° C target scenario the estimated number of 
nuclear plant in the non-OECD countries (dashed red line) is about 490, which means 
an addition of about 330 plants over a 40 year period.  The pace of nuclear power 
installation continues to accelerate to where the model projects over 1,800 plants by 
2100.  As a point of reference, commercial nuclear power generation started in the 





Figure 2-4: Approximation of the number of fossil fuel power plants.  
Based on historical and projected electricity generation data.  Sources: Historical 
data, IEA, 2009; Projections, Blanford et al, 2009. 
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Figure 2-5: Approximation of the number of nuclear power plants. 
Based on historical and projected electricity generation data.  Sources: Historical 
data, IEA, 2009; Projections, Blanford et al, 2009. 
 
2.2. 
A good place to start is with the concept of technological change as formulated by 
Josef Schumpeter (in 1942) where innovation and technological change were key 
driving forces of the modern economic system. Schumpeter identified three steps for 
technological change to take place (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins, 2001): First, there 
needs to be the invention of new technology through investments made by the private 
sector, public sector, or both.  Second, the new technology must be commercialized, 
that is, made available outside of the early circle of developers.  Lastly, the new 
Related Concepts on Technological Change  
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technology must be widely available and successfully adopted by many entities –the 
process of technology diffusion– for its full measure to be realized.   The concept of 
“technology change” in the context of climate economic analysis means the 
successful research, development, deployment of new climate mitigation technologies 
and their effective diffusion to most if not all countries around the world. The 
principal motivator for new technology is assumed to be a global climate policy that 
places a limit on GHG emissions that would then lead to a decrease in global 
warming.  New technology development by itself can’t solve the climate problem 
without a policy to limit GHG emissions and may in fact lead to increased emissions 
by the use of more emission-intensive technologies, for example converting coal to a 
liquid fuel for transportation.  This section provides a summary of the literature on 
technology change and diffusion.  
2.2.1. 
Technology is commonly associated with hardware devices, e.g., hybrid cars, wind 
turbines, but for it to be fully effective “technology” also includes the information and 
knowledge needed for the production and use of technological hardware (software), 
as well as the institutional settings and policy incentives for its deployment (Grübler, 
1998).  For the purpose of evaluating technical change, the future direction and rate of 
that should be analyzed as a range of possible futures given the many policy, 
engineering, and cost uncertainties. It is still possible to identify key features of the 
technical change process (Grübler, 1998): 
Technological Change  
• The process is fundamentally uncertain: outcomes are not certain and cannot 




• Research, development and innovation draws on underlying scientific or other 
knowledge.  
• Many new technologies depend on the exploitation of foundational knowledge 
based on experience.  
• Experimentation (trial and error) is usually involved.  
• Technological change is a cumulative process and depends on the history of 
the individual or organization involved.  
• Technological change is linked to the economic and cultural environment of a 
country or sector that is broader than an individual company.  
 
Technological change may be supply driven, demand driven, or both. Some of the 
most significant technological advancements were designed to respond to the most 
pressing needs; a prime example is wartime in order to address resource constraints or 
military objectives. From the other side of societal needs, some technological 
innovation is the result of curiosity or the desire to meet a technical challenge. Market 
forces, i.e., prices, also can act as a strong stimulus for innovation by firms and 
entrepreneurs aiming either to reduce costs or to gain market share (Nordhaus, 2007).   
 
Combustion turbine technology is one example of a technology where there has been 
cross-sector exploitation of prior experience and foundational knowledge and where 
long-term advancements have been the result of a cumulative process.  Conventional 
fossil-fueled power stations have been designed around steam turbines to convert heat 
into electricity with conversion efficiencies of new power stations above 40 percent. 




allow higher steam temperatures and pressures, enable efficiencies of closer to 50 
percent. More recently and in the near future some dramatic breakthroughs of 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) have been and should be achieved. The 
technology involves expanding very hot combustion gases through a gas turbine with 
the waste heat in the exhaust gases used to generate steam for a steam turbine.  
 
During the end of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th, steam turbine 
technology was primarily developed for electricity generation. That was then ported 
over to early designs for jet engines in the 1920s, which eventually lead to the first jet 
aircraft at the end of WWII (Rand, 2002).  In turn, advancements in extreme high-
speed turbines, metallurgy, and engineering related to jet aircraft found their way 
back to the next generation of gas turbines. Jet engine designs have frequently been 
modified to turn them into gas turbine engines.  The gas turbine can withstand much 
higher inlet temperatures than a steam turbine, which produces considerable increases 
in overall efficiency. The latest designs currently under construction can achieve 
efficiencies of over 60 percent and have been rising by over 1 percent per year for a 
decade (EPRI, 2008). 
2.2.2. 
Given the focus on climate mitigation technology, using the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) as a starting point to define technology diffusion and 
transfer is appropriate.  According to the IPCC, technology transfer is: 
Technology Diffusion and Transfer 
“a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience 




different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, 
financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
research/education institutions” (IPCC, 2000). 
 
The IPCC Mitigation Report (2007b) continues by stating that “although there are 
numerous frameworks and models put forth to cover different aspects of technology 
transfer, there are no corresponding overarching theories. Consequently there is no 
framework that encompasses such a broad definition of technology transfer.” It seems 
that technology transfer is easier to identify once it has taken place but harder to 
establish robust policy frameworks for its implementation.  At the same time, the 
IPCC report does classify the important stages of technology transfer as:  
• identification of needs,  
• choice of technology, and  
• assessment of conditions of transfer, agreement and implementation. 
 
There are additional aspects of a workable technology transfer policy and program, 
again from the IPCC 2007 report: “Evaluation and adjustment or adaptation to local 
conditions, and replication are other important stages. Pathways for technology 
transfer vary depending on the sector, technology type and maturity and country 
circumstances. Given this variety and complexity, the report concludes that there is 
no pre-set answer to enhancing technology transfer.”
 
 [emphasis added]. 
Even though the diffusion of new technologies is one of the most important 
requirements for effective climate mitigation there is not an agreed upon approach or 




a cap and trade policy to reduce GHG emissions is the case in the European Union 
and now starting some low- and middle-income countries, e.g., China and Mexico, 
but not under consideration in the U.S.  
 
2.3. 
Traditionally, there have been two pathways for the transfer of technology from the 
more advanced countries (mainly those within the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development - OECD) to the non-OECD countries which are public 
programs and private sector investments.  Public funding of technology transfer is 
mainly in the form of official developmental assistance (ODA) from governments or 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Compared to private investment, ODA 
flows are small, but they are important in areas of the world that receive little foreign 
investment.  Private firms transfer technology between countries in three ways:  
Pathways and Sources of Technology Diffusion  
1. Trade. According to the World Bank, GDP attributed to imported high-tech 
products has grown by over 50 percent in low-income countries, and by over 
70 percent in middle-income countries, since 1994.  
2. Foreign Direct Investment, mainly from multinational corporations (MNC) by 
the establishment of subsidiaries.  FDI was about $390 billion in 2007 (World 
Bank, 2008). 
3. License to a Local Firm where a MNC could instead choose to license its 
technology to a firm in the recipient country.  About $22 billion in licensing 
fees in 2006 (World Bank, 2008).  
 
Whether the diffusion of technology is done through public or private means, a 
critical element of the long-term effectiveness of any technology is the determination 




transfer in the Green Revolution (1981), he concludes that “[t]he type of transfer that 
occurred during the green revolution depended on the agroclimatic similarity of the 
adopting country with the country of origin and also on the sophistication of the local 
research system. The initial diffusion of high yield varieties in India, Pakistan, 
Turkey, and Malaysia was largely a material transfer because their agroclimatic 
conditions were similar to Mexico and the Philippines.” In this case, public and 
private sector involvement were critical for the diffusion of the technology.   Jeffery 
Sachs (2003) adds that many technologies are highly ecology-specific: “The diffusion 
of technology from the advanced to the lagging countries, so important in the process 
of catching up, works best when the laggard shares the same ecological zone as the 
leader . . . and works most poorly when the laggard is geographically isolated and in a 
distinct ecological zone.” 
 
In addition to environmental conditions, it is also important to bear in mind the 
cultural and political appropriateness of new technologies.  Frondel’s study (Frondel 
et al, 2004) evaluates the importance of market and regulatory mechanisms by 
looking at OECD data of over 4,000 firms and find that more than ¾ of all abatement 
measures adopted are for cleaner production rather than end-of-pipe reasons.  Aubert 
(2004) argues that diffusion of technology could go through a number of different, 
locally appropriate channels: “metrology, standards and quality control, extension 
services (for manufacturing and agriculture), information and training programs, 





A country’s infrastructure or lack of infrastructure must also be weighted heavily in 
the determination of appropriate technology.  For example, Larson (2006) analyzes 
fuel cell technology and suggests that it may be adopted in less developed nations 
before developed nations, since the need is greater and there is an absence of a 
reliable power infrastructure where fuel cells could follow the path of cell phones. 
This is the “leap frog” technology approach.  For climate mitigation and energy 
security policies a possible “leap frog” technology is electric transportation for light 
duty (passenger) vehicles.  One of the difficulties for this technology to reach a 
substantial share of total vehicles is the new electric charging infrastructure, 
especially in highly populated urban areas. (Think of the difficulty is installing 
sufficient charging stations in the street of New York or Los Angeles.)  This is in 
contrast to many cities in South America that can plan ahead and install the needed 
electric infrastructure as their urban and suburban areas develop beyond many of the 
dirt roads currently in use.  
2.3.1. 
There is no doubt that technology diffusion occurs in many different sectors and 
across a variety of technologies between countries of varying income levels. The 
pertinent question for the subsequent sections of this research is: what are the rates at 
which technology diffuses between countries and can we learn something from that 
assessment that is useful for modeling forward projections?  This is a similar to the 
question addressed in empirical research on classical convergence on income and 
more recent work on convergence of GHG intensities.  Classical convergence 
research (Sala-i-Martin and Barro, 2003) focuses on neoclassical economic growth 




models based on the Solow-Swan formulations.  The theory and assessment is that 
higher-income countries exhibit diminishing returns to investment which lead to 
declining growth rates of a country as it approaches a steady state level of capital per 
unit of labor.  The further implication being that the lower-income countries grow 
faster or “catch-up” to the higher-income economies, all else equal. From income 
converge researchers continued the line of inquiry on energy and GHG intensity with 
an emphasis on climate change policy.  Notable research by Strazicich and List 
(2003), Stegman and McKibbin (2005), and Aldy (2006) find that there is 
convergence in energy and emissions intensities among countries of different income 
levels but that it is important to track and understand the underlying structural 
changes in the economies and the difference in energy mix and technologies as the 
lower-income countries continue to industrialize.  The reason to continue the 
converge approach from income, to energy intensity, and finally to technology 
performance is to identify an empirical evidence of convergence of some economic or 
technology performance variables across countries to enhance the predictive capacity 
of forward looking models, climate economic models (See Table 1-1).  Furthermore, 
technological change and, in particular, technology diffusion has been a newer focus 
in the re-evaluation of economic growth models –since the late 1980s and early 
1990s– to assess the differences in growth or convergence between the low-income 
and high-income countries (Rutan, 2002). One of the early papers to specifically draw 
attention to the connection between technology diffusion and economic convergence 
was Bernard and Jones (1996) which concluded that economic growth models at the 




simple model which included these dynamics were better suited to modeling 
economic growth and convergence.  More recently Keller (2004) explores the role 
technology diffusion plays in the variation of income across countries and estimates 
that foreign sources of technology –attributed to diffusion– accounts for a significant 
fraction (~90%) of domestic productivity growth in the lower-income countries.   
 
To help use the established literature on income and energy/GHG intensity 
convergence and its application to technology convergence or how the performance 
of technologies converge over time, I draw on work of Comin and Hobijn (2004). 
Their work carefully examines the historical diffusion of more than twenty 
technologies across twenty-three of the world’s leading industrial or high-income 
countries.  This is covered in greater detail in the next section.  This section and the 
above material define and describe the relationships between technological change 
and the importance of technology diffusion.  The objective is to use the literature on 
technology convergence, which is a historical assessment, and the work presented in 
the following section to help develop more realistic estimates of technology diffusion 







3. Testing Technological Convergence 
 
3.1. 
There is a significant body of literature on the importance of technology and climate 
change mitigation that has been developed over the last two decades.  Some of the 
more recent organized volumes include EMF 19: Alternative technology strategies 
for climate change policy edited (Weyant, J., Ed., 2004);  Endogenous Technological 
Change and the Economics of Atmospheric Stabilisation (Edenhofer, et al, eds. 2006);  
Multi-gas mitigation and climate policy (de la Chesnaye and Weyant, eds., 2006); and 
International, U.S. and E.U. Climate Change Control Scenarios: Results from EMF 
22 (Clarke, L., Bohringer, C., and Rutherford, T., eds, 2009).  There is also a robust 
literature evaluating economic and GHG emissions converge between high-income 
and low- and middle-income countries. Once of the seminal papers on convergence is 
by Barro and Salai-i-Martin (1992).   Other notable papers on economic converge 
include Lall and Yilmaz (2000), Sala-i-Martin and Barro (2003), Mathur (2005), and 
Ralhan and Dayanandan (2005).  On the more specific question of energy and GHG 
convergence a good resource is by Stegman & McKibbin (2005) published as 
Brookings Institution Discussion Paper.   However, when it comes to assessments of 
technology diffusion, transfer, or cross-country technology adoption there is a very 
limited body of work.   One of the seminal papers in the area and one of the most 
cited is Comin and Hobijn in Cross-country Technological Adoption: Making the 
Theories Face the Facts (2004).  In their paper, Comin and Hobijn examine the 
diffusion of more than twenty technologies across twenty-three of the world’s leading 
industrial or high-income countries.  For the purposes of my dissertation this paper is 




important for at least two reasons: First, I plan to follow and expand on the 
methodology applied by Comin and Hobijn to test for technology converge between 
countries; and second, that paper covers two of the three of the energy sector 
technologies of interest, i.e., transportation and electricity.  The third sector 
technology evaluated is petroleum refining.  
  
An important limitation in the Comin and Hobijn paper, as in many other analyses, is 
that the assessment of technology convergence was done only for industrial or high-
income countries.  I believe that a more pressing question to be addressed and the first 
part of my dissertation research should be:   Is there a pattern of technological 
diffusion and convergence between middle & low income countries and high income 
countries similar to the pattern observed within high income countries, particularly in 
energy-related technologies? 
 
The data that Comin and Hobijn developed is more important than the methodology 
they followed to evaluate variation in technologies over time and the degree of 
technological convergence between countries.   As the authors state “at the heart of 
the empirical analysis” is the Historical Cross-Country Technology Adoption Dataset 
(HCCTAD- Comin and Hobijn, 2003a).   Table 3-1 lists the technologies and 
technology measures contained in the dataset.  A very important point to keep in 
mind is that the technology measures in the HCCTAD are proxies for the level of 





The research in this section encompasses two major data collection efforts: First, add 
technology measures for another energy related sector, that is, petroleum 
refining/liquid fuels for both conventional and non-conventional fuels and add 
additional details for electric power generation; and Second, expand the country 
coverage to include technology measures for low- and middle-income countries.  The 
objective is to obtain as much data as possible for as many countries as possible 
focusing on the following large CO2 emitting LMI countries.  Details on the data 
collection for this research follow in the next section.   
 
The HCCTAD contains annual data on technology measures for high-income 
countries with some of the data going back to the 18th century.  Given that reliable 
data for low- and middle income countries is usually not available for series starting 
before 1970, the data range is limited for the period 1970 to 2005 for all countries for 
which data I can obtain.  Data sources included the U.S. Dept. of Energy, the 







Freight traffic on railways (TKMs) per unit of real GDP 
Transportation (rail, road-, and airways) 
Passenger traffic on railways (PKMs) per capita 
Trucks per unit of GDP 
Passenger cars per capita 
Aviation cargo (TKMs) per unit of real GDP 
Aviation passengers (PKMs) per capita 
MWhr of electricity produced per unit of real GDP 
Electricity 
  
Other technology measures in the HCCTAD 
Textiles, e.g., Fraction of spindles that are mule spindles 
Steel e.g., Fraction of tonnage of steel produced using Electric Arc furnaces 
Telecommunication, e.g., Mobile phones per capita 
Information Technology, e.g., Personal computers per capita 
 
Table 3-1: Technologies covered in the Historical Cross-Country Technology 
Adoption Dataset.  
Adapted from HCCTAD (Comin and Hobijn, 2003).  
 
3.2. 
In their paper on technological diffusion and convergence Comin and Hobijn (2004) 
estimate cross-sectional coefficients of variation
Descriptive Statistic from Technological Convergence Assessment 
1
                                                 
1 The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation of a variable divided by its mean. 
 to show the differences in adoption 
rates for various technology groups.  The coefficient of variation is useful for this 
purpose since it measures the variability of in the data series independently of the unit 




below, reproduced from Comin and Hobijn’s original work (2004), shows cross-
sectional coefficients of variation for the information technology, transportation, and 
electricity technology groups.  By evaluating the time series of the coefficient of 
cross-section variation of technology adoption, a pattern of technological 
convergence can be seen.  As the coefficients of variation decrease over time, this 
indicates that variability in the technology measures (which again are a proxy for 
technology adoption) decrease, leading to convergence. There is also an indication of 
a technology “catch up” phenomenon for most of the technologies that are in the 
innovation, growth, and maturity phases.  This can more easily be seen in the more 
globalized technologies, especially in shipping and cars as manufacturing 
technologies and performance through competition and spillovers become more 
standardized across many countries.   
 
The second test for converge carried out by Comin and Hobijn (2004) is on Beta 
convergence of technology adoption which is drawn from the literature on economic 
convergence studies as mentioned above.   The standard regression equation 
employed by the authors is: 
 
Yijt = α + β Yijt-1 + eijt  
 
Where, Yijt is the measure of technology adoption for the jth technology in country i 
at time t, and is measured in logs whenever the variable is not a share. The measures 
of technology adoption are those defined in Table 3-1. According to the authors, the 





Table 3-2 presents selected results from the Comin and Hobijn (2004) paper on 
estimates of β convergence. 
 
The first column is an estimate across all technology groups over the all the time 
periods.  The second and third rows include estimates for samples before and after 
1945 by the indicated technology groups.  Comin and Hobijn point out two important 
findings: First, they notice that the speed of convergence indicated by their estimates 
is quite high with an average speed of convergence just over 11 percent for most of 
the 20th Century. Second, they find an acceleration of the speed of convergence both 
on average (increased from 10 to 14 percent) and within technology groups. 
 








    





















Table 3-2: Estimates of βs and the speed of convergence. 
In percent, for selected technologies. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Speed of 
convergence is calculated as –ln(β). Source: Comin and Hobijn (2004). 
 
The key findings from the Comin and Hobijn paper are mainly three: (1) They 
observe common patterns in the diffusion of a broad range of technologies across 
many countries. (2) They suggest a pattern of what they term “trickle-down” 
diffusion that is robust across technologies. They find that most of the technologies 




down to relatively less advanced countries.  And (3) they find that the overall rate of 
technology diffusion has increased over time, especially in the post -WWII era.    
 
3.3. 
My contribution in this research is to build on the above described work by Comin 
and Hobijn on technological convergence testing by expanding the set of technologies 
evaluated, particularly in the energy sector, that is, in electric energy generation and 
petroleum refining and consumption. See Table 3-3 for the list of energy sector 
categories.  I selected this list of technologies because of their direct association to the 
energy part of the economy and close relationship to improving energy intensity and 
climate mitigation, e.g., renewable power generation.  In addition to expanding the set 
of technologies, I also broadened the coverage of countries in the assessment of 
technological convergence  –particular to energy technologies– by including 29 high 
income countries and 83 middle and low income countries (total of 112).  
Testing Technological Convergence in Energy Production 
 
Since the analysis on convergence is over a 36 year time period (1971 to 2007) and 
among various country income levels, I needed to select an income definition at the 
start of the data series given that countries normally advance between the 
classifications.  The country income classifications used are as of 1971 according to 
the World Bank.  Earlier country classifications were "developing" vs. "industrial" 
countries but that was changed in 1989 to more quantitative classification of income 
per capita or gross national income (GNI), converted to U.S. dollars using the World 




the middle-income and high-income countries were set at $6,000 per capita in 1987 
prices.  Currently, economies are classified by their 2011 GNI per capita: low income, 
$1,025 or less; lower middle income, $1,026 - $4,035; upper middle income, $4,036 - 
$12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more (World Bank, 2012).  
 
Table 3-4 lists the countries included in this analysis.  I started the countries selection 
process with 144 countries for which there was data for both the energy sets and 
GDP.  Due to some gaps in energy data for middle and low income countries, mainly 
in Africa and Asia, and also due to change in country composition, mainly after the 
fall of communism, my resulting country data set contained 112 countries.   There 
was some special data manipulation required to construct consistent data series for 
some countries whose regional make up changed over the analysis period from 1971 
to 2007, e.g., Former Yugoslavia and the Czech Republic.  
 
There are several reasons to the World Bank definition or cleavage of countries for 
the analysis of technology convergence in this section and for the subsequent 
modeling of long-term mitigation targets in Section 4.  First, as discussed above, 
studies of technology change evaluate the dynamics of technology diffusion along 
this or similar country groupings based on per capita income and show that diffusion 
of technologies from high-income to lower-income countries account for an important 
part of international technology change (see Grubler et al, 1999 and Keller, 2004). 
Second, these same country and income groupings are the traditional basis for 




3.1 and the more recent GHG-intensity convergence literature (see Stegman and 
McKibbin, 2005 and Aldy, 2006).  Third, most of the models used in analyzing long-
term energy policy and climate mitigation targets also group countries by income per 
capita, as illustrated above in the MERGE example in Section 2.1.  This approach is 
also consistent with the climate policy consideration under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change with the definition of Annex I and non-
Annex I countries primarily done along income per capita considerations (UNFCCC, 
2014).  Last, is the importance of consistency.  The objective of conducting research 
of technology convergence is to determine if we learn something from that 
assessment that is useful for modeling forward projections in climate mitigation 
analyses. Without having the similar country groups it would be difficult to 
accomplish this task. 
 
The country specific energy data on energy production for electric energy generation 
and petroleum refining and consumption is from the International Energy Agency, 
specifically the Energy Balances of non-OECD Countries (IEA, 2010a) and Energy 
Balances of OECD Countries (IEA, 2010b).  These two reports provide data on the 
supply and consumption of coal, oil, gas, electricity, heat, renewables and waste as 
energy balances.  Electricity data is expressed in terms of Kilo Watt Hour (KWh) 
which is a unit of energy equivalent to one kilowatt (1 kW) of power expended for 
one hour (1 h) of time.  Oil related energy balance data is expressed in terms of kilo 
tons of oil equivalent (KTOE).  Both electricity and oil data are reported from 1971 to 






MWhr of electricity produced per unit of real GDP per year 
 MWhr of electricity produced by coal units 
 MWhr of electricity produced by natural gas units 
 MWhr of electricity produced by biomass and waste renewables  
 MWhr of electricity produced by wind and solar renewables 
 
Petroleum refining / fuels 
Kiloton of Oil Equivalent (KTOE) per unit of real GDP per year 
  KTOE of petroleum for Transportation 
  KTOE of petroleum for Oil Refining (excluding transportation uses) 
  KTOE of petroleum for Chemical and Petrochemical  production 
Table 3-3: Technologies added to evaluate energy and climate mitigation 
technology convergence.  
 
3.4. 
Electricity is expressed in megawatt hours and measured as gross electricity 
production, which in turn is measured at the terminals of all alternator sets in a power 
plant.  This gross estimation includes the energy taken by station auxiliaries and 
losses in transformers that are parts of the station.  According to IEA, parasitic loads 
(i.e., difference between gross and net production) range from 7% for conventional 
thermal stations, 6% for solar stations, and to 1% for hydro stations.  
Energy Related Output Data 
 
Electricity produced by coal units is via the combustion of coal to produce steam, also 
known as thermal coal, where the fossil fuel is burned in a boiler to heat water and 




produced by natural gas alternatively has more options.  Similar to coal, the most 
basic natural gas-fired electric generation is also via a steam generation unit. Natural 
gas also can be used in gas turbines and combustion engines where hot gases from 
burning the gas are used to turn the turbines.  Lastly, and more recently, natural gas 
power plants have been developed as combined-cycle units where there is both a gas 
turbine and a steam unit in the same plant.  In these combined-cycle plants, the 
exhaust heat from the turbine process also is used to improve the steam generation 
and hence achieve higher efficiencies.   
 
Wind energy represents the kinetic energy of wind used for electricity generation. 
Solar energy is the solar radiation used for electricity generation by flat plate 
collectors, mainly of the thermosyphon type. Passive solar energy for the direct 
heating, cooling and lighting of dwellings or other buildings (also considered as 
distributed generation) is not included. 
 
Turning to the second energy category, petroleum, it is expressed as gross energy 
consumption per year in units of kilotons of oil equivalent (KTOE), which is defined 
as the amount of energy released by burning one ton of crude oil.  Three categories of 
petroleum balances were selected due to the high number of country commonality: 
Transportation, Oil Refining (excluding transportation uses), and Chemical and 
Petrochemical production.  According to IEA (2010), transportation includes all fuels 
used for transport in industry and covers domestic aviation, road, rail, pipeline 




marine bunkers and international aviation bunkers.  Oil Refining includes the use of 
primary energy for the manufacture of finished oil products and the corresponding 
output; as a result the total estimates include transformation losses. 
 
The last petroleum category, Chemical and Petrochemical industry, is quite broad.  It 
excludes petrochemical feedstocks but includes the manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products, defined as the transformation of organic and inorganic raw 
materials by a chemical  process, and the formation of products. It also includes the 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals and the manufacture of biological and medicinal 
products. 
 
The representation of technologies via the aggregate metric for electricity generation 
of MWhr of electricity produced per unit of real GDP per year (further broken down 
by primarily energy types) and for petroleum refining of KTOE per unit of real GDP 
per year (further broken down by fuel end-use) is an aggregate approach but suitable 
for the assessment of technology convergence for the purposes of this dissertation.   
The principal reasons for the appropriateness of these metrics are the following:  
First, it is important that the data set evaluated covers both high-income and lower-
income countries in a consistent manner.  It is possible to find data on specific 
technologies, e.g., automobiles, passenger aircraft, and also on sector technologies, 
e.g., coal power generation, but the data coverage is incomplete and limited in terms 
of numbers of countries.   Second, the data needs to cover the most relevant sectors of 




collected in the previous convergence studies.  Third, this level of aggregation 
sufficiently captures the key technologies per sector, for example, coal or natural gas 
power generation in the electric sector.  These technologies can be further broken 
down by more specific types and fuels however the data for that categorization is not 
collected consistently across countries and over time which would strictly limit the 
available data.  The final reason for the use of these aggregate metrics is a practical 
one on two counts: (1) the data used needs to be easily obtainable for researchers and 
reliable; the data from the IEA meets all of the above criteria; and (2) the data used in 
climate economic models to set the models up and in reporting results is similarly 
aggregated and hence also fully consistent with these aggregate metric on technology 





Economic Output Data 
Country specific economic data, for the countries in Table 5, is gross domestic 
product (GDP) at constant prices which refers to the volume level of GDP where the 
constant price estimates are in terms of a base period which is 2005 and indexed to 
U.S. dollars (USD).  The data source is the United Nations Statistical Division (UN, 
2010).  According to the UN report, the price and quantity components of a value are 
identified and the price in the base period is substituted for that in the current period. 
Two main approaches are used in developing the data: First, the "quantity 
revaluation", is based estimated by multiplying the current period quantity by the base 




observed values to obtain volume estimates. The resulting price indexes are 






The first examination for convergence across the newly added, more detailed energy 
sector and related climate mitigation technologies is calculating the cross-sectional 
coefficients of variation.  This was done over the 112 countries in the dataset for the 
four electricity generation types, i.e., coal, natural gas, biomass and waste renewables, 
and wind and solar renewables; and for the three petroleum types, i.e., petroleum for 
transportation, petroleum for oil refining, and petroleum for chemical and 
petrochemical production.  
First Test of Technological Convergence: Cross-sectional Coefficients of 
Variation  
 
The coefficient of variation for each of the technology types is defined as the standard 
deviation of a variable divided by its mean over the country dataset. In this analysis, 
the data are the respective measures of technology represented by intensity measures: 
(1) MWhr of electricity produced per unit of real GDP per year, and (2) KTOE per 





High Income (29)   Middle and Low Income (83) 
Australia Albania Guatemala Philippines 
Austria Algeria Haiti Qatar 
Belgium Angola Honduras Romania 
Canada Argentina India Saudi Arabia 
Cyprus Bahrain Indonesia Senegal 
Czech Republic Bangladesh Iran Slovakia 
Denmark Benin Iraq South Africa 
Finland Bolivia Jamaica Sri Lanka 
France Brazil Jordan Sudan 
Germany Brunei Darussalam Kenya Syria 
Greece Bulgaria Korea Tanzania 
Hungary Cameroon Korea, DPR Thailand 
Iceland Chile Kuwait Togo 
Ireland China Lebanon Trinidad & Tobago 
Israel Colombia Libya Tunisia 
Italy Congo Malaysia Turkey 
Japan Congo Malta UAE  
Luxembourg Costa Rica Mexico Uruguay 
Netherlands Cote d'Ivoire Morocco Venezuela 
New Zealand Cuba Mozambique Vietnam 
Norway Dominican Republic Myanmar Yemen 
Poland Ecuador Nepal Zambia 
Portugal Egypt Nicaragua Zimbabwe 
Singapore El Salvador Nigeria   
Spain Ethiopia Oman   
Sweden Former USSR Pakistan   
Switzerland Former Yugoslavia Panama   
United Kingdom Gabon Paraguay   
United States Ghana Peru   
Total 112 countries 







Figure 3-1: Electric Power Generation Convergence – All generation. 
 
The results of the calculated time-varying coefficients of variation for the selected 
technology measures are presented in Figures 3-1to 3-10.  Figure 3-1 shows the 
coefficients of variation for aggregate electricity generation technologies.  In 
comparison to the earlier Comin and Hobijn (2004) research two key observations are 
made.  First, the level of convergence is similar in the later period of analyses, 
starting in 2000 with my coefficient estimate of 0.7 to Comin and Hobijn’s estimate 
of 0.6, indicating more converge of the combined electricity generation which is 
consistent with maturity phase of electricity production as a key input into overall 
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divergence in convergence in my data set between 1971 and 1990.  This can be 
attributed to the much broader range of country incomes and more countries in my 
dataset.  This is an indication of the growing share of electric energy as an input to 
economic production or electrification across countries evaluated.   
 
The above measure of all electric generation is the one measure that is the same as the 
original Comin and Hobijn (2004) research, albeit over a smaller and different 
country-income range.  A key objective of this research is to evaluate more specific 
technological convergence in energy and climate mitigation technologies which can 
be seen in the following figures by focusing on the convergence of particular 
electricity generating technologies.  
 
Coal generation convergence is illustrated in Figure 3-2.  For this technology, which 
has the broadest and longest data coverage across the countries in the dataset and the 
longest, continued use for electricity generation, the degree of convergence has 
remained relatively stable.  This is surprising since I expected a traditional example of 
technological convergence for a mature technology, that is, with the coefficient of 
variation approaching zero.  Given the available data I can only offer a suggestion as 
to why this is the case. Within the broad category of fossil coal combustion for power 
generation, there are variations in the types of power plants technologies, e.g., from 
sub-critical pulverized coal, to supercritical pulverized coal, to ultra-supercritical 
pulverized coal, which have different heart-rate efficiencies and costs. These 




high-income and low- & middle-income countries so that, in a broad, aggregate 
measure, i.e., coal, a divergence persists and absolute converge is not observed over 
time.   A more detailed dataset with further breakdown of coal unit technologies 
could help illuminate these dynamics but I have not found a sufficiently consistent 
and robust enough set of data to conduct that analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Electric Power Generation Convergence – Coal.  
 
Evaluating the convergence of biomass and waste renewables in Figure 3-2 shows a 
greater degree of convergence than in the coal measure over time but still exhibiting a 
degree of divergence persisting at the end of the time period evaluated.  Biomass and 
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advantage of cheap and available waste material and not necessarily for the purpose 
of reducing carbon dioxide emissions and climate change concerns. In this context, 
electricity generated from biomass and waste can be considered a more mature 
technology than newer renewable technologies that have been developed with GHG 
mitigation in mind, i.e., solar and wind power renewables.  
 
 
Figure 3-3: Electric Power Generation Convergence – Bio-waste.  
 
The convergence in the use of natural gas for electric power generation, as shown in 
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although with a more pronounced and smooth trend toward convergence.  Here too, 
however, there is not an absolute convergence closer to a zero coefficient of variation. 
 
Turning to more traditional forms of renewable power, we can see convergence rates 
for wind and solar power electricity generation in Figure 3-5 (notice that the scale is 
changed).   Here a clear and distinct pattern of convergence can be seen in the 
coefficient of variation, starting at about 7.5, continuing sharply down to just over 1.5 
at the end of the period with a noticeable disruption in around 1990.   This observed 
dynamic in wind and solar power electricity generation shows a pronounced catch-up 
effect expected of newer technologies.  At the same time, there has not been total 
convergence, which is also expected given the rapid pace of technology development 






Figure 3-4: Electric Power Generation Convergence – Natural Gas.  
 
 
Lastly, Figure 3-6, puts the converge rates of all of the electricity generation measure 
on one chart for easier comparison.  Here the very different range and rate of 
convergence of the newer, renewables technologies of wind and solar are even more 
distinct.  In addition, the patterns of convergence between the different technologies 
make sense in that the older, more dominant technology, coal, has the least amount of 
convergence or catch up given that it is more widely established than the others.  This 
is then followed by slightly higher degree of converge with both the gas and biomass 
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renewables of wind and solar shows the greatest convergence across the electricity 
generation measures evaluated.    
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Figure 3-7: Petroleum Convergence – All.  
 
The second set of estimates, based on the 112 countries in the dataset, is on the three 
petroleum types, i.e., transportation, oil refining, and chemical & petrochemical 
production, which provide an assessment on technological convergence and energy 
intensity related to another key energy sector.  For these convergence estimates the 
country data used is in terms of KTOE per unit of real GDP per year.  The original 
research by Comin and Hobijn (2004) does not include any analysis of the 
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The first petroleum convergence assessment is that for transportation, Figure 3-7, 
which in this context means petroleum used for all domestic transportation.  The 
refining of petroleum into various transportation fuels, e.g., gasoline, diesel, can be 
considered a stable and established technology, especially over the time period 
analyzed (1970 to 2007).  It is somewhat surprising that there is not a higher degree 
of convergence toward the end of the time series or the coefficient of variation getting 
closer to zero.  This is a further example where a technology has reached a  decline 
phase in terms of technological progress and where the catch up effect or 
convergence is not observed.  At the same time, the coefficient values start small and 
remain stable throughout.  This may be a similar situation as the electric coal 
generation analysis above in that a more detailed technological assessment may show 






Figure 3-8: Petroleum Convergence – Oil.  
 
The convergence rate for the oil refining sector is illustrated in Figure 3-8. This 
energy measure includes the use of petroleum, as primary energy, for the manufacture 
of finished oil products and the corresponding output.  This trajectory shows a 
decadal catch up period during the 1970s which is then followed by a similar stable 
path out to 2007.  This different occurrence of convergence is worth further 
exploration to determine the driving forces of that short period of convergence.  
Starting around 1980, the technology on oil refining shows the similar decline phase 
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Figure 3-9: Petroleum Convergence – Chemicals and Petrochemical. 
 
In the assessment of the convergence rate for last petroleum category, Chemical and 
Petrochemical industry, a very different dynamic is seen, one that is unique to all the 
technology measures evaluated in this research.  After the 1970s, where stability was 
experienced, Figure 3-9 shows almost two decades of technological divergence in the 
chemical and petrochemical industry.  The first observation to make is that similar to 
the transportation sector, a lack of technological convergence here is an indication 
that, in aggregate, this sector has reached its technological decline phase.  The second 
observation is that given the broad number of sub-sectors included in this measure, 
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also the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, there may be other dynamics pushing the 
divergence across the countries evaluated.  One that comes to mind is the impact of 
international trade where the associated chemical and petrochemical industries can 
move to low-& middle-income countries and import the needed petroleum 
feedstocks.  Comin and Hobijn (2004) point to international trade as a possible 
explanation in the similar lack of convergence observed in the dataset for the global 
textiles industry.  A comparison of the various petroleum related convergence rates in 
shown in Figure 3-10.  
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Second Test of Technological: Beta convergence 
Following on the original Comin and Hobijn (2004) research, I also conducted a 
second test for converge or Beta (β) convergence of technology adoption.  In the 
economic growth literature, β  convergence is defined as a negative relationship 
between the growth rate of a variable of interest in a future time period and the initial 
time period from the countries analyzed (Barro and Salai-i-Martin, 1992).  The 
standard regression equation drawn from the literature on economic convergence and 
used here is: 
Yijt = α + β Yijt-1 + eijt  
 
Where, Yijt is the measure of technology adoption for the jth technology in country i 
at time t, and is measured in logs whenever the variable is not a share.  The key 
estimated variable is β which can be use to estimate the speed of convergence given 
by -ln(β).   Table 3-5 provides the regression results on evaluating the 8 technology 
measures across the dataset of 112 countries.   
 
From these measures of convergence or the pace of convergence a few key 
observations can be made.  First, it is important to remember than these estimates are 
developed by comparing two periods of time, in this case 1971 and 2007.   Second, it 







Table 3-5: New Estimates of β Convergence.  
Estimates of βs and the speed of convergence, in percent, for selected technologies 
 
This can be seen where the speed of convergence for the All Electricity measure is 34 
percent whereas it can range from a very high estimate of 84 percent for coal 
electricity to mid to high teens for gas and bio-waste electricity. The speed of 
convergence for wind-solar electricity is also estimated to a high value of 57 percent 
but the very low R2 value indicates that this is the least robust measure of the set.  The 
results are consistent with expectations in that: (a) the more widely used coal 
electricity generation technology has a high speed of convergence, that is, the similar 
technology (as defined above) is utilized across the country dataset; and (b) the newer 
and more divergent technologies, mainly gas and bio-waste electricity have a slower 
pace of convergence.  
 














































Turning to the petroleum measures of convergence, similar observations can be made. 
The speed of convergence estimated for transportation oil is highest at 54 percent, 
again given that it is a   widespread technology utilized across many countries. 
Similarly, the two other petroleum-related technology measures, refineries and 
chemicals, with speed of convergence estimates of 8 and 27 percent, respectively, are 
more widespread across the country dataset.      
 
In the evaluation of both technology measure sets, electricity generation and 
petroleum, it is clear that there are appreciable and measurable differences in the rate 
of adoption of technologies across and between high income and low- & middle 




From the original work of Comin and Hobijn (2004) paper, based on their 
convergence analysis of mainly OECD high-income countries, they highlighted three 
main conclusions:  
Observations on Convergence Testing  
1) They observe common patterns in the diffusion of a broad range of technologies 
across many countries;  
2) They suggest a pattern of what they term “trickle-down” diffusion that is robust 
across technologies. They found that most of the technologies evaluated in their 
study originated in the more advanced countries and then trickle down to 




3) They find that the overall rate of technology diffusion has increased over time, 
especially in the post -WWII era.    
 
My contribution to the analysis of technological convergence, with a link to 
technology diffusion, is to: (a) add more detailed energy sector and related climate 
mitigation technologies for the four electricity generation types, i.e., coal, natural gas, 
biomass and waste renewables, and wind and solar renewables; and for the three 
petroleum types, i.e., petroleum for transportation, petroleum for oil refining, and 
petroleum for chemical and petrochemical production; and (b) expand the analysis to 
112 countries covering 29 high-income countries and 83 middle-& low-income 
countries.  
 
The main conclusions I draw from this analysis are the following: 
• Similar to Comin and Hobijn (2004) I find an observed pattern of technological 
convergence between high-income countries and middle-& low-income countries 
for the technology measures evaluated; however;  
• For the one similar measure between the Comin and Hobijn (2004) paper and this 
analysis, aggregated electricity generation technologies, convergence is faster 
between high-income countries and middle-& low-income countries (this 
analysis) than that observed between OECD countries;  
• The rate of convergence differs based on how the technology measure in 
aggregated, e.g., all electricity generation show a different patterns than coal 




solar renewable electricity, a newer technology;   
• This is the same for oil refining, however, transportation and chemical production 
show very distinct patterns;  
• Established technologies that have a broad utilization across most countries, like 
coal electricity, exhibit a degree of convergence that has remained relatively 
stable;    
• Newer technologies (wind and solar) exhibit much faster convergence rates than 
stable technologies;   
• For all of the technologies evaluated, there was not one technology that showed 
full technological convergence, that is with the coefficient of variation 
approaching zero, which I think this is a particular aspect of energy technologies; 
and finally  
• For the one sector that is most related to international trade, for chemical and 
petrochemical production, there is an observed period of technological divergence 
in the country dataset.  
 
The implications of the research up to this point, particularly for the next section on 
modeling different rates of technology, are mainly three: First, details within 
technology groups matter; the more detail the better for specifying convergence rates 
of technologies.  Second, newer technologies have faster convergence than older 
more established technologies. Finally, the assumption of total, full convergence of 
technologies, at least for energy sector and climate mitigation-related technologies is 







Additional Technology Evaluation Measures  
In addition to the new research on technology convergence completed in the previous 
section, a couple of different measure or metrics for evaluating and comparing  
technology performance between countries of different income groups, particularly in 
electric power generation, is provided in this section.  Including these additional 
technology performance comparisons, on electric power fossil efficiencies and 
renewable capacity installment, have the same objective as the technology 
convergence analysis, that is, to see if historical rates at which technology diffuses 
between countries can help inform and improve new climate economic modeling 
projections.    
 
Using data from the International Energy Agency from two recent publications 
(Klaassen, 2011; Taylor,2008) allows for a historical comparison of electric power 
coal-fired efficiencies across a range of countries, both in the High-Income group, 
e.g., Japan, Germany, the UK, and USA, and in the Lower-Income group, e.g., China, 
India, and South Africa.     
 
Data on fuel inputs to public electricity and CHP plants and electricity and heat 
outputs from these plants are taken from IEA statistics for both the OECD and non-
OECD countries.  It is important to note that the IEA data used in the efficiency 
calculations covers the following (Taylor, 2008):  Energy inputs for combined heat 




energy outputs are defined as the gross production of electricity and heat.  In addition 
and for consistency the particular approach used to calculate electric power 
efficiencies is as follows:   
   E = (P + H x s) / I 
Where: 
E = energy efficiency of electricity production 
P = electricity production from CHP and electricity plants; 
H = useful heat output from public CHP plants; 
s = correction factor between heat and electricity, which is defined as 
the reduction in electricity production per unit of heat extracted; 
I = fuel input for public electricity plants and public CHP plants 
 
Both studies find that average global efficiencies for coal-fired electricity in more 
recent years is just under 35%, for natural gas-fired electricity it is just under 40%, 
and for oil-fired electricity it is about 37%.   Figure 3-11 below highlights efficiency 
levels from a few countries from both income groups, showing patterns over time for 
coal-fired electricity.  This data show that coal efficiencies in the lower-income 
countries are lower than those in the high-income countries, generally, and that the 
gap between the two, persist over time.  South Africa and South Korea are exceptions 
with the former’s deployment of high-efficiency units in the early 1980s and the 
latter’s in the early 2000s.  With the exception of India, efficiency levels have 







Figure 3-11: Efficiency of coal-fired power generation.   
Data sources: Klaassen, 2011; Taylor,2008 
 
 
Using the same approach to calculate electric power fossil efficiencies Maruyama & 
Eckelman (2009) covered coal- and gas-fired generation and also grouped countries 
by the OECD and non-OECD classifications.  This study provides a good comparison 
to the High-Income and Lower-Income classifications used in the convergence 
analysis above and also for the climate mitigation modeling in the subsequent section.  
Summaries of Maruyama & Eckelman (2009) assessment on efficiencies are provided 
in figures 3-12 to 3-14.  Coal-fired efficiencies show the same pattern as in Fig 3-11 
above and also show the persistent gap between non-OECD and OECD groups over a 
30-yr plus period.  In addition, the performance of the non-OCED coal plants by the 







1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005















OECD plants at the beginning of the time period (1973).   There are exceptions, of 
course, as noted above by the example South Africa but the general pattern is clear: 
there is at least a 30-year gap in performance between the OECD (High-Income) 
group and the non-OECD (Lower-Income) group of countries and has even widened 
somewhat in the 2000s.  
 
Efficiency of coal-fired power generation 
 
Figure 3-12: Coal electric power efficiencies.  
Source Maruyama & Eckelman (2009). 
 
 
Evaluating natural gas-fired electric efficiencies in Figure 3-13 below shows similar 
patterns to coal efficiencies over the 30-year period but some closure of the gap 
between OECD and non-OECD groups starting the 1990s.  Efficiencies in both 
groups continue to improve and at a faster pace than coal efficiencies.  The same key 








Efficiency of gas-fired power generation 
 
Figure 3-13: Natural gas electric power efficiencies.  
Source Maruyama & Eckelman (2009). 
 
 
A further electric sector measure or metrics that can help in evaluating and comparing 
technology performance between countries of different income groups is renewable 
power.  More specifically, the data below compare the amount of installed renewable 
capacity for wind power and solar & tidal wave power, respectively, to total non-
hydro renewable power.  The other renewable power technologies included in non-
hydro power include geothermal and biomass & waste renewables.  Given that solar 




times, consistent global data only spans 2005 to 2011.  The data is from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2014b).  Comparing wind power and solar & tidal 
wave power to total non-hydro renewable power allows for a more detailed 
appreciation of the diffusion these newer technologies. Hydro power has remained 
relatively stable over the time period evaluated so there is not much of an advantage 
in including it.  And including all power generation technologies swamps over the 
contribution of wind and solar & tidal wave power thereby making the regional 
comparison more difficult.  As a result these comparisons provide more of a current 
snapshot versus the longer-term trends assessed above for electric power efficiencies.  
 
Figure 3-14 provides the first comparison for wind power and shows three distinct 
groupings.  At the lower end are the Central and South America countries where wind 
power capacity share does not raise above 15% by the end of the period. The second 
grouping is the African continent which starts at 25% in 2005 and over the next six 
years achieves a level higher than Europe and close to the World level of 60%.  This 
increase in Africa is lead by the countries of Nigeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco 
where wind is the only non-hydro renewable power technology.  The third and 
highest percentage groups are North America, where wind is over 70% of non-hydro 
renewables in both the U.S. and Canada by 2011, and Asia & Oceania, where China 
and India reach 85% and 80%, respectively, by 2011.   Using this metric, wind power 
as percentage of total non-hydo renewables, provides a different assessment for the 
potential for technology diffusion with at least two principal lower-income countries, 




income regions of Europe and the U.S.  Again, this should be considered a short-term 
comparison of technology diffusion but still instructive in the ability of lower-income 
countries to deploy newer technologies.  
 
 
Figure 3-14: Wind Capacity as percentage of total non-hydro renewables.  
Source: EIA, 2014b. 
 
 
The assessment of solar and tidal wave power capacity however tells a different and 
somewhat distorted story.  Solar power renewable technologies have not penetrated 
the global electricity sector as well as wind power in most regions, including Central 
and South America, Africa, and even North America.  Asia and Oceania’s share of 
solar and tidal wave power reaches just under 10% by 2011 with the majority of 
installed capacity occurring in China, Australia, and then India.  The distortion is 
caused by Germany given that by 2011 it had installed more solar power (25 
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power capacity.  These relationships and the high increase in Europe’s (mostly 
Germany) share are illustrated in Figure 3-15 show solar and tidal renewables as 
share of non-hydro renewable power.  
 
 
Figure 3-15: Solar & Tidal Capacity as percentage of total non-hydro 
renewables.  
Source: EIA, 2014b. 
 
 
Comparing wind and solar renewable power capacity of different regions (that also 
have different income classifications) shows that there are examples of the 
deployment of newer technologies where lower-income regions (Asia) are not 
necessarily different, and may even be faster, than higher-income regions (North 
America in the solar case).  The principal point remains that deployment of newer 
technologies or technology diffusion lags in the lower-income relative to high-income 
regions as exemplified by the performance of the regions of Central and South 
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newer technologies on par with high-income countries (e.g., Thailand and South 
Africa) in the fossil electric efficiencies and Asia in renewable power capacity 
installments, these additional assessments of technology performance are consistent 


















4. Modeling Different Rates of Technological Diffusion 
Between High-Income and Low- and Middle-Income 
countries 
 
This section will cover new climate economic modeling to test the impact of different 
rates of technology diffusion in energy-sector related, climate mitigation technologies 
and compare them to other key assumptions included in modeling analyses.    
The model utilized for this part of the dissertation analysis is the Global Change 
Assessment Model (GCAM) which was developed and is maintained at the Joint 
Global Change Research Institute at the University of Maryland (JGCRI, 2013).   The 
main reasons I selected to use the GCAM model apart from other climate economic 
models is because of the geographic disaggregation and detailed technology 
representation that allowed me to specify different rates of technological diffusion 
between high-income countries and low- and medium-income countries.  
I provide a summary description of GCAM here to better explain the scenario set up 
and relationships.   
4.1. 
GCAM is in a class of economic models commonly referred to as climate economic 
models when used to evaluate energy, climate mitigation, or technology policies. 
GCAM can also be considered a highly aggregated integrated assessment model for 
the purposes of analyzing boarder issues related to climate change such as agriculture 
and landuse changes, multiple greenhouse gas, aerosols, and other substances that 





effect global warming, and atmospheric composition leading to global-mean climate 
changes. For the purposes of this analysis, I focus on evaluating the impact on CO2 
emissions from changes to economic, population, and technology assumption.  The 
model divides the globe into 14 geographic regions and is configured and run as a 
partial equilibrium model that balances the demand for energy and with the supply of 
energy from principal commodities or sources of oil, gas, coal, uranium, and 
renewable sources.  The model runs in 15-year time steps from 1990 to 2095.  
Technologies are represented in the model in the transformation of energy, e.g., 
electric power generation from coal, and in the use of energy, e.g., gasoline in light-
duty vehicles for passenger transportation.    
 
One of the principle reason I selected GCAM for the climate mitigation modeling 
work in this dissertation is because it has a sufficient level of regional disaggregation 
in that it breaks up the globe into 14 different geographic regions which are listed in 
Table 7.  Even with this level of detail the model’s aggregation is still considerable 
when in come to countries’ populations, land areas, and energy use as exemplified by 
the regions of Africa, Latin America, Western Europe and Easter Europe.  Modeling 
the whole world in a climate economic or energy model necessities this type of 
aggregation for the purposes of computational tractability, a degree of model and data 
management, and ultimately an ability to understand and make use of model outputs.  
 
For the purpose of the analysis on different rates of technology diffusion I needed to 




corresponding as closely as possible to the groups evaluated in Section 2.  There are 
various approaches to grouping countries for the purpose of climate mitigation 
analysis depending on the issues or questions evaluated.  The first consideration was 
along the lines of country or region income level where the “high income” countries 
were included, that is, United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia & New 
Zealand, and Japan.  Two regions that are just below that income level but were 
included in the High Income group are Eastern Europe and South Korea due to 
technology, geopolitical, and climate policy similarities.  These seven countries and 
regions comprise the full High Income group in Table 4-1 below.   The remaining 
seven countries and regions make up the Middle and Low Income group.  These 
classifications are not perfect as there are countries in specific regions that enjoy 
higher income than others in their assigned region, e.g., Mexico which is a member of 
the OECD is in the Latin America region; and there are also countries exhibiting 
relatively greater technological advancement than others in their regions, e.g., the 
Baltics in the FSU.   
 
 
High Income Middle and Low Income 
1. United States 8. China/Asia Reforming 
2. Canada 9. India 
3. Western Europe  10. Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
4. Eastern Europe  11. Middle East 
5. Australia & New Zealand 12. Latin America 
6. Japan 13. Africa 
7. South Korea 14. (rest of) S&E Asia 







In addition to testing the implications of different rates of technology diffusion, I run 
various other scenarios to test changes in a few other input assumptions key to 
climate economic modeling analysis.   As the rates of technology diffusion are 
specified exogenously, the other key parameters selected also are specified 
exogenously, these are: the rate of population growth; the rate of economic growth; 
and the rate of economic convergence between high-income and middle- & low-
income countries.  Each one of these changes produces a separate baseline scenario 
defined as a case where there is no specified CO2 policy, or no-mitigation case.  Each 
scenario provides an indication of what global CO2 emissions may be in the absence 
of concern over the potential for global warming and the ensuing climate change 
impacts.  
Description of the research scenarios 
 
Against each of these baseline scenarios a policy case is applied starting in 2015 that 
specifies a global CO2 concentration stabilization level of about 420 ppm by 2100.  
The CO2 policy is a global constraint that allows countries (or regions of countries as 
aggregated in the model) to reduce emissions across their energy sectors that produce 
CO2 emissions at a level that is consistent with a global carbon price, that is, the 
model applies an equalized  marginal carbon price across all regions.  There are 
various policy approaches to implementing a mitigation policy in climate economic 
models from a cap-and-trade approach with either a global target that apportions 
mitigation costs on specified some economic rational (Fisher, et al, 2007) or a 




mitigation level (Blanford, et al, 2014).  The economic policy levers are also diverse 
in that one could apply costs to GHG emissions, e.g., a carbon tax, at various levels or 
use subsidies to incentivize clean energy investments in non- and low-CO2 emission 
technologies, e.g., a production tax credit for renewable power.  For the analysis in 
this study, applying an equalized, global CO2 marginal cost is straightforward and 
allows a focus on the main question evaluated in this dissertation which is the 
importance of assumptions on technological diffusion.  
 
Below I provide a more detailed description of the model and the changes made to the 
model structure to execute the scenario run.  The scenarios modeled for this 
dissertation consist of two main sets.  The first set of scenarios use the standard model 
assumptions of technology diffusion where the other key identified exogenous 
parameters are modified.  The first four scenarios yield both a corresponding baseline 
and climate mitigation case:  
 
1.a. Reference (no policy) case.   
This includes the model’s standard inputs and assumptions on global 
population growth, economic growth, economic convergence, as well as the 
model initial inputs on energy prices, technology costs, and initial conditions 
on the structure of each regions energy infrastructure and system.  With all 
these initial standard inputs and assumptions the model is then run forward, in 
this case to 2095, to produce a Reference case where there is no specified CO2 





1.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from Reference.  
 
Once the Reference case is generated, a policy case is applied starting in 2015 
that specifies a global CO2 stabilization level of about 420 ppm by 2100.   
This produces a very different and divergent global CO2 emissions trajectory 
with regional emissions levels varying based on the level on the energy 
intensive production of each region and the share available energy sector 
mitigation technologies based on the model’s standard assumptions. This CO2 
or climate mitigation policy can be considered a physical limit that 
policymakers have endorsed in the expectation of limiting potential damages 
from climate change in the future.  
 
2.a. High Population (no policy) case.  
 
GCAM uses the projections on global population from the U.N. central 
statistical agency (UN, 2010). The central population estimates lead to 8.9 
billion worldwide by 2050 which grow to a maximum of 9.2 billion in 2075 
and then level out at 8.9 billion by 2095.  The global numbers are the 
aggregate of more region specific estimates.  U.N. statistics are provided at 
the county level which are then aggregated into the 14 GCAM regions. A 
High population case was developed to test the impact of changing this key 
assumption on global CO2 emissions.  The expectation is that greater growth 
in population leads to higher energy demand, higher economic output, and 
results in higher CO2 emissions, given the same level of technology and in the 




 2.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from High population case.  
 
With the alternative baseline CO2 emissions trajectory based on a higher 
world population, I then apply the same global CO2 stabilization target as 
above in scenario 1.b.  Comparing policy scenario 2.b. to 1.b. --with the 
reference population level, provides a measure of how more difficult (or easy) 
it may be for the world economies to limit their emissions and reach the 
physical, global CO2 emissions stabilization.   
 
3.a. High GDP Growth (no policy) case.   
 
Global GDP is an aggregate of the same 14 GCAM regions described above 
where each region’s GDP growth is specified exogenously.  In this model 
regional GDP is principally a function of labor productivity and population 
growth or more specifically the growth in the labor force that is some share of 
total population.  To adjust regional economic growth I increased the rate of 
labor productivity while keeping population growth the same as the GCAM 
reference case. With higher levels of economic output occurring over time, 
there will be greater demand for energy leading to higher global CO2 
emissions than the reference case –again maintaining the same levels of 
energy technologies and in the absent a mitigation policy.    
 
3.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from High GDP Growth.  
 
In the same pattern as for the previous two CO2 stabilization scenarios, this 




CO2 emission trajectories to test what the implication is on changing the GDP 
growth assumption.   
 
4.a. Low economic convergence (no policy) case.   
 
The last of the no policy scenarios is one where the rate of economic 
development convergence between the low- and middle-income countries is 
lower than the GCAM reference scenario. The prevailing view in economic 
growth theory (Solow, 1956) which has been brought over to climate 
economic modeling (Grübler et al., 2004 ) is that today’s low- and middle-
income countries should have higher rates of economic growth relative to 
high-income countries so that over time the per capita wealth between those 
sets of counties narrows; this is also called “catching up” in economic 
modeling. To test the impact of this modeling assumption, I adjust the 
exogenously specified economic growth rates of the low- and middle-income 
countries out to reach lower economic levels by the end of the modeling 
horizon or 2095. With lover levels of economic growth in the low- and 
middle-income countries, where the bulk of future emissions growth is 
expected, overall global CO2 emissions will be lower.  
 
4.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from Low economic 
convergence  
 
Again the same CO2 stabilization target is applied, now to the Low economic 
convergence emissions levels to test the effect of changing these input 





Second set of modeling cases modify the GCAM assumptions of technology diffusion 
based on analysis done in earlier sections for the same global CO2 stabilization target.  
These results are then compared to the above first set of modeling runs.  
 
5.a. Technology diffusion focused on just the electric generation sector.  
 
This scenario places two separate conditions on the model that are different 
from the standard GCAM baseline.  First, I modify the inputs in GCAM to 
approximate different rates of technological convergence observed in Section  
2 above for the electric generation sector only; all other sectors in the model 
maintain the GCAM standard parameters.  For example, the standard inputs in 
GCAM have the cost and availability for advanced fossil power generation 
with carbon capture and storage (CCS) the same between the U.S. and Latin 
America.  I modify the model so that the availability of CCS is delayed by two 
to three decades in Latin America after the U.S.  This is not a mandate for 
CCS at a later period as it still must compete economically with other 
technologies.  For the second condition, I run the model with the same CO2 
stabilization target as in applied in the above policy scenarios so that the 
results can be compared to scenarios 1.b., 2.b., 3.b., and 4.b. which will 
provide an indication of how much of an impact changing the technology 
diffusion assumptions has on mitigation costs relative to the other key 
assumptions.  A detailed description of the changes made to GCAM for this 





6.a. Technology diffusion for the transportation sector.  
 
This scenario is similar in design to scenario 5.a. above but the changes to 
GCAM are focused on the transportation sector and then added to scenario 
5.a.  An example for this sector is the adoption of advanced plug-in hybrid 
electric passenger vehicles where the introduction of the vehicles is delayed 
by two decades between Europe and South East Asia representing the groups 
of High-Income and Low-Income countries.  After the GCAM modifications 
are in place, the same global CO2 stabilization target is run to then assess the 
impact of the changes to transportation sector assumption on technological 
diffusion versus the other key assumptions. Details on the changes to 
technological diffusion in the transportation sector by region in GCAM are 
also described below in the model section.   
 
7.a Technology diffusion on ALL energy-related sectors.   
 
The third and last sensitivity case run on technological diffusion combines 
three energy sectors, electric generation sector, transportation sector, and the 
petroleum refining, which correspond to the same sectors evaluated in Section 
2 on historical convergence rates.  First, the GCAM changes made for 
scenarios 5.a. and 6.a. are combined with additional changes to the rates of 
diffusion for the refining sector between High-Income and Middle and Low-
Income regions. Second, the CO2 stabilization case is applied with the revised 




this scenario, additional details on the changes made to the refining sector are 




Changes made to GCAM to implement the new economic and emissions 
scenarios. 
1.a. GCAM Reference (no policy) case.  
 
GCAM’s reference case is the results of running the model with the standard 
or reference set of inputs and assumptions as selected by the modeling team at 
the  Joint Global Change Research Institute (JGCRI). I ran the model with the 
standard assumption to establish the reference levels of outputs specific to the 
global energy system and CO2 emissions.  
 
1.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from Reference. 
 
To impose a global CO2 emissions limit in GCAM I had to specify a new 
objective function to stabilization CO2 concentrations at 420 ppm by 2100. To 
meet this target, the model to seek reductions across all regions by applying an 
increasing equalized carbon price until the emissions level is met.  The results 
are a globally applied carbon tax and a CO2 emissions trajectory that 
significantly diverge from the reference case.  
 
2.a. High Population (no policy) case. 
 
The model uses as its standard input on population the U.N. median global 




population inputs requires two steps. First is to obtain the different population 
dataset which in this case is the UN High population case which reaches 13.7 
billion in 2095 and then re-aggregate the data to match up with GCAM 
regions. Second is to modify the GCAM configuration file to use that new 
data instead of the standard population data.  
 
2.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from High population case.  
 
Once the High population, no-policy case is run, I apply the same stabilization 
objective function as in scenario 1.b. to achieve the same level of CO2 
emissions for the common policy case.  
 
3.a. High GDP Growth (no policy) case.  
 
In this type of climate economic model GDP is modeled as a straightforward 
relationship between population, or more specifically, the share of a region’s 
population that is the labor force, and rates of labor productivity increases that 
are specified exogenously.  GDP is set in the base year 1990, and then as the 
model is run forward it is normalized against that initial value. In GCAM, 
regional GDP is estimated based on the following equation:  
 
GDPindext = GDPindext-1 * (1+Prolm,t)Nstep * Laborforce_indext   
where, 
GDPindext is the normalized GDP value (normalized against the base-year 




Prolm,t represents the labor productivity increase from one point in time to the 
next;  
Nstep is the time span from one time period to the next (set to 15 years);  
Laborforce_indext  stands for the ratio of the labor force at time (t) divided by 
the labor force at the previous point in time which is simulated as the ratio of 
the product of the population and the fraction of the population in the labor 
force engaged productive activities.  
 
To create a High GDP case I adjusted upward the individual region labor 
productivity rates in the labor prod input file so that each region generated 
more GDP than in the reference case.  Table 8 below provides the reference 
case labor productivity rates and the revised ones for the High GDP case.  
 
 
Region Reference rates in  
2050 & 2095 
Revised rates in  
2050 & 2095  
1. United States 1.5%  & 1.5% 1.7% & 1.7% 
2. Canada 1.7% & 1.6% 1.9% & 1.8% 
3. Western Europe  1.5% & 1.2% 1.7% & 1.5% 
4. Eastern Europe  3.2% & 2.6% 3.4% & 2.8% 
5. Australia & New 
Zealand 
1.3% & 1.3% 1.5% & 1.5% 
6. Japan 1.5% & 1.2% 1.7% & 1.4% 
7. South Korea 2.1% & 1.9% 2.3% & 2.1% 
8. China/Asia 
Reforming 
4.3% & 2.3% 4.5 & 2.5% 
9. India 4.2% & 3.4% 4.5% & 3.7% 
10. Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) 
3.2% & 2.6% 3.4% & 2.8% 
11. Middle East 1.5% & 1.9% 1.7% & 2.1% 
12. Latin America 2.4% & 2.7% 2.6% & 2.9% 
13. Africa 2.0% & 3.2% 2.2% & 3.4% 
14. (rest of) S&E Asia 4.0% & 3.0% 4.1% & 3.2% 







3.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from High GDP Growth  
 
Same as in scenario 2.b., after establishing the High GDP Growth under a no 
policy condition, I apply the same stabilization objective function to achieve 
the 420 ppm level of CO2 emissions as the policy case.   
 
4.a. Low economic convergence (no policy) case 
 
This scenario requires the same manipulation to the input date file on labor 
productivity rates but instead of adjusting all regional rates upward I only 
adjust the rates for the Middle and Low-Income countries so that their overall 
rates of economic growth are slower relative to the reference scenario and, as 
a result, economic convergence to the High-income regions takes longer to 
achieve.   The reference case labor productivity and adjusted value for this 
scenario are listed in Table 9 below.  
Region Reference rates in  
2050 & 2095 
Revised rates in  
2050 & 2095  
1. United States 1.5%  & 1.5% no change 
2. Canada 1.7% & 1.6% no change 
3. Western Europe  1.5% & 1.2% no change 
4. Eastern Europe  3.2% & 2.6% no change 
5. Australia & New 
Zealand 
1.3% & 1.3% no change 
6. Japan 1.5% & 1.2% no change 
7. South Korea 2.1% & 1.9% no change 
8. China/Asia 
Reforming 
4.3% & 2.3% 4.0% & 2.0% 
9. India 4.2% & 3.4% 4.2% & 2.0% 
10. FSU 3.2% & 2.6% 2.1% & 1.9% 
11. Middle East 1.5% & 1.9% 1.5% & 1.2% 
12. Latin America 2.4% & 2.7% 1.5% & 1.5% 
13. Africa 2.0% & 3.2% 1.5%  & 1.5% 
14. (rest of) S&E Asia 4.0% & 3.0% 2.1% & 1.9% 




4.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from Low economic 
convergence 
 
Same as in the previous two scenarios, the same stabilization objective 
function is applied to the Low economic convergence scenario in order to 
evaluate the differences in achieve that climate policy target.  
 
The scenarios described above were run to establish the standard GCAM reference 
results for regional population, GDP, energy consumption, and CO2 emissions that 
are aggregated to global totals. Additional sensitivity cases were developed to test the 
impact of changing key assumptions on population growth and GDP growth and how 
those resulting changes affect the degree of difficulty or cost in achieving a global 
CO2 stabilization target.    
 
4.4. 
The subsequent technology converge scenarios are where the bulk of the effort in 
modifying GCAM took place due to the detailed technology specification in the 
model and because the model is divided into 14 separate economic regions requiring 
that changes are needed in each regional model parameterization.   The work entailed 
in interpreting results from Section 3 on historical patterns of technological 
convergence, modifying the appropriate GCAM structure and data files, and 
executing the new scenarios is described in the subsections below.  The scenario 
results are presented in Section 5.  





Given the partial equilibrium solution approach, regional structure, and technology 
details of GCAM there are three possibly ways to differentiate technology diffusion 
rates between the regions. One approach would be to specify the costs of new 
technologies differently in each of the model’s 14 regions.  If a particular technology, 
e.g., advanced coal power generation with carbon capture and storage, was more 
expensive in a lower-income country than in a high-income country then it would 
generally deploy later given a normalized climate mitigation policy.   Similar 
technologies would be more expensive in lower-income countries due to a difficulty 
in accessing capital, fees for the transfer of technology, and an insufficient 
infrastructure basis among other factors (World Bank, 2008).  This approach was not 
selected since region-specific cost data on near-term and advanced technologies is not 
readily available and uncertain, particularly with as-yet commercialized technologies. 
More importantly, this cost-variation approach is inconsistent with the technology 
convergence research completed in the previous section and the additional historical 
time series assessment of electric power efficiencies both of which show a clear 
technology gap over time. 
 
A second approach would be to use the logit-share (or logit-choice) equations in 
GCAM which control the degree of switching between technologies or fuels in 
response to price changes (JGCRI, 2013).  For example, during the transformation of 
energy from raw fuel to refined fuel to final fuels consumed by end-users, all fuels 
compete based on relative prices. The competition among fuel prices is governed in 




elasticities.  In addition, various costs like transportation costs, taxes, non-fuel costs, 
and structural factors are also included in delivered fuel costs.  The use of the logit- 
share equation approach in GCAM also ensures that fuels and their related 
technologies can contribute in some way to total energy demand and that transition 
between fuels and technologies change in a smooth fashion as prices or policies 
change over time. For addition detail of the logit-sharing formulation in GCAM see 
Clarke and Edmonds (1993).   The use of the logit-share approach was not used in 
this research for much of the same reasons as above on the differential technology-
price formulation: region-specific, logit-share equations or expansion rates would 
need to be specified and this approach is inconsistent with the research completed on 
technology convergence in previous sections.  A recent paper by Iyer et al (2013) 
does use the logit-share formulation to evaluate different expansion rates of low-
carbon technologies only in the electric sector under a tight climate mitigation 
scenario.  In further research it would be worth evaluating and comparing the 
approach taken in the Iyer et al paper, a more price-response approach to technology 
diffusion, to the more time-dependant and region specific approach taken in this 
dissertation.  
 
The third approach that can be used in the GCAM model to specific diffusion of 
technologies is the share-weight parameter. Share-weights are denominated as the 
percentage of total capacity that a specific technology may attain in a given year.  
Share-weights are initialized on a model base year, e.g., 2000, and then allow gradual 




region’s electric power sector, generation of electricity from coal is 50% of total in a 
base year with natural gas at 25% and renewable power at the remaining 25% of total 
capacity.  If there were no specified share-weights, the amount of capacity attributed 
to the mix of generation technologies would be solely based on the economic 
competition among the options, that is, markets would rapidly transition in response 
to newer technologies that generally exhibit greater efficiencies. The use of share-
weights takes into account engineering, market, and technology transition 
considerations not captured in the pure economic optimization in the model.  
According to the GCAM documentation (JGCRI, 2013), the principal lever or 
parameter that allows the introduction of new or advanced technologies in GCAM is 
the Share-weight. This is the approach taken in this dissertation.  
 
 Table 4-4 below provides the standard configuration in GCAM for the share-weight 
parameter dealing with the introduction and penetration of advanced fossil 
technologies for the power generation sector.  
 
Fossil - Reference - share-weight (tech level) share-weight 
  Region supplysector subsector technology 2010 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095 
ALL electricity Coal Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity Gas Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity Oil Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 4-4: GCAM standard configuration of the share-weight parameters. 
 




Region: this instructs GCAM to apply the specification equally to all of the 14 
regions in the model. This is one of the important specifications to modify in order to 
test the implications of different technology diffusion rates.  
Supplysector & Subsector: this identifies to which energy supply sector and 
subsector (or fuel type) the technologies are applied. 
Technology: this identifies the specific technology whether for energy 
transformation, as in this example, or energy use, e.g., transportation technologies for 
passenger use.  Here the advanced technologies are integrated gasification combined 
cycle (IGCC) for coal and oil with CO2 carbon capture and storage (CCS) for electric 
power generation; and combined cycle units for natural gas with CCS.  
Share-weight: this is the key parameter which is exogenously specified.  For existing 
technologies the share-weight, or percent of total allowable capacity, is calibrated to a 
base year, e.g., 2000, based on historical data.  For advanced technologies which are 
not yet commercially available the share is zero (0) as above for 2000.  For the 
standard configuration in GCAM, starting in 2020 the model will allow up to one 
third of total capacity to be comprised of CCS technologies for those respective 
generation-fuel types in all of the 14 regions as there is no regional differentiation. 
The resulting amount of generation is determined on an economically competitive 
basis between the technologies depending on costs, fuel prices, and the type of 
policies imposed.  
     
For most of the energy sector-related technologies represented in GCAM the share-
weight specification regarding regions is similar to the example above in that all 




That is, there is no allowance for different rates of technological diffusion for 
advanced technologies with the exception of some transportation technologies which 
are covered below.  The standard approach is simple and efficient as just a few lines 
in the input file configure the model as needed. In order to test the impact of 
technological diffusion on climate mitigation targets I needed to change the GCAM 
share weight parameters for each technology and for each region.  That means 
modifying the share-weight input files for each technology of interest and expanding 
the file to properly specify different rates of technology diffusion.  Using the above 
share-weight specification example with three advanced technologies, which are 
applied to ALL regions this mean that a new file need to be created with 42 different 
row specifications  (3 technologies X 14 different regions).  This additional work, 
model specification, and regional detail is perhaps why most climate economic 
models use the more simplified assumption of making all technologies similarly 
available globally.  Below I describe the changes to the standard GCAM structure to 
model different rates of technology diffusion in the electric generation sector, the 
transportation sector, and then all a combined energy sector case by adding refining to 
the previous two sectors. 
 
5.a. Technology diffusion focused on the electric generation sector 
 
Electricity is part of energy input to economic production where it competes 
with and also uses other primary energy sources, e.g., natural gas, oil, and 
coal.  Electricity can be generated by a variety of technologies where the mix 




technology availability and the relative prices of energy sources which include 
carbon or other environmental policies if applicable. Table 4-5 below lists the 
various electricity generation technologies and their respective primary fuel 
sources as well identifying the existing or near-term technologies and the 
advanced technologies available in GCAM. Each technology is characterized 
by specific data on its cost and performance.   
 
Existing or near-term technology Advanced Technology 
Fossil Generation  
(1) Oil  
 
integrated gasification combined cycle 
(IGCC) stand alone  
IGCC with carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
(2) Natural Gas natural gas with CCS 
(3) Coal IGCC 
IGCC with CCS 
Nuclear   
(4) Nuclear GEN II & III reactors GEN IV reactor 
(5) Fusion - not available  Available 
Renewables   
(6) Solar PV Solar PV with energy storage 
(7) Wind power 
Types 
Wind with energy storage 
(8) Hydro power NA 
(9) Biomass IGCC 
IGCC with CCS  
Other Advanced  
(11) Hydrogen fuel cells – NA Available 
(12) Satellite solar - NA  Not included 





In the standard GCAM configuration there are no differences between regions in a 
technology’s cost or performance (common assumption in most climate economic 
models), and all technologies are allowed to deploy at the same time across all 
regions.  Table 4-6 below is a simplified representation of the input file in GCAM 
specifying the respective share-weights for electricity generation technologies that 
determine the pace of technology diffusion.  For each different generation and fuel 
combinations the advanced technologies are highlighted in darker shading.  Notice 
that in the standard configuration these rates are applied to “ALL” regions equally in 
the model.   
 
To test the implication of different rates of technology diffusion two important 
modifications were made to the above input file. First, instead of using the ALL 
regions designation, separate region-specific and technology-specific parameters were 
developed. Second, for each advanced technology type a different projected share-
weight specification was applied depending on the current income level of each 
region.  This second step is the representation of different rates of technology 
diffusion which I based on the research completed in Section 3.  I further describe the 
modifications for each of the main technology generation and fuel combinations 





        Variable ID 
        37a 
  
share-weight 
     Reference - share-weight (tech level) 
       Region supplysector Technology 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095 
ALL Electricity Coal (conv pul) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Coal (existing) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALL Electricity Coal (IGCC) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALL Electricity Gas (CC) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Gas (existing) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALL Electricity Gas (peak load conv) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALL Electricity Oil (existing) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALL Electricity Oil (peak load conv) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Oil (IGCC) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Biomass (conv) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL Electricity Biomass (existing) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALL Electricity Biomass (IGCC) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity CSP 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity CSP_storage 0 0.1 0.9 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity PV_storage 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity Wind 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL electricity Wind_storage 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 4-6: GCAM input file – share weights. 
 
 
Advanced Coal Units 
 
Technologies under advanced coal for power generation include IGCC in a 
stand-alone mode and IGCC with CCS which can reduce CO2 emissions up to 
90% compared to a conventional coal plant. For the High Income countries 




as represented in the share-weights.  For the Middle and Low income 
countries Coal IGCC units were delayed 30 years and allowed to come in 
fully, based on the high speed of convergence of 84% for coal electricity from 
the β Convergence estimates (see Table 3-5).  The more advanced IGCC with 
CCS was delayed 45 years but with only a 25% share-weight, then some 
additional allowed penetration 60 years later at 50%, and finally full 
deployment 75 years after initial deployment in the High Income countries. 
This new adjustment on the Middle and Low income share-weights is based 
on the speed of convergence of 34% for all electricity as a representation of a 
slower convergence for broadly applicable technologies.   
 
Advanced Gas Units  
 
As was done for coal units the rate technology diffusion for the High Income 
countries is the standard GCAM parameters as represented in the share-
weights.  For the Middle and Low income countries Gas units with CCS were  
delayed 45 years with only a 33% share-weight, then to 50% at 60 years, and 
finally full deployment at 75 years. This is based on a combination of a slower  
speed of convergence of 16% for gas electricity from the β Convergence 
estimates (see Table 3-5) but also a faster convergence rate in the more recent 
decades (see Figure 3-6). 
 
Advanced Oil Units  
 
The modifications to share-weights for oil with CCS units are the same as 





Advanced Biomass Units 
 
Biomass units take agricultural and forestry products, either purposely grown 
or by-production/waste materials, combust them to create steam for power 
generation. One special feature of advanced biomass units is that when they 
are combined with CCS technologies they yield “negative CO2 emissions”, 
that is, the biomass material pulls CO2 from the atmosphere which is then 
combusted in a boiler and then the CO2 is captured and stored in a geologic 
formation. The result is the net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere.  The 
potential importance of biomass with CCS (referred to as BioEnergy Carbon 
Storage or BECS) as a negative emissions technology cannot be understated 
as many climate mitigation scenarios with tight targets, for example a 2 
degree target, are not feasible unless BECS can deploy widely and 
immediately across the globe (Clarke, et al, 2008).  For the High Income 
countries the standard GCAM parameters were kept.  For the Middle and Low 
income countries both Biomass IGCC and CCS units were delayed 45 after 
deployments in the High Income countries and come in with only 25% 
penetration allowance. After 15 years this is increased to 33% and finally after 
30 additional years the maximum penetration is limited to 50%.  This slower 
rate of allowed technology diffusion in both terms of timing and reduced level 
of market penetration is due to the slower speed of convergence of 19% for 
biomass electricity from the β Convergence estimates (see Table 3-5).  From 




Biomass with CCS marks the most significant change to the standard 
assumption in the GCAM model.  
 
Renewable Power  
 
Apart from fossil electricity generation the renewable power technologies 
were grouped together and included solar power –both concentrated solar 
power and photovoltaic cells, and wind power turbines.   Hydro power was 
not included in any changes to technology diffusion.  The renewable power 
options were grouped together for two reasons.  First, in GCAM the 
differentiation between conventional renewable generation and advanced 
generation is the addition of energy storage technology to each generation 
type as listed in Table 4-5 above.  Energy storage allows excess electricity --
generated when wind or solar resources are available but when demand for 
electricity is low—to be used when demand is higher which can provide 
temporary solutions for regional and local capacity shortages.  The second 
reason renewables were combined in terms technology diffusion 
specifications (share-weights in GCAM) is because they are also combined in 
the historical convergence assessments were the observed β Convergence 
estimates for wind and solar was 57% meaning that over the period of analysis 
the lower level regions gained more than half of the difference.  With this in 
mind I adjusted the Middle and Low income countries rates so that advanced 
renewable technologies were delayed by 15 years with 25% penetration 




more years, and reach the same level as High Income countries after the final 




The last electric power generation technology to include in the modifications 
of technology diffusion in GCAM is nuclear power, which given the 
important differences and complexities of this technology, took a different 
approach to the modification in the model.  In the standard GCAM 
configuration nuclear power is differentiated in terms of diffusion and pace of 
growth given existing, regional nuclear power capacity and experience.  
In my examination of historical technology convergence rates there was not 
sufficient data to conduct a robust enough analysis on nuclear power.  
Furthermore, and related, the deployment of nuclear power is not solely a 
decision of technology transfer and diffusion given concerns of nuclear 
weapons proliferation and safety concerns on  operating a nuclear power 
plants (Clarke, et al, 2007).  In addition, I took into account the reality that 
some regions defined as Low and Middle Income, e.g., the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU), have had operational nuclear plants in place for a few decades.  
As a result, nuclear power technology has the distinction of having two 
differently specified technology diffusion rates: For Eastern Europe, Korea, 
and the FSU, the more advanced Gen Type III reactors are delayed 15 years at 
a 25% penetration rate, then 33%, 50%, and 75% for the next 15-year 




years starting at a 25% penetration rate, then increasing to 50%, and 100% for 
next two 15-year intervals. A variety of different timelines and diffusion rates 
can be developed for nuclear power that fall more in the area of regional and 
security studies versus energy and climate economics. The approach here can 
be seen as a starting example given the importance of nuclear power as a 
potential climate mitigation technology with security implications.  
 
 
6.a. Technology diffusion in the transportation sector  
 
The GCAM model has one of the more detailed transportation sectors among 
the current class of climate and energy economic models that go out to 2100.   
The detail covers three aspects of transportation: First is the technology 
representation or mode of transportation, i.e., air, bus, light-duty vehicle, rail, 
ship, and truck; Second the energy type, i.e., fossil fuel, electric, gas, and fuel 
cell; and Third is the transportation class, i.e., passenger, freight, international 
shipping.  The advanced technologies, that is transportation that does not rely 
on fossil fuels, are identified as electric, hydrogen (H2) fuel cells, and 
compressed natural gas (CNG). The standard rates of technology diffusion for 
these more advanced technologies are shown in Table 4-7.  All three aspects 
are applied in the appropriate combinations to create the standard GCAM 






Standard Transportation Technology share-weight path 
  
2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095 
Electric  0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
H2 (fuel cell) 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
CNG (gas) 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 




       Variable ID 1011 
 
shareweight  
    Region Supplysector tranTechnology 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095 
USA trn_freight Air 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_freight rail ICE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_freight rail electric 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
USA trn_freight truck ICE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_freight domestic ship ICE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_passenger Air 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_passenger high speed rail 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
USA trn_passenger rail ICE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_passenger rail electric 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_shipping_intl international ship ICE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_pass_road LDV ICE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_pass_road LDV electric 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
USA trn_pass_road LDV gas 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
USA trn_pass_road LDV fuel cell 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
USA trn_pass_road bus ICE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_pass_road bus electric 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
USA trn_pass_road bus gas 1 1 1 1 1 1 
USA trn_pass_road bus fuel cell 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Table 4-8: GCAM Input file -- Transportation share-weights. 
 
Another advantage of the existing GCAM transportation structure is that there 
also is distinction in the regional configuration of transportation options and 
there rates of technology diffusion as represented by the share-weight 
parameter. The above table shows the specification for the U.S.  Other 




given the current availability of transportation modes and technologies in each 
region.   
 
As the transportation parameters were already specified by each of the 14 
regions in the model this saved me the effort of creating new regional details 
as was done for the electricity generation technologies.  For the High Income 
countries the standard GCAM parameters were kept as is.  The new effort was 
in modifying the share-weights to account for different rates of technology 
diffusion between the High and Middle and Low Income regions for the 
advanced technologies.  The β Convergence estimates, from Section 2, Table 
3-5, for the speed of convergence in the transportation is 54% over the time 
evaluated. This relatively high estimate is only for historic fossil related 
transportation between the regions; however it does provide a starting point 
for modifying technology diffusion.  For all of the Middle and Low Income 
regions, the following adjustments were made for particular combinations of 
transportation mode, class, and technologies:  electric high speed rail was not 
delayed but the penetration rates were adjusted down to 50% in 2020 and 75 
in 2035; electric passenger LDV was delayed by 15 years with no changes to 
the penetration rates; CNG electric LDV was also delayed by 15 years with no 
changes to the penetration rates; fuel cell passenger LDV was delayed by 30 
years with no changes to the penetration rates; electric bus technology was 
similarly delayed only by 15 years with no adjustments for penetration rates; 




penetration rates staying the same.   No other changes were made to regional 
transportation parameters.  
 
7.a Technology diffusion on the refining sector 
 
The specifications and configuration of the refining sector in GCAM can be 
viewed as a combination of the technology detail in the electric power sector 
with some of the regional differentiation in the transportation sector.  The 
technology detail is needed due to the complexities of the refining sector in 
the many way of producing refined liquid fuels to meet regional and global 
demand for energy.  The refining subsectors in GCAM include the following 
fuels and conversions:  
• unconventional oil  oil refining  coal to liquids  
• gas to liquids   biomass liquids-ethanol 
• regional sugar→ethanol regional corn→ ethanol 
• biomass liquids-FT   regional sugarbeet→ ethanol   
(FT stands for Fischer–Tropsch process) 
 
The technology diffusion, as represented by the share-weight specifications, is 
the same for all regions for the above technologies and process except in two 
cases.  The first is related to regional biomass liquids used for the production 
of ethanol and biodiesel which does have different regional share-weights to 
account for a region’s agricultural production of the necessary feedstocks.  
This is related to the detailed agricultural landuse module in GCAM which 
produces the feedstocks based on region specific productivity and growing 
zones.  The second reason is related to the international trade of 




for all the 14 regions based on the pattern of trade with the U.S.  Since the 
pattern and reasons for differentiated share-weights in GCAM are not 
necessarily related to technology diffusion differences for the existing refining 
technologies, I do not alter them for the purposes of evaluation here.  
 
Advanced technologies for the refining sector are characterized by the 
additional of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies –same as in the 
electric power– to a subset of the current refining technologies which are 
listed in Table 15 below as a representation of the share-weights specification 
in GCAM.  Notice that the share-weights apply equally to all regions and the 
same time.      
INPUT_TABLE 
          Variable ID 2005 
 
sharewt 
        region Supplysector subsector/technology 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095 
ALL refined liquids endues coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids industrial coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids endues coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids industrial coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids endues 
biomass liquids-ethanol 
CCS Level 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids endues 
biomass liquids-FT CCS 
Level 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids industrial 
biomass liquids-ethanol 
CCS Level 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids industrial 
biomass liquids-FT CCS 
Level 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids endues 
biomass liquids-ethanol 
CCS Level 2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids endues 
biomass liquids-FT CCS 
Level 2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids industrial 
biomass liquids-ethanol 
CCS Level 2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 
ALL refined liquids industrial biomass liquids-FT CCS L2 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 





In order to model technology diffusion in GCAM’s refining sector the same 
type of modifications as made to the sector above were required here. First I 
needed to create a new input file for different share-weight specifications for 
each of the seven Middle and Low Income regions, i.e., Africa, China/Asia 
Reforming, India, Former Soviet Union, Middle East, Latin America, and 
S&E Asia. Second, I modified the standard share-weights for the advanced 
technologies based on consideration of the β Convergence estimates, from 
Section 3, Table 3-5, for the speed of convergence in the refining sector of 
less than 10% over the period of analysis. That estimate was for petroleum 
refining and is a relatively slow convergence rate compared to the other 
technologies evaluated.  The changes made to the share-weights were a 
straightforward delay of 45 years for all the technologies while maintain the 






5. Presentation, description and interpretation of the 
new modeling results.  
 
This section covers the GCAM results on the seven scenario sets, resulting in 11 
separate scenarios, which explore the implications of different assumptions on global 
CO2 emissions and their mitigation to a common climate policy target.  The scenarios 
and their abbreviations used in the following figures are as follows: 
1.a. GCAM Reference (no policy) case =Reference 
1.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from Reference = 
NewReference_Policy 
2.a. High Population (no policy) case = High_Pop 
2.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from High population case = 
High_Pop_Policy 
3.a. High GDP Growth (no policy) case = High_GDP 
3.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from High GDP Growth = 
High_GDP_Policy 
4.a. Low economic convergence (no policy) case = Low_Conv 
4.b. Global CO2 Stabilization policy case from Low economic convergence = 
Low_Conv_Policy 
5.a. Technology diffusion focused on just the electric generation sector = 
PolicyElecNucDelay 





7.a Technology diffusion on ALL energy-related sectors = 
PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay 
 
The modeling results presented below include the main global drivers for CO2 
emissions, i.e., population, economic growth, and technology use and development; 
and changes to emissions and energy systems from the imposition of a CO2 
mitigation target; and ultimately the differences in mitigation costs from changes to 
assumptions on technology diffusion in the key energy sectors of electric generation, 





Following from the changes made to the standard GCAM inputs on population data 
the differences between the Reference and the High Population scenarios is show in 
Figure 5-1 on regional reference projections and Figure 5-2 with a global comparison 
of the two scenarios.  In 2050 the difference is 1.5 billion people worldwide growing 






Figure 5-1: GCAM Regional population projections – Reference.  
 
 



















































Global economic output or the aggregate of the 14 region gross domestic production 
is more varied in GCAM than the population results based on the changes made to the 
standard set of assumptions; see Figure 5-3 below. The changes made to the High 
population scenario drive the highest total GDP by 2095.  This is followed by the 
High GDP scenario were the focus was to increase all region GDP through the 
century.   The Lower Convergence scenario –where the Middle- and Low-Income 
regions experience a slower rate of economic growth– yields the lowest global GDP 
compared to all the scenarios given the importance of that combined region’s 
projected economic growth in the reference which is carried forward in the High GDP 
and High population scenarios.   
 
 






























Global Primary Energy Results 
Based on the results for population and economic growth in the Reference and 
revised scenarios for the sensitivities on High Population, High GDP, and Low 
Convergence, global primary energy differs according for each scenario as illustrated 
in Figure 5-4.   
 
 





Global CO2 Results 
The combination of the population, economic growth scenarios and the long-term 
energy transformation and end-use technologies employed in GCAM give results to 


















Figure 5-5).  The one important scenario added to the analysis at this point is the CO2 
Mitigation policy which defined as stabilizing global CO2 concentration levels at 
about 420 ppm by 2100 which represent an increase over today concentration of 390 
ppm but a significant deviation from a Reference or no policy scenario where 
concentration would reach 800 ppm or greater. Since global concentration of CO2, a 
well-mixed, long-lived atmospheric pollutant, depend upon the decadal trajectory of 
CO2 emissions, that trajectory must continue to decline over the century as shown in 
Figure 5-5.   
 
 





Regional CO2 Emissions 
At an aggregate level it is difficult to appreciate the differences in CO2 emissions for 






























mitigation or Policy scenarios.  Growth in GHGs, primarily CO2, is expected to be 
much greater from the Middle- and Low-Income countries than the High-Income 
countries as the former group experiences continued economic growth to catch up 
partly to the income levels of the latter group.  
 
 
Figure 5-6: Low- and Middle Income Region CO2 Projections. 
 
 
The combined emissions from all the Low- and Middle income countries for five  
scenarios are shown in Figure 5-6.  As expected the long-term projection in the 
Reference scenario is a continual upward trend that more than triples today’s level of 
about 5,000 Million tons (MT) of CO2 emissions in carbon terms to about 1,700 MT 
in 2095. In contrast the climate policy scenario, labeled as NewReference_Policy 
shows a dramatic and continued decline in emissions to just over 900 MT by century 
end. There are slight but noticeable deviations in the emissions trajectories for the 
three new mitigation scenarios where the rates of technology diffusion have been 
































countries.  The changes are in line with expectations as the delay in the two scenario 
that include the electric and transportation sectors push off mitigation in those 
respective sectors 50 years plus since the more advanced and cost effective 
technologies are not as readily available.  In the aggregate emissions of the whole 
Low- and Middle income regions there is no difference between these two scenarios; 
most of the mitigation occurs in the electric sector with very small changes in the 
transportation sectors.  Adding the postponement of technology diffusion of the 
refining sectors does show up with the additional delay in the scenario labeled 
PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay (green line) by about 40 years. 
 
 
Figure 5-7: High-Income Region CO2 Projections. 
 
 
Evaluating the emission trajectories for the High-Income countries (Figure 5-7) 
shows a couple of key differences from those of the Low- and Middle Income 
countries. First, in the GCAM reference projection there is only a slight increase in 
































2100 representing only a 25% increase. Second, where the delay cases for the Low- 
and Middle Income countries show less mitigation occurring during the middle of the 
century, this is flipped for the High Income countries where there is a greater 
mitigation of CO2 emissions.  As there is a global mitigation budget it is more 
difficult for Low- and Middle Income countries to reduce emissions without 
advanced technologies then more of the burden falls on the High Income countries.  
This is of course in a climate economic-modeled scenario where there is a coherent 
and binding policy and countries/regions undertake mitigation to comply with the 
policy.  There is a similarity in the pattern of the delay between the three technology 




Figure 5-8: China CO2 Projections. 
 
 
To gain a better sense of the pattern of CO2 emissions it is useful to evaluate the 





























China (Figure 5-8) and the U.S. (Figure 5-9).   Projected reference case emission in 
China follow the same overall pattern as in the broader Low and Middle Income 
group in that there is a significant growth in emission out to 2095 with a noticeable 
difference that Chinese emissions level out and even start declining due to the 
underlying trajectory of the population and structural changes in the that economy. 
The mitigation scenarios both the New Reference, i.e., the un-modified standard 
GCAM results, and the three delay cases shown immediate deviations from the 
Reference scenario with the 40-year or so postponement of the advanced technologies 
showing up as expected.  By looking more closely at one country, which also is 
projected to become the highest emitter of CO2 emission of any one country, we can 
see the appearance of negative emissions around 2085 due to the deployment of bio-
energy energy technologies with carbon capture and storage (or BECS) primarily in 
the electric power generation but also to a limited extent in the refining sector. 
 
 





























The CO2 emissions across the Reference and delay scenarios for the U.S. in Figure 5-
9 show a similar pattern to the High Income groups but a mainly different that the 
U.S. emissions exhibit greater mitigation particularly in the delay scenarios, for 
example momentarily hitting negative emissions in the 
PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay scenario by 2050 and full negative emission, 




Global Sectoral CO2 Emissions 
Emission projections for CO2 for the aggregate income regions and two key countries 
can be further disaggregated by sector.  Figures 5-10, 5-11, and 5-12 show the 
patterns of emissions for the global Electricity, Transportation, and Industrial sectors, 
respectively, for the Reference or no policy scenario, the un-modified GCAM 











































































Global Electric Power Generation  
Decomposing the electric power generation at the global level by technology and 
primary energy source provides a better sense of emissions in the Reference (no 
policy) scenario and mitigation potential in the optimal GCAM mitigation scenario, 
NewReference_Policy, and the combined delay-policy scenario for the electric, 
transport, and refining sectors.  The Reference scenario, Figure 5-13, shows a steady 
increase in fossil generation primarily coal-based generation which achieves a share 
of about 37% of total generation in 2050 which moderates to about 32% by 2095.  
Natural gas-powered generation also increases in the absence of a climate policy with 
about 27% of generation in 2050 and 20% by 2095.  Fossil generation does improve 



























no price placed on GHG emissions.  Nuclear power generation is about 12% of 
generation in 2050 and continues to grow to just short of 20% by 2095.  Renewable 
energy power including hydro, geothermal, wind, biomass, and solar also increases it 
share of total generation with 21% in 2050 and almost 25% by 2095 where the 
growth in mainly from wind and solar which benefits from projected cost declines.  
Hydro and geothermal are based on exogenous assumptions of capacity as of 2010 
that do not change over time based nor on the scenario hence is their contribution to 
energy generation constant throughout the results.  
 
The NewReference_Policy scenario shows a distinctly different future of global 
electric power generation where there is a stringent and globally implemented climate 
mitigation policy.  This scenario is illustrated in Figure 5-14 below.   There are three 
principal differences that stand out in this policy scenario when compared to the 
Reference scenario.  First, nuclear power grows dramatically and dominates power 
generation with a share of 22% of total energy produced in 2050 increasing to about 
42% by 2095.  This growth is based on the non-emitting GHG nature of nuclear 
power and that it is cost competitive against renewable power options.  The 
assumptions used in the projected growth of nuclear power in this GCAM reference 
projection were developed prior to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident that 
occurred in March 2011.  If more recent prevailing views on nuclear power growth 
are taken into account there would be less of a growth in nuclear power over the 
century although developing limits to place on cost-competitive model solution would 




technologies –starting in 2020– on both coal-based and gas-based generation which 
permit the continued use of fossil fuels by capturing 90% of the emitted CO2.  The 
amount of energy produced from coal and gas does not change very much over the 
century but the share from each decreases as non-emitting technologies continue to 
grow.  Coal goes from about 17% in 2050 to less than 10% by 2095 with practically 
all coal generation requiring CCS as of 2065.  Since natural gas has lower CO2 
emissions per unit of energy, its transition to all CCS deployment is more gradual.   
The share of generation for natural gas is about 22% in 2050 and 12% by 2095 with 
less than 10% of gas generation running as un-captured by the end of the century.  
The notable third difference in comparison to the Reference scenario is the 
appreciable growth in renewable power which is about 32% in 2050 of total 
generation and continues to 36% by 2095 with almost equal shares for wind, biomass 






Figure 5-13: Global Power Generation – Reference. 
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Figure 5-15: Global Power Generation – All Sector Delay.  
 
 
Finally the picture on global electricity generation in the all-sector delay scenario 
(PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay – Figure 5-15 ) shows a clear punctuation in 
2050 when most of the energy-related CO2 mitigation technologies are allowed to be 
deployed in the low- and middle-income countries, especially the larger countries or 
regions of China, India, Latin America and Southeast Asia. The lack of technology 
diffusion for advanced CO2 mitigation until largely until 2050 yields higher energy 
costs due to the addition of the carbon tax (see Section 5.9 below for details) which 
suppresses demand for energy in particular electric energy.  In the standard 
NewReference_Policy scenario, global electric energy generation reaches 150 EJ by 
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2040 and does not come into alignment with the NewReference_Policy levels until 
2065 of about 300 EJ.  In the All Delay scenario there is a greater reliance on 
renewable energy at about 46% -mostly wind-- of total generation in 2050 which 
moderates some to 37% by 2095when the advanced technologies come on line 
especially biomass with CCS and solar power.  Coal generation is approximately 10% 
in 2050 staying about the same share out to 2095 but switching to coal with CCS 
mainly as of 2070.  With the limitations on technology diffusion mostly lifted on 
nuclear power as of 2050 its share of generation increases from just over 15% in 2050 
to over 35% by 2095 and thereby exhibiting the same pattern of overall mitigation 
share in the NewReferece_Policy scenario. Lastly natural gas has the same 
characteristic of coal but shows an even greater expansion after 2050 when its share is 
about 24%, then abruptly increases starts transitioning to CCS technologies and 







Regional Energy Sector Projections 
Taking a closer look at the main energy and CO2 mitigation sectors, that is electric 
power generation and transportation, in the two representative countries the U.S. (for 
the High Income countries) and China (Low- and Middle-Income) helps to better 
understand the implications of the technology diffusion changes and associated  
changes in CO2 emissions.   The trajectories for different realizations of the future for 
China’s electric power generation show three distinct pathways as illustrated in 
Figure 5-16.  The Reference scenario shows continued, increased generation 
increasing six fold by 2090 when it start to level off. This follows China projected 
population and economic trajectory with some slower rate of increase due to continue 
pattern of improvements in energy intensity.  The first contrast is to the GCAM un-
modified climate mitigation scenario, NewReference_Policy, where there are no 
changes to the standard assumptions on the availability of advanced technologies, for 
example coal generation with CCS or renewables with energy storage.  In the 
standard GCAM configuration the level of electric power generation increases 
significantly due to the imposition of a climate policy target as the Chinese economy 
increases its electrification.  More specifically, it is more cost-effective to 
decarbonizes the electric power sector and then increase the share of electricity used 
by the industrial, commercial, residential, and transportation sectors relative to other 
energy inputs that are more carbon intensive, mainly coal, petroleum, and natural gas. 
This pattern of increased electrification is a common and robust finding in climate 




technology delay cases which cause a divergence from both the Reference and 
standard policy cases, that is, away from greater electrification.  The lack of available 
advanced technologies in China prevents a move toward more cost-effective forms of 
energy use in that economy.  Under the climate policy target this also has the effect of 
creating a shortage of cheaper mitigation from one of the largest emitters of CO2 
putting a further burden on other countries.  
 
 
Figure 5-16: China Power Generation.  
 
 
The U.S. power generation trajectories (Figure 5-17) show similar patterns for the 
Reference and the un-modified climate mitigation scenario, NewReference_Policy, 
with increasing electric energy generation over the century and a move toward more 
electrification and decarbonization of the U.S. economy.  As was seen in the 
emissions projections for the technology delay cases, there will be more of a burden 
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countries do not have equal and timely access to advanced technologies.  This is 
shown in the uptick of electric power above the standard policy case from 2035 to 
about 2070. 
 
Figure 5-17: U.S. Power Generation. 
 
Switching from energy production to the use of energy for transportation services in 
the economy we see the opposite patterns for both China and the U.S. in that the 
climate policy decreases the amount of energy consumed in transportation relative to 
the no-policy References case. See Figure 5-18 for China’s transportation results and 
Figure 5-19 for the U.S. in energy terms.  In both countries the policy cases cause a 
drop in both passenger transportation and freight transpiration services due to the 
imposition of the carbon tax.  In China where the decreases are more noticeable, 
Reference scenario passenger transportation is about 7,800 billion passenger-
kilometers (pass-km) in 2050 which decreases by 6% in the NewReference_Policy 
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projected transportation services in China are just over 13,000 billion pass-km in the 
Reference scenario.  Since the mitigation options are the same in the later periods, 
both policy scenarios yield the same level of reductions of about 11%.  The other part 
of transportation services modeled in GCAM is freight or cargo which is denominated 
in ton-km which is the ability to move 1 ton of cargo a distance of 1 km. Reference 
freight transportation is projected at about 18,700 billion ton-km in 2050 and just over 
31,000 billion ton-km in 2095.  These are impacted by 23% and 25% reductions in 
the All-Delay policy case by 2095, respectively, which indicate a greater impact on 
freight than passenger transportation in China.   
 
 
Figure 5-18: China Transportation Energy Use. 
 
 
The impact on transportation services in the U.S. is not as great as in China for both 
passenger and freight transportation services although it is useful to note that while 
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in the earlier half of the 21st century, China expends more energy for less 
transportation services owing to the much greater efficiency of the U.S. transportation 
technologies and system. In 2050, projected Reference scenario U.S. passenger 
transportation is about 15, 000 billion pass-km and decreases by less than 3% in the 
climate mitigation cases. By 2095, passenger transportation increase to just over 
20,000 billion pass-km in the Reference scenario with just about a 4% decline in the 
policy cases. Similar to China, freight transportation takes a bigger hit in the policy 
cases, about a 14% drop from the Reference projection of over 20,000 billion ton-km 
in 2050 to almost 25% in 2095 of the approximately 30,000 billion ton-km Reference 
level.  
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Scenario Cost Implications  
The results presented so far have shown the implications of changing key 
assumptions in climate economic modeling including population growth, GDP 
growth, and economic convergence on regional and global CO2 emissions projections 
which are common sensitivity analyses conducted in the modeling community.  The 
new work and main contribution made in this study is the change to assumptions on 
the rates of diffusion for advanced technologies mainly climate mitigation purposes.  
In the end, once a specified climate mitigation target is applied it is important to 
evaluate the feasibility of the modeled outcomes in terms of breath and pace of 
changes in the global energy system.  Part of that evaluation is done by closer 
examination of the changes to energy production, energy use, and ultimately the cost 
of those transformations.   Even though changing assumptions to population and 
economic growth rates, while leaving the standard GCAM technology diffusion 
assumptions in place, lead to different no-policy emissions trajectories, these can be 
compared to the set of technology delay scenarios given that all of the mitigation 
scenarios meet the same physical CO2 emissions limit in the atmosphere.    
 
Another way to think about the scenario comparison is to postulate different “What 
If” questions?  That is, given a concern for climate damages and therefore a physical 
climate policy target of stabilizing global CO2 concentrations at 420 ppm by 2100, 
what are the implications in terms of cost for meeting that target: 
• If global population increases more than the central UN forecast? 




particularly in the Low- and Middle Income countries? 
• If, conversely, the Low- and Middle Income countries do not “catch up” to the 
income levels of the High Income countries rapidly as commonly expected?    
• If the rate of technology diffusion is not instantaneous and equally distributed 
around the globe as commonly expected in many climate economic models?  
 
Figure 5-20 combines all of the policy mitigation scenarios based on the various 
different assumptions to the examined, key exogenous assumptions by showing the 
marginal cost as represented by the respective global carbon prices. It is important to 
note that these values are in 1990 USD per metric ton of carbon not carbon dioxide 
which is more commonly used.  The non-delay mitigation scenarios exhibit the 
expected carbon prices trajectories starting with the New Reference case –using the 
standard GCAM assumptions– which steadily increase over time starting just below 
$110/TC in 2015, hitting about $285/TC in 2050, and ending under $680/TC by 2095. 
The non-delay scenarios range from the high of the High Population Policy Scenario 
hitting just under $1,050/TC in 2095 to the lower trajectory of the Low Convergence 
Scenario --where the Low- and Middle-Income countries have a slower rate of 
economic growth than the standard policy case—so that the carbon price is estimated 
at $525/TC in 2095.    
 
They key test for the delay scenarios and a key insight from this study is the impact 
on the carbon price of the technology delay scenarios. These are clearly identified in 




delay scenarios so that the increase over the standard New Reference Policy scenario 
ranged between 65% and 85% percent in that year (see Figure 5-21 for the percent 
changes over the New Reference Policy for all the scenarios).  This result is a clear 
indication that the assumptions made on the rates of diffusion for advanced mitigation 
technologies between High Income and Low and Middle Income countries matter just 
as much or more than other key assumptions made in climate economic modeling.  
 
 
Figure 5-20: Global Mitigation Policy Marginal Costs.    
 
 
The policy cost of achieving the same global climate target can also be used to 
compare the scenarios but more caution is needed as policy costs are estimated as the 
cost of hitting the target versus a baseline case where no policy is implemented and 
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Comparison of Total Policy Cost




This can be seen in the comparison of policy costs among the mitigation scenarios 
(Figure 5-22) corresponding to the High Population scenario, the NewReference 
scenario, and the delay scenario for the global electric power sector 
(PolicyElecNucDelay).   Similar to the marginal costs shown above, the global total 
policy cost of the Delay Scenario is greater than the other two from 2030 through 
2045 (just over $2 trillion 1990 USD) when most of the technology delay 
assumptions are in place.  Global policy costs in terms of the net present value (NPV) 
from 2015 to 2050 at 5% is highest for the Delay scenario at $12.9 trillion, versus 
$9.4 trillion for the standard mitigation approach where all technologies are 
instantaneously and equally available worldwide.  Even the High Population scenario 
is less at just over $12.5 trillion in NPV.   It is over the longer term projection out to 
2095 where the much greater CO2 emissions in the High Population case and the 
required greater mitigation lead to higher policy cost starting in 2050 on an annual 
basis.  However, this is a very different baseline or no-policy scenario where the same 
type of experiment on the delay of technology diffusion could be done in the 
corresponding mitigation scenarios.  The NPV estimates of total policy costs out to 
2095 do show the High Population scenario much higher at just over $33.3 trillion.  
The two scenarios that are comparable are the NewReferece Policy scenario at almost 
$21.0 trillion versus the Delay scenario at over $24.3 trillion which indicates that over 
the century the additional cost of the assumed delay in technology diffusion from 






The new scenarios implemented above focus on the question:  What are the 
implications if the rate of technology diffusion is not instantaneous and equally 
distributed around the globe as commonly expected in many climate economic 
models?  To assess another angle on the technology diffusion question an alternative 
scenario was constructed where advanced technologies are implemented first in the 
lower-income countries and later in the high-income countries.  This alternative 
scenario is named “Developing_Advanced” (LDC_Adv) and is defined as follows:  
Alternative Diffusion Scenario  
• Same global mitigation target as the existing scenarios. 
• Focus on the electric power sector and even more specifically only on 
advanced fossil generation with CCS and advanced nuclear power; 
• Country technology diffusion defined by: 
o Delay deployment in High Income countries by 30 years and then 
gradually allow deployment by adjustment of the share weight 
parameters.   
o Allow immediate deployment of advanced technologies in China, 
India, (rest of) S&E Asia, Former Soviet Union, and Latin America. 
o Keep the deployment to the Middle East and Africa the same as in the 
current Delay scenario.        
Result from this alternative scenario follow below with a focus on evaluating global 
electric power generation, CO2 emissions for China and the US, and global carbon 






Figure 5-23: Global Electric Power Generation in an Alternative scenario.  
 
In comparing global electric power generation from the “All Delay” scenario 
(PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay) from Figure 5-15 to the alternative scenario in 
Figure 5-23 the most notable difference is the absence of the abrupt transition or 
punctuation around 2050 in the “All Delay” scenario.  In a scenario where the lower-
income countries (particularly China, India, and Latin America) deploy advanced 
technologies before the high-income countries, the over global transformation is a 
smoother transition than the original “All Delay” case. The reason is because the 
majority of projected GHG emissions over the course of the century are expected 
from the lower-income countries (See figure 2-1).  As a result, more GHG mitigation 
and advanced technologies are projected to be required in the lower-income countries.  
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reliance first on new nuclear power, and then on CCS on both coal and gas plants, and 
an increasing share of non-hydro renewable power.  
 
 
Figure 5-24: China CO2 Emissions in an Alternative scenario.  
 
 
Figure 5-25: U.S. CO2 Emissions in an Alternative scenario.  
 
The changes from the power sectors in China and the U.S. are reflected in those 



















































where the Developing_Advanced (LDC_Adv) is compared to the standard main 
policy scenario, “NewReference_Policy”, and the All Delay scenario.  As expected 
the move for China is in the opposite direction as more GHG reductions occurs in the 
Developing_Advanced scenario. This is indicated by the LDC_Advance line showing 
greater mitigation than both of the two other scenarios.  For the U.S., the alternative 
scenario shows mitigation effort closer to the standard policy scenario (the purple 
“LDC_Adavce” line proximity to the black “NewReference_Policy” line).  This is 
also expected since the alternative scenario places constraints on advanced power 
generation technologies on the U.S. and other high-income countries until later 
decades whereas the major lower-income countries can deploy those technologies 
from the start.  
 























The cost implication of the alternative scenario are captured in Figure 5-26 and also 
compared to the other main scenarios in terms of the global marginal carbon price.  
The LDC_Advance (black dashed line) scenario initially falls between the All_Delay 
(light blue) scenario and the standard GCAM policy (purple) scenario and then 
gradually increases over the standard, all country-technology availability scenario.  It 
is initially surprising that the carbon price of the alternative LDC_Advance does not 
increase as much as the All_Delay scenario (where delays are in place for the lower-
income countries) but this again reflects the requirement that most mitigation occur in 
the lower-income countries.  Since those countries have earlier access to advanced   
technologies the costs should be lower than the case where they do not.  In addition, 
the high-income countries can still mitigate CO2 emissions with the available 
standard set of technologies available in GCAM; it is only the advanced technologies 
of CCS and next generation nuclear power that are delayed for the high-income 
countries. Once those advanced technologies are available to the higher-income 
countries the carbon price start to track similarly to the standard policy mitigation 
scenario that has no specified delays for either group of counties. The overall insight 
from this alternative scenario help to further stress the importance, especially in 
keeping costs down, of incentivizing advanced technology diffusion to the lower-







6. Observation, conclusions, and implication for 
modeling climate mitigation targets  
 
 
This final section will cover two sub-sections with observations and implications of 
this study for climate economic modelers who interpret and use modeling results.    
Over the last decade there have been over 1,300 global GHG emission scenarios 
created by the internal modeling community that have covered a plethora of 
variations on inputs, assumptions, and modeling approaches.  There are two main 
scenario databases —which include baseline and mitigation scenarios— available to 
the research community for the purposes of maintaining, comparing, and assessing 
data related to GHG emissions drivers and their results.  The first database is the 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Scenarios database maintained by the National Institute 
for Environmental Studies in Japan (NIES, 2012) which contains data of the past 
IPCC reports, including the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, Third 
Assessment Report, and Fourth Assessment Report as well many of the underlying 
scenarios efforts such as the International Energy Workshop Poll, the Energy 
Modeling Forum, as well as directly from individual researchers.  The second, more 
recent scenarios database is the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) initiative 
housed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria 
(IIASA, 2013).   The objective of the SSP database is to catalogue and document 
GHG projections from Integrated Assessment Modeling scenarios in order to 
facilitate research among the broader community including areas of climate change 
climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation.  There also have been 




Assessment Report on Mitigation in Chapter 3 (Fisher et al, 2007) and the National 
Academies of Sciences 2010 report Limiting the Magnitude of Future Climate 
Change, Chapter 2: Goals for Limiting Future Climate Change (de la Chesnaye and 
Clarke, 2010).  (There is also a draft of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on 
Mitigation but that will not be officially approved and published until mid 2014.)  
While it is not feasible to have reviewed all of the scenarios in the literature, I have 
reviewed most of the key scenarios studies and major assessments to appreciate the 
range of main variations on inputs, assumptions, and modeling approaches used by 
the principal research groups in this field.  In the development of reference or no-
policy cases the main drivers of GHG emissions, and therefore possibilities of 
modifications to those drivers, include population growth, economic growth, the type, 
use, and advancement of technologies, and changes in landuse (not covered in this 
dissertation).  In the development of climate mitigation scenarios, for a given policy 
target, there are two traditional areas of focus: The first is the how the policy or 
policies will be realized, e.g., is it a globally comprehensive target with full 
international participation (similar to what many modeling groups use to reach the 2 
degree target)? Or is a globally fragmented set of policies with each nation pledging 
its own goals and letting the resulting GHG emissions and CO2 concentrations fallout 
from that, as is the case reported from the last two UNFCCC international 
negotiations (Economist, 2013).  The second area of focus in the modeling 
community on mitigation scenarios is on the role or availability of technology, more 
specifically advanced mitigation technologies to more cost-effectively reduce GHG 





Just ahead of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Mitigation there is a forthcoming 
special issue journal in Climatic Change (Weyant, 2014) covering the most recent 
coordinated, international study organized the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford 
University on global GHG emissions scenarios.  The study (EMF-27) includes 18 
climate-economic and integrated assessment modeling team from Europe, Japan and 
the U.S. that evaluated global technology strategies for climate mitigation under 
various assumptions on long-term global climate policies and technology availability 
and their interactions.  The synthesis policy paper (Blanford, et al, 2014) provides an 
overview of the multi-model comparison in the study that included two harmonized 
long-term climate targets.  The first target is to achieve a concentration of 450 ppm 
CO2-e by 2100 allowing temporary overshoot of the target.  These targets are CO2-
equivilant (CO2-e) which include other GHGs such as methane and nitrous oxide 
meaning that they are more stringent than CO2-only targets since allowance is needed 
for the radiative forcing of the other gases (IPCC, 2007).  As a consequence the 450 
ppm CO2-e target is roughly equivalent to a 370 ppm CO2 target.  The second target 
is a 550 ppm CO2-e (or ~ 450 ppm CO2) which must be exceeded during the 21st 
century.  This second target is consistent with the climate policy scenario run in this 
dissertation.  In the EMF-27 study there also were two fragmented policies based on 
national and regional emissions targets.  The EMF-27 study results stress the 
importance of international cooperation and an appreciable divergence from the 
current trajectory of policy commitments if global concentrations anywhere 




illustrate the heavy dependence on negative emissions in future decades if modeled 
tight targets are to be met and a consideration for this dependence in the policy 
debate. 
 
In the same EMF-27 study there is also a technology synthesis paper (Kriegler, et al, 
2014) that provides a summary on the role of technology in climate mitigation targets. 
There are two main findings from the study worth noting here. The first is that an  
extrapolation of current fragmented policy actions or energy intensity improvement 
rates are insufficient to keeping emissions from exceeding global concentrations of 
550 ppm CO2-e, however there is considerable uncertainty about the emissions 
implications of long-term climate targets from the various models.  Second, GHG 
mitigation pathways show significant transformation of the global energy system 
through increased energy intensity improvements and the electrification of energy 
end-use coupled with a rapid decarbonization of the electricity sector.  The study 
continues to highlight how important technology is toward meeting achieving climate 
mitigation targets and helping to transform the energy sectors of principally the 
developing countries off of their non-policy trajectories.  Finally, the broad 
availability of advanced technologies is re-evaluated with more emphasis on the 
different between the 450 ppm and the 550 ppm CO2-e targets where the global costs 






In early 2014 edition of Climatic Change special issue there are 22 issue-specific 
papers covering various dimensions of climate change policy and related mitigation 
technologies plus the two technology and policy overview papers described above.  
Out of the whole set there are four papers that specifically address technology 
diffusion (Sano, et al, 2014) or availability (van Vilet, et al, 2014), technology 
interdependence (Kanudia, et al, 2014), and the value of technology development 
(Tavoni, et al, 2014). However, the approach taken with respect to differences 
between countries or regions on technology diffusion is the same standard approach 
as is customary, that is, there is no modeled difference in rates of technology 
diffusion between countries.  In the Sano, et al, paper (2014), technology diffusion is 
modeled with a focus on renewable intermittency which is a challenge with a global 
climate-economic model due to the level of geographic aggregation. The study uses    
four different representations for renewable intermittency to highlight the importance 
of advancing the regional specificity of renewable availability for what they term 
more “realistic evaluations of climate change mitigation scenarios”.  The study also 
reinforces the importance or value of CCS technologies to keeping marginal 
mitigation down with stringent climate targets.  Kanudia, et al, paper (2014) also 
evaluates the importance of dealing with renewable intermittency of renewable power 
but goes a step further in structuring the analysis to assess the interdependence or 
timing of various electric sector mitigation technologies.   They find that the 
technology development of the intermittent renewables, that is wind and solar, are 
more dependent on stable baseload power such as nuclear and fossil generation with 




value of biomass energy can be extended with its connection to CCS technologies 
resulting in a “negative emissions” option.   Examining the importance of limiting 
climate mitigation technologies is the focus of the van Vilet, et al, paper (2014) which 
uses the IMAGE integrated model and finds that limits on technologies, from 
whatever reason, e.g., technological or public acceptance related, exacerbate pressure 
on near-term mitigation requirements if a long-term target is to be realized.  The 
study further highlights the importance on the negative emissions option of BECS.  
The IMAGE modeling approach continues to use the same technology diffusion 
assumptions, just delay equally across all regions, to achieve the long-term globally 
harmonized climate target.   The last paper on technological evolution by Tavoni et al 
(2014) covers familiar ground on the value of technology availability to confront 
climate targets and updates the literature from previous coordinated international 
studies including Weyant 2004 and Clarke et al 2008.  In addition, the newer paper 
includes more recent work on technical change and the connection between technical 
progress and market failures that prevent clear signals for learning and innovation.    
This assessment of the most current literature on climate mitigation studies, with 
some emphasis on technology diffusion or evolution, shows that the standard 
approach on assumptions on technology diffusion between countries remains the 
same as in previous research and studies, that is, technology mainly diffuses as the 
same rate and across all countries at the same time.  
 
Outside the special issues of Climatic Change (2014) a GCAM-related paper that 




employs GCAM to evaluate stringent climate mitigation policies under different rates 
of technology diffusion (or diffusion constraints) based not on an assessment of 
technology converge as present above but rather on other factors such as limits 
caused by possible institutional, behavioral, and social issues.  The research in this 
dissertation is also different in how technology diffusion was modeled both in 
changes to the standard GCAM approach (refer back to Section 4.3) and to 
geographic granularity of technology diffusion.  In the Iyer at al approach, expansion 
constraints are placed only on technologies in the electric power sector, that is, 
nuclear power, CCS, and renewables.  The approach taken in this dissertation  
included the power sector but also expanded to cover the modeling of different 
technology diffusion delays to the transportation and the petroleum refining sectors.  
In addition, this effort implemented different diffusion rates (delays) for the lower-
income countries whereas the Iyer el at analysis imposed diffusion rates on a global 
level.  Even with the different modeling approaches and stated underlying reasons for 
differences in diffusion rates, the conclusions of both analyses are similar: delay or 
limits on the diffusion of technology have an appreciable impact on the costs and 
feasibility of meeting stringent climate mitigation policies.  Furthermore, both 
analyses highlight the importance of deploying advanced technologies in the power 
sector including nuclear power, CCS, and renewables.  Comparing the differences in 
modeling approaches and implementation would be a useful exercise in further 
research with GCAM.    
 
Beyond the recent climate economic modeling literature, research on technology 




dissertation.   It is important to recognize that even in rapid pace of globalization that 
exist in the early part of the 21st century there is not a “global pool of technology” as 
pointed out in Keller’s study (2004) on international technology diffusion even while 
acknowledging that foreign sources of technology explain a significant fraction of the 
productivity growth in the lower-income countries.  There are distinct patterns of 
technology diffusion based on existing financial flows (trade, FDI, and private sectors 
agreements) and motivated by government technology transfer programs (See Section  
2.2).   In addition, there are also historical-geographic patterns to technology 
diffusion between higher-income and lower-income regions that should be 
recognized.   More specific to renewable power Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) evaluated 
the diffusion of non-hydro renewable energy technologies for electricity generation 
across 108 developing countries between 1980 and 2010.  They found that the 
positive determinants of technology diffusion include implementation of stabilizing 
economic reforms and instruments, a diverse portfolio of power generation 
technologies, higher per capita incomes and education levels, and stable, democratic 
regimes. Factors that slowed the diffusion of renewable technologies included, in the 
power sector, growth of electricity consumption and high fossil power generation, 
and from the policy side, institutional and strategic policy support programs.   A 
World Bank study (2008) on technology diffusion identified comparable issues and 
stated that most lower-income countries do not possess the same ability as higher-
income countries to generate innovations at the technological frontier due to nascent 
domestic technology sectors, lower education levels, lack of protection for intellectual 




other factors.   These studies reinforce the modeling approach introduced in this 
dissertation of implementing a delay on technology diffusion based on the 
classification of countries by their income groups.  
 
The key results from this dissertation show that the cost of meeting the same climate 
target could be appreciably higher when different assumptions on diffusion rate of 
climate mitigation technologies between countries are used.  Marginal costs, 
expressed at $/TC start of much higher as soon as the mitigation policy is 
implemented and reach 65% to 70% above the standard mitigation scenarios for the 
Electric Sector and Electric and Transportation Sectors Delay scenarios.  Marginal 
costs above the standard mitigation scenario are more than 80% in Delay scenario 
than combines the Electric, Transportation, and Refining Sectors.  In terms of Total 
Policy Costs, the All Sector Delay scenario more than 30% greater than the standard 
mitigation scenario through 2050.  The scenarios with delays for lower-income 
groups for technology diffusion and the alternative delay scenario where lower-
income countries deploy first all point to the critical importance of incentivizing 
advanced technology diffusion to the lower-income countries in order to deal with 
their significant, project growth of emissions over the 21st century.   
 
The assumptions on technical diffusion used in this research are based on historical 
rates of technological convergence across three main energy-related sectors covering 
electricity production, petroleum refining and transportation across more than 128 
countries.  With these results in mind, a few observations and recommendations are 





• More detailed work is needed on sectoral and technology specific assessment 
on a historical basis to develop various rates of technology diffusion.  For 
example, more detailed studies of how power generation technologies diffused 
in the past to countries at different levels of industrialization and income.  
Other areas to further explore are the electric power fossil efficiency rates that 
currently show general 30-year gap between the performance of OECD 
(higher-income) and non-OECD (lower-income) groups plus the newer 
experience with renewable power expansion in those two groups.   
 
• Analysis on various factors that drive technology diffusion could help 
improve forward-looking scenarios in climate economic models.  For 
example, other factors that may influence or retard technology diffusion could 
be common languages, common industrial standards and practices, historical 
ties and allegiances (e.g., Latin America and Spain, U.K. and Commonwealth 
countries), possible the strengths of trade flows between regions (i.e., trade 
agreements and trade facilitation); and the degree of income equality between 
different regions.  
 
• For many climate economic models it may be difficult to specify different 
rates of technology diffusion depending on the level of technology and region 
detail.  Analysts employing these more aggregated, simplified models should 




technology performance  in an effort to simulate different scenarios than the 
ones where the best, advanced technologies are immediately and equally 
availably globally.  
 
• Lastly, climate economic modelers should include in their core set of 
sensitivity analyses different rates of technology diffusion, especially for very 
advanced technologies that have not been commercially demonstrated at scale, 
for example carbon capture and storage (CCSW) or even more bio-energy 
with CCS, that can mean achieving a tight climate mitigation target or not, for  
example the 2 degree C target that is a principal focus of the international 
climate negotiations.  
 
• The cost and difficulty of climate mitigation targets are likely underestimated 
because of the overly optimistic assumptions of technology diffusion in the 
recent and current round of climate economic studies (IPCC, etc). 
 
• Assumptions on technology diffusion are just as important and influence the 
estimates of meeting climate targets just as much or more than the 
assumptions on population growth, GDP growth, and economic convergence.  
Technology diffusion and more particularly technology transfer could be an 
important policy option where decision-makers and policymakers could have 
more direct impact on mitigation and keeping the cost down on meeting tights 




in the control of most governments (China as the main exception) and many 
governments actively encourage greater population growth. Similarly with 
economic growth as counties continue to promote higher levels of economic 
growth, and those in the Low- and Middle income countries want to catch up 
as fast as possible.  Globally coordinated policy mitigation policies, as 
pursued under the UNFCCC do not seem to be making sufficient progress on 
reducing emissions.  Perhaps a strategy of promoting grater technology 
diffusion could help start reducing emissions in the short-term and also 
decrease global mitigation costs in the long-term given a particular mitigation 




Appendix A -- Data used in Section 3: Testing Technological 
Convergence 
 
Oil Refining measure KTOE/GDP (2000 USD GDP) 
Country 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2008
Albania 429.5 448.2 213.0 204.1 248.5 89.7 45.0 52.6 32.1
Algeria 96.1 131.9 303.4 325.7 311.4 267.4 257.2 179.8 197.8
Angola 78.7 92.0 154.4 153.9 156.5 175.0 153.2 78.4 58.7
Argentina 234.2 205.8 225.3 179.3 189.6 161.7 185.9 150.2 131.7
Australia 85.3 102.3 83.8 69.4 72.2 68.0 54.9 40.0 39.5
Austria 56.9 57.6 50.8 42.5 42.1 39.4 33.9 29.2 28.1
Bahrain 4012.9 2058.3 2187.4 2320.8 1894.3 1572.9 1168.5 915.5 797.8
Bangladesh 44.3 53.1 63.2 42.3 39.5 33.8 29.5 22.5 16.8
Belgium 166.8 140.7 127.7 113.3 114.7 115.3 113.8 94.1 94.3
Bolivia 173.5 212.1 212.3 205.0 224.8 227.0 195.8 158.3 179.8
Brazil 108.2 118.9 110.7 103.4 98.3 97.8 111.3 101.0 93.2
Brunei Darussalam 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.5 51.8 62.9 65.4 68.3 73.9
Bulgaria 696.7 679.8 585.3 455.4 195.0 335.9 242.3 235.6 209.2
Cameroon 0.0 0.0 98.5 117.1 80.1 133.0 106.1 112.7 114.6
Canada 177.5 172.6 150.9 110.3 114.4 108.9 97.3 88.7 84.9
Chile 145.1 156.1 112.5 105.4 114.9 103.0 101.0 93.1 77.0
China 212.4 305.1 259.6 196.9 166.9 127.1 118.1 108.9 96.7
Colombia 192.6 146.0 121.9 120.6 129.3 129.9 133.2 97.0 86.3
Congo 0.0 0.0 0.0 132.4 124.2 58.0 102.4 99.4 80.8
Costa Rica 85.1 39.8 64.4 74.4 35.0 48.5 17.5 31.4 25.1
Cote d'Ivoire 136.4 196.5 193.8 177.9 183.8 201.1 190.0 237.7 203.6
Cuba 240.5 263.5 214.5 174.1 138.6 69.2 72.0 46.2 103.2
Cyprus 0.0 107.3 97.4 78.6 80.2 61.8 76.2 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 105.0 110.1 115.2 97.7 77.0 78.4 60.2 62.3 60.3
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 63.2 34.3 28.8 6.2 26.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark 81.2 57.2 41.5 42.5 43.7 50.0 33.8 30.0 27.9
Dominican Republic 0.0 156.1 125.0 124.3 89.4 68.3 46.5 53.1 39.5
Ecuador 162.2 137.5 230.4 228.7 262.8 259.7 254.0 208.3 204.1
Egypt 375.1 581.2 571.6 522.2 469.9 426.0 360.4 297.7 264.1
El Salvador 60.6 71.4 64.5 72.0 74.8 56.7 62.8 48.0 43.6
Finland 115.8 124.2 107.4 78.2 83.4 91.3 69.6 69.6 70.9
Former USSR 594.1 631.2 581.3 475.0 384.9 334.2 301.6 260.7 238.3
Former Yugoslavia 121.4 144.3 116.9 129.6 112.5 90.9 76.0 63.4 57.9
France 113.9 108.9 76.8 54.6 50.2 50.2 45.8 40.3 40.0
Gabon 304.3 119.6 176.0 92.5 30.5 81.0 59.0 69.8 94.3
Germany 91.8 82.5 69.5 57.0 46.0 47.6 42.6 42.7 39.6
Ghana 192.3 286.0 267.1 194.7 162.8 135.3 131.2 84.0 101.8
Greece 52.4 85.3 108.7 107.7 93.5 118.7 104.4 88.6 82.5
Guatemala 92.0 63.1 51.6 36.7 33.7 36.7 34.4 2.4 1.7
Honduras 212.9 136.6 57.6 40.1 68.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 127.5 148.0 128.9 112.5 106.8 101.8 80.4 75.3 73.5
India 133.2 132.7 142.5 171.1 147.3 131.7 173.8 162.9 156.9
Indonesia 222.0 183.7 184.6 233.6 234.3 195.7 215.6 161.6 140.7
Iran 395.9 295.2 311.0 318.8 401.4 483.3 497.3 394.3 365.6
Iraq 561.7 682.6 606.0 1491.7 1229.1 1394.5 1538.2 833.2 924.1
Ireland 78.7 43.7 13.0 24.8 22.9 20.5 20.8 15.3 15.0
Source: IEA. 2010a.IEA. 2010b.  
Israel 165.4 159.0 133.5 122.0 116.9 101.8 90.1 82.8 78.0
Italy 147.2 107.9 82.0 69.6 62.2 58.0 56.2 55.5 52.9
Jamaica 209.3 138.3 101.6 100.0 99.0 60.5 92.5 87.6 100.0
Japan 106.1 100.7 75.2 51.0 49.2 51.6 48.7 43.7 41.7
Jordan 219.4 398.4 379.2 361.0 404.0 404.1 388.0 309.0 235.9
Kenya 464.4 393.7 308.0 186.1 159.5 121.5 106.3 86.1 73.8
Korea 176.3 181.8 168.0 120.2 148.7 182.3 174.2 142.0 129.4
Korea, DPR 0.0 0.0 144.5 98.3 124.5 79.0 47.7 28.2 34.1
Kuwait 283.4 390.5 391.4 783.2 119.4 739.2 592.1 525.1 472.9
Lebanon 125.4 341.0 149.5 68.5 40.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Libya 24.1 83.7 155.8 389.2 418.2 476.6 465.9 297.9 295.4
Malaysia 248.2 234.9 165.9 197.0 177.9 197.6 212.3 160.8 163.2
Mexico 89.2 99.5 113.4 123.3 118.0 108.6 87.8 80.1 73.9
Morocco 96.2 129.3 170.0 140.9 139.4 127.2 135.3 98.0 81.8
Mozambique 437.3 160.2 198.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Myanmar 653.7 484.7 405.3 335.0 207.7 165.5 123.5 61.3 48.3
Netherlands + Antilles 373.4 283.7 220.0 199.9 181.0 184.4 157.1 141.9 99.2
New Zealand 60.1 59.9 48.2 39.4 70.0 56.4 53.8 46.5 46.5
Nicaragua 145.8 157.7 180.5 151.8 219.9 187.5 232.0 168.2 140.8
Nigeria 49.5 52.6 147.4 151.8 255.9 186.7 158.7 48.7 35.9
Norway 57.8 66.2 49.1 41.5 66.3 62.6 52.5 55.1 48.0
Oman 0.0 0.0 0.0 182.7 175.5 155.4 117.3 129.6 137.8
Pakistan 165.1 124.9 132.7 120.8 107.5 80.0 110.3 98.0 86.6
Panama 957.6 643.7 224.2 125.1 133.6 199.6 167.8 0.0 0.0
Paraguay 92.5 73.2 57.1 44.9 47.8 23.6 14.8 0.0 0.0
Peru 123.7 127.4 150.3 161.1 168.4 125.6 123.0 96.2 84.0
Philippines 288.1 219.2 179.3 152.3 174.5 250.0 178.8 97.2 75.3
Poland 66.1 88.5 78.3 72.0 69.5 71.5 70.9 66.1 61.4
Portugal 60.5 67.5 78.3 78.6 71.7 80.6 70.5 71.5 63.2
Qatar 2.9 32.1 33.4 125.1 180.6 192.1 102.6 129.7 90.1
Romania 425.1 362.5 286.6 257.7 191.6 161.7 154.6 137.2 116.8
Saudi Arabia 370.8 171.2 148.7 324.6 331.1 352.3 316.3 311.4 296.0
Senegal 175.9 178.9 179.5 107.7 105.7 116.7 131.0 36.6 82.9
Singapore 1507.5 1422.7 1510.3 1051.6 876.7 667.1 415.0 394.2 380.0
Slovakia 276.8 277.7 266.1 208.6 199.5 157.1 164.8 124.2 108.8
South Africa 116.5 97.7 87.1 92.4 107.5 127.3 128.7 91.8 88.1
Spain 85.8 97.0 84.2 82.7 73.7 67.3 58.4 52.7 49.7
Sri Lanka 287.6 232.4 202.7 156.2 124.5 126.3 106.7 81.0 62.9
Sudan 79.9 80.7 65.2 73.8 71.9 35.8 92.3 123.8 90.2
Sweden 64.6 71.2 64.7 61.3 69.0 78.5 65.6 51.8 53.0
Switzerland 22.8 21.6 15.9 15.7 15.4 16.9 14.2 14.6 12.8
Syria 437.2 310.7 738.8 806.5 856.6 602.9 551.6 428.5 371.7
Thailand 235.5 250.1 180.2 146.7 124.4 225.2 262.7 239.4 229.1
Trinidad and Tobago 3741.0 2521.3 892.0 550.0 724.5 625.2 685.6 427.3 393.9
Tunisia 202.3 139.7 142.2 128.7 108.8 97.0 77.6 55.7 53.0
Turkey 74.5 83.0 78.8 87.8 82.7 78.1 69.9 51.0 45.2
United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.0 51.1 234.4 179.1 169.4 167.7 117.5 94.3
United Kingdom 103.5 86.1 66.0 58.3 60.3 56.2 40.5 36.0 34.0
Source: IEA. 2010a.IEA. 2010b.  
United Republic of 
Tanzania 199.9 152.4 104.6 101.2 84.8 63.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
United States 143.1 147.0 118.7 101.0 94.0 85.3 74.4 66.9 64.9
Uruguay 187.0 175.8 127.4 87.0 95.9 100.7 105.0 100.1 99.3
Venezuela 1048.9 607.9 477.4 486.6 489.7 461.7 448.2 366.3 324.9
Yemen 1535.7 470.4 641.8 561.0 612.2 299.3 252.0 176.9 200.1
Zambia 0.0 173.0 139.0 108.1 104.4 81.5 36.4 50.3 54.0
Std Dev 579.6 357.6 289.7 304.9 257.5 238.1 218.0 151.1 144.3
Mean 288.4 236.3 212.0 209.4 191.5 181.2 165.3 128.5 120.2
Coefficient of  2.0 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Moving Avg 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
Source: IEA. 2010a.IEA. 2010b.  
Chemical & Petrochemical measure KTOE/GDP (2000 USD GDP) 
Country
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2008
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.5 4.3 3.9
Algeria 0.0 0.4 9.2 12.0 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1
Australia 1.5 4.6 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.1 3.2 3.2 2.9
Austria 3.3 3.1 1.7 1.5 2.3 2.4 2.8 3.0 2.8
Bahrain 0.0 0.0 0.0 143.6 138.2 102.8 97.3 76.4 76.0
Bangladesh 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium 14.6 11.1 9.6 8.5 7.7 8.2 8.6 8.8 8.6
Botswana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Brazil 5.6 5.7 7.2 6.9 6.9 7.2 8.0 7.8 6.9
Bulgaria 47.8 45.4 0.0 0.0 108.2 106.4 47.4 32.6 26.5
Canada 5.1 4.8 8.6 7.9 7.1 6.8 4.6 4.0 3.6
Chile 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4
China 13.7 16.0 141.5 65.9 61.3 60.2 31.8 29.9 28.8
Colombia 1.3 6.8 12.5 10.3 10.4 9.7 10.6 8.8 9.6
Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.1 3.6 2.2 1.9
Cote d'Ivoire 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.0 0.3
Cuba 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5
Cyprus 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czech Republic 16.2 9.5 7.8 7.8 7.1 8.5 12.0 13.2 9.1
Denmark 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9
Finland 6.5 7.1 6.1 7.6 7.0 7.0 3.4 3.8 4.7
Former USSR 74.4 90.1 63.8 60.8 20.2 36.8 38.0 27.7 22.4
Former Yugoslavia 13.9 8.7 11.9 14.6 11.1 8.3 4.5 7.6 4.6
France 6.1 5.2 4.6 4.6 3.9 3.4 4.0 3.2 3.2
Gabon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Germany 13.3 12.1 10.4 9.2 5.4 4.5 3.7 3.2 3.7
Greece 2.6 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.0
Hungary 13.5 14.8 14.1 14.6 12.1 10.5 8.6 5.5 5.4
Iceland 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.1
India 10.3 14.6 18.0 18.5 18.5 16.1 10.1 5.7 4.9
Indonesia 4.6 6.7 5.6 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.4 2.6 2.0
Iran 31.9 21.4 1.5 1.8 20.8 16.2 26.5 22.0 34.5
Iraq 10.9 8.0 0.0 0.0 43.9 34.9 38.7 20.9 23.2
Ireland 0.7 0.8 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.4
Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0
Italy 13.5 11.2 5.7 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.1 3.4 2.8
Japan 8.2 6.1 3.6 3.2 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.5
Jordan 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 0.8 1.0 0.6
Korea 2.4 2.5 9.8 6.7 11.1 10.0 8.9 8.6 8.3
Kuwait 7.4 10.1 9.6 16.1 0.1 9.8 24.9 15.8 15.8
Luxembourg 7.0 9.8 7.5 5.8 2.3 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.5
Mexico 5.6 7.1 9.8 15.1 13.1 7.5 5.2 3.2 3.1
Morocco 0.6 0.8 1.6 0.9 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.1
Myanmar 1.0 3.4 4.2 9.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 16.1 11.0 17.9 14.9 11.3 10.8 9.2 7.1 6.5
New Zealand 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.4 0.4
Source: IEA. 2010a.IEA. 2010b.  
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 5.4 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.4
Norway 7.4 6.2 6.1 4.6 3.6 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.4
Pakistan 11.4 14.1 1.8 1.0 1.3 12.1 11.2 13.9 9.1
Philippines 3.2 5.1 2.5 2.5 3.0 5.7 4.3 3.7 2.5
Poland 30.1 28.0 29.1 23.0 23.2 19.8 14.5 11.8 10.1
Portugal 3.4 3.3 3.9 4.2 3.2 2.6 3.4 2.8 2.8
Qatar 0.0 10.1 41.7 89.5 84.9 78.9 58.0 52.1 36.9
Romania 64.5 39.1 29.4 114.9 68.9 50.7 33.0 20.9 20.6
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Senegal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.0 1.1
Singapore 0.8 0.8 1.1 2.3 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 11.1 10.3 20.3 20.7 15.3 8.0 8.3
South Africa 6.0 6.4 6.3 6.2 5.6 7.4 4.6 8.2 7.1
Spain 4.7 5.5 5.8 4.5 4.5 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.5
Sweden 5.0 4.7 3.7 3.6 5.6 7.1 5.3 2.1 1.9
Switzerland 0.7 1.3 1.5 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.9
Syria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 14.2 24.5 17.5 16.8
Thailand 0.8 5.4 4.0 4.5 6.0 9.4 8.3 8.2 7.3
Togo 1.3 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.5 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 3.5 5.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 4.8 4.3
Turkey 3.4 3.1 3.8 2.8 4.3 3.7 3.5 4.4 2.0
United Arab Emirates 50.5 34.4 50.9 156.3 209.9 230.2 143.4 81.7 96.3
United Kingdom 7.8 7.6 6.9 4.6 3.7 3.3 3.4 2.4 2.2
United States 4.3 5.1 4.1 3.3 8.5 8.2 7.8 5.8 5.7
Venezuela 0.6 13.5 14.1 20.6 26.5 46.0 38.3 32.0 27.9
Zambia 11.8 9.2 6.6 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Std Dev 14.3 13.3 19.5 30.2 33.8 33.4 22.5 15.3 15.8
Mean 8.1 7.9 9.1 13.5 14.8 14.8 11.7 9.0 8.6
Coefficient of  1.8 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.8
Moving Avg 1.8 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.8
Source: IEA. 2010a.IEA. 2010b.  
Electricity consumption/GDP (kWh per 2000 USD)
Country 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2008
Albania 0.6795 0.9713 1.0227 1.2969 0.5579 0.9108 0.9158 0.6054 0.7629
Algeria 0.1137 0.1327 0.1982 0.2501 0.3069 0.3415 0.3967 0.4089 0.437
Angola 0.0834 0.0727 0.0802 0.0814 0.0798 0.0988 0.1487 0.1429 0.1396
Argentina 0.1266 0.1499 0.1696 0.2029 0.2171 0.2306 0.291 0.2945 0.2813
Australia 0.297 0.3665 0.4232 0.4685 0.5231 0.4863 0.4978 0.4697 0.4655
Austria 0.272 0.2879 0.296 0.3046 0.3196 0.312 0.3067 0.3132 0.3029
Bahrain 0.3263 0.2978 0.4809 0.7693 0.6119 0.7145 0.744 0.8078 0.7811
Bangladesh 0.0398 0.0716 0.088 0.1382 0.1748 0.2522 0.3021 0.4295 0.4499
Belgium 0.2733 0.3019 0.3176 0.3396 0.3506 0.3735 0.3631 0.3546 0.3397
Benin 0.0391 0.0725 0.1023 0.0991 0.1279 0.1478 0.1837 0.2126 0.2124
Bolivia 0.185 0.1884 0.2637 0.2927 0.3221 0.3888 0.4096 0.4231 0.478
Brazil 0.2108 0.2317 0.3068 0.3814 0.4425 0.4658 0.4739 0.5078 0.5019
Brunei Darussalam 0.0819 0.0559 0.0978 0.1593 0.2401 0.3599 0.3685 0.4497 0.4737
Bulgaria 3.047 3.0457 2.9618 2.8701 2.7418 3.0568 2.3565 1.9069 1.7877
Cameroon 0.2921 0.2895 0.2375 0.2049 0.276 0.2758 0.25 0.3588 0.3737
Canada 0.6982 0.7191 0.7707 0.83 0.8524 0.8173 0.708 0.6459 0.653
Chile 0.3285 0.4051 0.3627 0.4137 0.4049 0.4255 0.5235 0.544 0.5331
Chinese Taipei 0.4141 0.476 0.4662 0.4838 0.5053 0.5206 0.5741 0.574 0.5516
Colombia 0.2841 0.2782 0.3304 0.4054 0.3918 0.3691 0.3635 0.3413 0.3261
Congo 0.0761 0.0781 0.0623 0.1406 0.1565 0.1442 0.1008 0.1115 0.1237
Costa Rica 0.249 0.2697 0.3238 0.3828 0.3656 0.359 0.3719 0.3738 0.3585
Cote d'Ivoire 0.1022 0.1316 0.1983 0.1933 0.2211 0.2465 0.2949 0.3249 0.3518
Cuba 0.2922 0.3312 0.373 0.348 0.3858 0.4386 0.4451 0.3464 0.3414
Cyprus 0.287 0.3226 0.2854 0.2904 0.3113 0.3126 0.3425 0.3901 0.4008
Czech Republic 0.878 0.9458 0.9879 1.0424 1.1087 1.0783 1.0359 0.9184 0.8514
Democratic Republic of 
C
0.4679 0.532 0.5108 0.5744 0.6424 0.8616 1.0977 1.0273 0.9666
Denmark 0.1825 0.2058 0.2348 0.2374 0.2553 0.2446 0.2157 0.2106 0.1998
Dominican Republic 0.182 0.2313 0.2394 0.2668 0.2171 0.2762 0.3712 0.3985 0.3799
Ecuador 0.153 0.1771 0.2801 0.3204 0.3801 0.4599 0.4975 0.5456 0.6515
Egypt 0.3431 0.3905 0.4646 0.5455 0.6015 0.628 0.6982 0.8076 0.7989
El Salvador 0.0892 0.1159 0.16 0.2032 0.2311 0.259 0.2776 0.3187 0.3562
Ethiopia 0.1306 0.1124 0.1325 0.1569 0.1879 0.1959 0.2044 0.2375 0.2232
Finland 0.4345 0.4903 0.5479 0.6051 0.6699 0.7053 0.6537 0.6254 0.5654
Former Soviet Union 1.8063 1.8786 1.9021 2.0053 2.8073 3.3212 2.7807 2.2323 2.0295
Former Yugoslavia 0.7762 0.899 1.0237 1.2051 1.4392 1.1985 1.1501 0.9963 0.9388
France 0.2285 0.2565 0.2922 0.3296 0.3377 0.3529 0.3333 0.3252 0.326
Gabon 0.059 0.0617 0.1562 0.2181 0.194 0.1823 0.2195 0.2548 0.2786
Germany 0.3349 0.3698 0.371 0.3782 0.3238 0.3019 0.2895 0.2927 0.2802
Ghana 1.0302 1.6126 1.8265 1.2502 1.4859 1.4993 1.2762 0.9765 0.8194
Gibraltar 0.119 0.1188 0.1224 0.1228 0.1521 0.1703 0.1673 0.1768 0.1846
Greece 0.1634 0.202 0.2376 0.2849 0.323 0.3703 0.3871 0.3691 0.3719
Guatemala 0.0925 0.1119 0.1194 0.1352 0.1573 0.1885 0.2162 0.2919 0.2848
Haiti 0.0181 0.0372 0.0624 0.0807 0.0706 0.0751 0.0796 0.0916 0.0571
Honduras 0.1423 0.1669 0.2051 0.2775 0.3377 0.372 0.4583 0.4707 0.4932
Hong Kong, China 0.2029 0.1803 0.1758 0.2003 0.208 0.2045 0.2192 0.182 0.1696
Hungary 0.69 0.7079 0.726 0.7984 0.8629 0.8271 0.7089 0.6462 0.6511
Source: IEA. 2010a.IEA. 2010b.  
Iceland 0.4572 0.5459 0.554 0.6071 0.6086 0.65 0.8497 0.85 1.3271
India 0.4662 0.576 0.6433 0.7731 0.9352 0.9313 0.8594 0.81 0.7814
Indonesia 0.0639 0.0747 0.1212 0.1843 0.2712 0.3469 0.5159 0.5387 0.5436
Iraq 0.0527 0.0682 0.177 0.4243 1.2042 2.1438 1.2411 1.5657 1.5611
Ireland 0.2539 0.2783 0.2772 0.3008 0.2777 0.264 0.2232 0.2039 0.2042
Islamic Republic of Iran 0.1723 0.2126 0.4126 0.5929 0.7248 0.8909 1.0346 1.1623 1.0875
Israel 0.2168 0.227 0.2365 0.2472 0.2594 0.2948 0.3305 0.324 0.3226
Italy 0.2246 0.2371 0.2348 0.239 0.2519 0.2624 0.2757 0.2898 0.288
Jamaica 0.2416 0.2369 0.2383 0.2375 0.2198 0.5883 0.6673 0.6413 0.6725
Japan 0.1905 0.2069 0.194 0.1927 0.1946 0.207 0.2127 0.2075 0.1995
Jordan 0.1146 0.2149 0.2351 0.4032 0.6486 0.7402 0.7753 0.8114 0.8661
Kenya 0.2271 0.2538 0.2502 0.2756 0.2862 0.3159 0.2915 0.3382 0.337
Korea 0.1411 0.2046 0.2769 0.2956 0.3466 0.423 0.5389 0.5573 0.5731
Korea, DPR 4.4565 3.2231 2.1961 1.6801 1.6155 1.5508 1.6156 1.6413 1.682
Kuwait 0.0757 0.1658 0.408 0.6549 0.6749 0.6696 0.8174 0.7048 0.6831
Lebanon 0.0977 0.3371 0.2588 0.275 0.2415 0.4292 0.4541 0.4254 0.4012
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.0116 0.0524 0.0953 0.1164 0.2228 0.2735 0.3401 0.4794 0.4646
Luxembourg 0.6683 0.5911 0.5324 0.4709 0.4047 0.3965 0.3231 0.3039 0.2857
Malaysia 0.2635 0.2974 0.3505 0.4282 0.4636 0.5661 0.734 0.6902 0.6775
Malta 0.4927 0.3454 0.3312 0.4178 0.5149 0.4435 0.4405 0.4737 0.4484
Mexico 0.1295 0.1489 0.1562 0.2121 0.2176 0.2552 0.2707 0.2877 0.2792
Morocco 0.1602 0.1908 0.2608 0.276 0.2995 0.3449 0.384 0.4168 0.4206
Mozambique 0.1672 0.282 0.1691 0.2537 0.2835 0.23 1.0631 1.388 1.3003
Myanmar 0.2114 0.2782 0.2529 0.3281 0.3837 0.4057 0.3258 0.2584 0.2518
Nepal 0.0433 0.0622 0.0942 0.1569 0.2011 0.2228 0.2727 0.3351 0.3517
Netherlands 0.2392 0.2683 0.2725 0.2707 0.278 0.2827 0.272 0.2713 0.2645
New Zealand 0.4669 0.5548 0.5978 0.6506 0.7632 0.6816 0.6767 0.6225 0.6117
Nicaragua 0.1869 0.2188 0.285 0.3314 0.4416 0.4249 0.4305 0.4945 0.5045
Nigeria 0.0724 0.1189 0.1405 0.2821 0.2388 0.2305 0.1999 0.2423 0.2595
Norway 0.9016 0.8804 0.8599 0.8265 0.8414 0.7123 0.673 0.5848 0.5902
Oman 0.0035 0.047 0.1468 0.2527 0.304 0.338 0.3813 0.4242 0.4423
Pakistan 0.3215 0.3492 0.4042 0.5099 0.6236 0.6854 0.7101 0.7619 0.6437
Panama 0.1814 0.2294 0.236 0.2741 0.2854 0.3184 0.3365 0.3179 0.295
Paraguay 0.1019 0.1306 0.1772 0.2591 0.3742 0.5414 0.6547 0.647 0.6611
People's Republic of 
Chi
1.1877 1.4224 1.476 1.2301 1.301 1.1462 1.0484 1.2663 1.2496
Peru 0.1895 0.1975 0.2248 0.2607 0.3499 0.2978 0.3472 0.3519 0.3532
Philippines 0.3078 0.3625 0.334 0.3766 0.402 0.4619 0.5352 0.5011 0.48
Poland 0.7189 0.8055 0.9666 1.0129 1.0749 0.8728 0.7193 0.6456 0.5991
Portugal 0.1748 0.2073 0.2469 0.2957 0.3014 0.3366 0.3715 0.4259 0.4217
Qatar 0.0349 0.0681 0.2414 0.4402 0.5037 0.5812 0.5046 0.5595 0.5327
Romania 1.779 1.6542 1.6006 1.5368 1.5134 1.3379 1.1679 0.9827 0.8761
Saudi Arabia 0.0374 0.0457 0.144 0.3665 0.4397 0.5509 0.6655 0.7161 0.7408
Senegal 0.1432 0.1579 0.216 0.2132 0.2241 0.2506 0.2547 0.301 0.2985
Singapore 0.2317 0.278 0.2938 0.3325 0.3363 0.3151 0.3437 0.3018 0.2924
Slovak Republic 0.9559 1.0418 1.3634 1.3965 1.6793 1.4993 1.2818 0.9852 0.8632
South Africa 0.7101 0.889 1.0725 1.3788 1.4344 1.4973 1.4362 1.3534 1.2673
Spain 0.2172 0.2636 0.3061 0.3175 0.3111 0.3288 0.368 0.3978 0.3883
Sri Lanka 0.1713 0.1952 0.2229 0.2591 0.2691 0.2833 0.3421 0.3717 0.3407
Sudan 0.0935 0.1139 0.1132 0.1989 0.1665 0.1471 0.1423 0.1825 0.1812
Source: IEA. 2010a.IEA. 2010b.  
Sweden 0.4609 0.5228 0.5713 0.6805 0.6891 0.6454 0.5743 0.4772 0.4613
Switzerland 0.1726 0.1955 0.2115 0.2297 0.2322 0.2312 0.2299 0.2264 0.218
Syrian Arab Republic 0.2864 0.2353 0.369 0.6414 0.7069 0.7315 0.9436 1.1397 1.1439
Thailand 0.2268 0.3231 0.3661 0.4494 0.5262 0.634 0.7625 0.7969 0.7859
Togo 0.2201 0.2303 0.2028 0.2682 0.3086 0.3872 0.3775 0.4066 0.403
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2189 0.2375 0.2918 0.5088 0.5313 0.6152 0.6145 0.4938 0.5255
Tunisia 0.1715 0.2023 0.3044 0.3812 0.4263 0.4508 0.497 0.4846 0.4704
Turkey 0.1109 0.1537 0.1991 0.2307 0.2821 0.3387 0.4119 0.4209 0.4538
United Arab Emirates 0.0214 0.0691 0.1379 0.3555 0.3396 0.415 0.5582 0.5782 0.6137
United Kingdom 0.3207 0.3116 0.2967 0.2763 0.276 0.2635 0.2399 0.2189 0.2099
United Republic of 
T i
0.1189 0.127 0.1456 0.1669 0.2057 0.244 0.2182 0.2075 0.2315
United States 0.4037 0.4323 0.4342 0.4015 0.4357 0.417 0.3715 0.354 0.3539
Uruguay 0.1613 0.1594 0.1781 0.22 0.24 0.2448 0.2957 0.2706 0.2724
Venezuela 0.1807 0.2092 0.4017 0.4649 0.4901 0.5313 0.556 0.5583 0.5155
Vietnam 0.2223 0.2659 0.3308 0.3619 0.431 0.5616 0.7912 1.1268 1.2351
Yemen 0.1586 0.1415 0.1369 0.2015 0.292 0.2493 0.2646 0.3346 0.3917
Zambia 1.8518 2.105 2.2426 2.2843 2.0079 2.123 1.9473 2.018 1.5552
Zimbabwe 1.0174 1.6021 1.4747 1.4583 1.2868 1.2689 1.4444 2.3371 2.7009
Std Dev 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Mean 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Coefficient of  1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
Moving Avg 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7















region supplysector subsector technology 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
Africa refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Latin America refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
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Southeast Asia refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Japan refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
India refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
India refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
India refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
India refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
India refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Canada refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
China refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
China refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
China refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
China refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
China refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
China refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
China refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
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China refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
China refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
China refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
China refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
China refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Korea refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Middle East refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
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Middle East refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Middle East refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
USA refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
USA refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Unionrefined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids enduse coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids industrial coal to liquids coal to liquids CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids enduse biomass liquids biomass liquids‐FT CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Korea refined liquids industrial biomass liquids biomass liquids‐ethanol CCS Level 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1





2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
elec and other 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
INPUT_TABLE H2 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Variable ID CNG 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1010
calibrated‐value share‐weight
region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnominicam‐en 1990 2005 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
USA trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.493404 0.543212 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.432782 0.497982 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
USA trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 3.483727 4.701163 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.161957 0.166223 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_passenair air refined liqu 2.731653 3.007405 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.014442 0.016618 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.014851 0.026851 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 1.207795 1.085956 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 12.90182 17.41053 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
USA trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
USA trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
USA trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.133974 0.180794 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
USA trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0 0.02175 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA trn_pass_robus bus fuel ce H2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Canada trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.009192 0.012399 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.084132 0.074193 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Canada trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.407764 0.523267 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.061864 0.079336 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.174654 0.235581 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.002058 0.001815 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Canada trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.037999 0.024681 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.95981 1.231683 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Canada trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Canada trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Canada trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.016523 0.021204 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Canada trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0.001495 0.001691 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnoapply‐to from‐year to‐year interpolation‐function
USA trn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
USA trn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
USA trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
USA trn_pass_robus bus gas share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Canada trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnominicam‐en 1990 2005 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
Western Eutrn_freight air air refined liqu 0.149891 0.258533 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.115544 0.106229 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.008124 0.01085 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 3.951857 4.892998 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.290589 0.278275 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_passenair air refined liqu 1.182472 2.03954 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0.012401 0.030674 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.01842 0.016935 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.160002 0.199587 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 1.48447 2.234537 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 5.442247 6.738327 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Western Eutrn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Western Eutrn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Western Eutrn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.388547 0.48108 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Western Eutrn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0.008729 0.020172 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Eutrn_pass_robus bus fuel ce H2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Japan trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.013113 0.02063 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.00715 0.005029 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Japan trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 1.067463 1.273318 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.169787 0.163708 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.277656 0.436812 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0.008143 0.008143 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.00585 0.004115 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.052522 0.060623 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Japan trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.220301 0.245313 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 1.507931 1.798728 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Japan trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Japan trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Japan trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.103355 0.123286 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Japan trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnoapply‐to from‐year to‐year interpolation‐function
Western Eutrn_freight rail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Western Eutrn_freight rail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Western Eutrn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Western Eutrn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Western Eutrn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Western Eutrn_pass_robus bus gas share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Japan trn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnominicam‐en 1990 2005 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
Australia_Ntrn_freight air air refined liqu 0.006781 0.012126 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.02143 0.026221 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.001682 0.002652 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.359378 0.475715 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.022509 0.010515 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_passenair air refined liqu 0.128841 0.230396 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.002381 0.002913 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.005046 0.007955 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.040531 0.044595 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.516597 0.683828 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Australia_Ntrn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Australia_Ntrn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Australia_Ntrn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.022843 0.030238 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_Ntrn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Australia_Ntrn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0.002797 0.00188 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Australia_Ntrn_pass_robus bus fuel ce H2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Former Sovtrn_freight air air refined liqu 0.128424 0.066867 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.320558 0.124636 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.035954 0.026636 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 1.837872 1.206893 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.20579 0.058984 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_passenair air refined liqu 0.878477 0.457401 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.038467 0.014956 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.314594 0.233068 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.115775 0.022034 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 1.834607 1.204749 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Former Sovtrn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
Former Sovtrn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Former Sovtrn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.064428 0.042308 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Sovtrn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Former Sovtrn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0.057661 0.0104 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnoapply‐to from‐year to‐year interpolation‐function
Australia_Ntrn_freight rail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Australia_Ntrn_freight rail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Australia_Ntrn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Australia_Ntrn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Australia_Ntrn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Australia_Ntrn_pass_robus bus gas share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Former Sovtrn_freight rail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Former Sovtrn_freight rail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Former Sovtrn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Former Sovtrn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Former Sovtrn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnominicam‐en 1990 2005 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
China trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.006244 0.065546 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_freight rail rail coal delivered c 0.332938 0.137796 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
China trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.07389 0.308626 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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China trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.003325 0.011225 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.700185 2.406322 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.114707 0.388276 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.034306 0.360106 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
China trn_passenrail rail coal delivered c 0.083234 0.034449 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
China trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.018473 0.077157 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.018839 0.063608 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.060182 0.320767 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.130548 0.448655 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
China trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
China trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
China trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.18404 0.63249 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
China trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0 0.002918 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China trn_pass_robus bus fuel ce H2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Middle Eas trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.061597 0.074723 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle Eas trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eas trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eas trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.520117 0.987755 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle Eas trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eas trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.349052 0.423433 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle Eas trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
Middle Eas trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eas trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eas trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.37816 0.561608 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle Eas trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 1.447779 2.749479 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle Eas trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eas trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
Middle Eas trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Middle Eas trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.112572 0.213785 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle Eas trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eas trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0 0.010764 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnoapply‐to from‐year to‐year interpolation‐function
China trn_freight rail rail coal share‐weig 2005 2095 linear
China trn_freight rail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
China trn_freight rail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
China trn_passenrail rail coal share‐weig 2005 2095 linear
China trn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
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China trn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
China trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
China trn_pass_robus bus gas share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Middle Eas trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnominicam‐en 1990 2005 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
Africa trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.010317 0.016404 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.003112 0.004486 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.002977 0.004132 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.461131 0.767684 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.005514 0.036229 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.196021 0.311682 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.006279 0.00905 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.013876 0.019255 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.220854 0.26893 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.461104 0.767639 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Africa trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
Africa trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Africa trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.485953 0.809007 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0.000103 0 0 1 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Africa trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0 0.010371 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa trn_pass_robus bus fuel ce H2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Latin Amer trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.045128 0.068535 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.043934 0.043438 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Latin Amer trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 2.5707 3.885869 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.079436 0.125823 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.289152 0.439129 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.009319 0.009214 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.010211 0.012495 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.230882 0.440533 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 1.113678 1.683436 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Latin Amer trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
Latin Amer trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Latin Amer trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.365668 0.552744 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin Amer trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0.000312 0.000639 1 1 1 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Latin Amer trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0.008424 0.235512 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnoapply‐to from‐year to‐year interpolation‐function
Africa trn_freight rail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Africa trn_freight rail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Africa trn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Africa trn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Africa trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Africa trn_pass_robus bus electricshare‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Africa trn_pass_robus bus gas share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Latin Amer trn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Latin Amer trn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Latin Amer trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Latin Amer trn_pass_robus bus electricshare‐weig 2005 2095 fixed





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnominicam‐en 1990 2005 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
Southeast Atrn_freight air air refined liqu 0.032036 0.070013 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.001861 0.003821 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Southeast Atrn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.2896 0.645892 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.076183 0.133602 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_passenair air refined liqu 0.368415 0.805152 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.018956 0.038926 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.001927 0.005138 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.640618 1.471942 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.449036 1.001479 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Southeast Atrn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
Southeast Atrn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Southeast Atrn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.978927 2.183287 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Southeast Atrn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 5.44E‐05 0.006155 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Atrn_pass_robus bus fuel ce H2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Eastern Eurtrn_freight air air refined liqu 0.001736 0.001862 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.030691 0.016681 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.002664 0.002034 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Eastern Eurtrn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.405498 0.649996 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.023444 0.005309 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_passenair air refined liqu 0.063382 0.067971 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.007419 0.004032 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.050609 0.038636 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.02226 0.019348 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.482207 0.772958 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.069641 0.111631 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 4.19E‐06 0.00162 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnoapply‐to from‐year to‐year interpolation‐function
Southeast Atrn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Southeast Atrn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Southeast Atrn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Southeast Atrn_pass_robus bus gas share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Eastern Eurtrn_freight rail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Eastern Eurtrn_freight rail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Eastern Eurtrn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Eastern Eurtrn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Eastern Eurtrn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnominicam‐en 1990 2005 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
Korea trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.018557 0.031075 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.002423 0.002236 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Korea trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.12583 0.309981 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.066403 0.03513 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.074227 0.1243 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0.001159 0 0 1 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.009693 0.008942 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.003642 0.006258 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 OF 9
Korea trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.066181 0.416219 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.276638 0.681494 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Korea trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
Korea trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
Korea trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.047601 0.117264 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
Korea trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0 0.013557 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea trn_pass_robus bus fuel ce H2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
India trn_freight air air refined liqu 0.011229 0.022038 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_freight rail rail ICE refined liqu 0.019228 0.020151 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_freight rail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.00147 0.003739 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_freight road truck ICE refined liqu 0.181746 0.249938 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_freight domestic shdomestic shrefined liqu 0.023351 0.020159 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_passenair air refined liqu 0.063631 0.124885 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_passenhigh speed high speed elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 1
India trn_passenrail rail ICE refined liqu 0.044864 0.047018 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_passenrail rail electric elect_td_tr 0.013234 0.033652 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_shippininternationinternationrefined liqu 0.006212 0.001231 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_pass_roLDV LDV ICE refined liqu 0.188725 0.259536 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_pass_roLDV LDV electri elect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
India trn_pass_roLDV LDV gas delivered g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.25
India trn_pass_roLDV LDV fuel ceH2 Enduse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.25
India trn_pass_robus bus ICE refined liqu 0.538258 0.740215 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India trn_pass_robus bus electricelect_td_tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
India trn_pass_robus bus gas delivered g 0 0.027645 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





region supplysectotranSubsec tranTechnoapply‐to from‐year to‐year interpolation‐function
Korea trn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Korea trn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Korea trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
Korea trn_pass_robus bus gas share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
India trn_freight rail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
India trn_freight rail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
India trn_passenrail rail ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
India trn_passenrail rail electric share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed
India trn_pass_robus bus ICE share‐weig 2005 2095 fixed






region technology 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
Africa Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Africa Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Africa Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa Gas (CC) 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Africa Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Africa Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Africa Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Africa Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Africa Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Africa Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Latin America Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latin America Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin America Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Latin America Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Latin America Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latin America Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin America Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latin America Gas (CC) 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Latin America Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Latin America Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latin America Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin America Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latin America Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Latin America Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Latin America Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latin America Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latin America Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Latin America Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Southeast Asia Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southeast Asia Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Asia Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Southeast Asia Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Southeast Asia Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southeast Asia Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Asia Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southeast Asia Gas (CC) 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Southeast Asia Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Southeast Asia Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southeast Asia Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Asia Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southeast Asia Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Southeast Asia Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Southeast Asia Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southeast Asia Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Southeast Asia Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Southeast Asia Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Middle East Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Middle East Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle East Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Middle East Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Middle East Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Middle East Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle East Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Middle East Gas (CC) 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Middle East Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Middle East Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Middle East Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle East Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Middle East Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Middle East Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Middle East Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Middle East Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Middle East Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Middle East Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
India Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
India Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
India Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
India Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
India Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
India Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
India Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India Gas (CC) 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
India Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
India Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
India Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
India Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
India Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
India Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
India Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
India Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
India Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
China Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
China Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
China Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
China Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
China Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
China Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
China Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China Gas (CC) 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
China Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
China Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
China Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
China Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
China Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
China Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
China Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
China Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
China Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Former Soviet Union Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Former Soviet Union Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Soviet Union Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Former Soviet Union Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Former Soviet Union Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Former Soviet Union Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Soviet Union Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Former Soviet Union Gas (CC) 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Former Soviet Union Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 1
Former Soviet Union Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Former Soviet Union Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Soviet Union Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Former Soviet Union Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Former Soviet Union Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Former Soviet Union Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Former Soviet Union Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Former Soviet Union Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Former Soviet Union Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5
Eastern Europe Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe Gas (CC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Korea Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Korea Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea Gas (CC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Korea Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Korea Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Korea Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia_NZ Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia_NZ Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia_NZ Gas (CC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia_NZ Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia_NZ Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia_NZ Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada Gas (CC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Gas (CC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Coal (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western Europe Coal (conv pul) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Coal (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Coal (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Gas (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western Europe Gas (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Gas (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western Europe Gas (CC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Gas (CC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Oil (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western Europe Oil (peak load conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Oil (base load conv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western Europe Oil (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Oil (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Biomass (existing) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Western Europe Biomass (conv) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Biomass (IGCC) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Biomass (IGCC)_CCS 0 0 0 0.333 1 1 1 1 1
Africa PV_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Latin America PV_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Southeast Asia PV_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
India PV_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Middle East PV_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
China PV_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Former Soviet Union PV_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Eastern Europe PV_storage 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Korea PV_storage 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Canada PV_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe PV_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan PV_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ PV_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA PV_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa CSP_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Latin America CSP_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Southeast Asia CSP_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
India CSP_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Middle East CSP_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
China CSP_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Former Soviet Union CSP_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Eastern Europe CSP_storage 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Korea CSP_storage 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Canada CSP_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe CSP_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan CSP_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ CSP_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA CSP_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Africa wind_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Latin America wind_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Southeast Asia wind_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
India wind_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Middle East wind_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
China wind_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Former Soviet Union wind_storage 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1
Eastern Europe wind_storage 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Korea wind_storage 0 0 0 0.25 0.333 0.5 1 1 1
Canada wind_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe wind_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan wind_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ wind_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA wind_storage 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
USA Gen_III 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada Gen_III 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Western Europe Gen_III 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan Gen_III 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia_NZ Gen_III 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern Europe Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.3 0.5 0.75 1
Korea Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.3 0.5 0.75 1
Former Soviet Union Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
China Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Middle East Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Africa Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Latin America Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1
Southeast Asia Gen_III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1






totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop
region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 412028 630697 919484 1032840 1134742 1225761 1319913 1404323 1493557 1559406 1630097 1683839 1755813 1809448 1864499 1893855 1922680 1937867 1948830 1944503 1928285
Australia_N 16909 20532 24548 25835 27057 28226 29387 30430 31400 32164 32819 33278 33647 33809 33832 33652 33363 32961 32509 32029 31592
Canada 23139 27698 32318 33896 35040 35934 36799 37386 37910 38126 38344 38425 38630 38755 38938 39070 39283 39521 39813 40094 40343
China 980561 1223291 1426771 1469426 1511917 1544737 1564310 1574451 1574778 1564877 1548112 1523878 1500563 1473884 1449614 1422749 1399717 1376916 1355263 1328750 1293598
Eastern Eur 112678 122883 119100 118410 117147 115835 114477 112907 110998 109156 106905 104655 101539 98436 94866 91661 88225 85111 82267 80347 79646
Former Sov 254228 289091 284342 283390 283487 284059 284080 284395 283991 284128 283238 282204 279466 276550 272704 269095 264977 261167 257763 255727 255638
India 606142 849515 1094583 1214464 1291722 1352178 1412225 1456108 1494751 1521585 1544450 1561583 1569149 1569662 1559181 1544504 1519125 1487947 1449540 1411441 1377394
Japan 111469 123478 127773 126995 126369 125521 124121 122841 121335 120020 118428 116732 114698 112501 110071 107461 104726 101995 99478 97414 96155
Korea 35278 42869 48138 48501 48866 48896 48574 48264 47965 47528 47119 46495 46156 45559 45025 44054 43149 42102 41194 40297 39629
Latin Amer 319222 436676 549919 584391 619954 654891 686786 717081 743913 770226 793205 815184 833139 850658 866087 881779 895362 907541 916824 923083 924592
Middle Eas 76657 131495 188106 210542 232198 253011 273172 292929 312247 330563 347974 363789 378471 390958 401515 409339 415117 418699 420752 421589 422203
Southeast A 474445 666169 875769 955566 1033074 1108389 1180396 1247683 1308968 1364412 1412063 1452295 1482438 1504280 1516383 1520705 1515847 1503409 1483694 1458934 1430679
USA 215079 250181 299730 321704 336265 349627 365110 379007 393314 407363 421860 437135 450656 464450 476574 489725 501034 512070 521816 532323 544015





laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce
region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 0.425 0.44 0.419 0.434 0.446 0.457 0.466 0.475 0.48 0.491 0.497 0.505 0.502 0.5 0.491 0.486 0.475 0.464 0.452 0.446 0.446
Australia_N 0.446 0.499 0.51 0.508 0.5 0.491 0.48 0.472 0.464 0.462 0.46 0.46 0.458 0.458 0.455 0.454 0.449 0.445 0.44 0.437 0.44
Canada 0.453 0.542 0.527 0.533 0.53 0.524 0.514 0.503 0.491 0.482 0.472 0.466 0.456 0.449 0.44 0.434 0.427 0.42 0.413 0.408 0.406
China 0.522 0.574 0.609 0.609 0.614 0.62 0.62 0.615 0.603 0.586 0.564 0.541 0.515 0.493 0.474 0.463 0.457 0.456 0.457 0.457 0.448
Eastern Eur 0.506 0.489 0.515 0.514 0.505 0.493 0.477 0.464 0.45 0.445 0.439 0.44 0.434 0.434 0.43 0.432 0.431 0.43 0.427 0.427 0.43
Former Sov 0.502 0.498 0.515 0.509 0.502 0.493 0.485 0.477 0.47 0.462 0.456 0.45 0.447 0.443 0.44 0.436 0.433 0.43 0.429 0.428 0.43
India 0.432 0.43 0.447 0.458 0.468 0.476 0.483 0.488 0.491 0.492 0.49 0.486 0.482 0.475 0.467 0.457 0.447 0.437 0.428 0.422 0.418
Japan 0.502 0.518 0.525 0.515 0.503 0.489 0.476 0.464 0.453 0.446 0.44 0.437 0.434 0.433 0.433 0.434 0.434 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.435
Korea 0.383 0.458 0.606 0.575 0.547 0.522 0.5 0.481 0.465 0.455 0.446 0.44 0.432 0.427 0.42 0.416 0.41 0.405 0.398 0.394 0.393
Latin Amer 0.347 0.387 0.431 0.436 0.442 0.448 0.45 0.45 0.445 0.441 0.433 0.427 0.416 0.408 0.4 0.397 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.394 0.39
Middle Eas 0.292 0.285 0.311 0.324 0.343 0.364 0.384 0.402 0.415 0.428 0.435 0.441 0.439 0.438 0.433 0.432 0.428 0.427 0.424 0.422 0.419
Southeast A 0.42 0.445 0.463 0.467 0.465 0.459 0.452 0.444 0.437 0.426 0.418 0.408 0.404 0.398 0.394 0.385 0.379 0.371 0.365 0.359 0.355
USA 0.447 0.494 0.508 0.504 0.497 0.489 0.48 0.471 0.462 0.457 0.45 0.447 0.44 0.436 0.431 0.428 0.425 0.422 0.418 0.417 0.416






region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 0 ‐0.00415 0.00911 0.01201 0.01423 0.01433 0.01433 0.01331 0.01438 0.01446 0.01834 0.02176 0.02818 0.0319 0.03598 0.03762 0.03916 0.03904 0.03827 0.03651 0.03433
Australia_N 0 0.00621 0.02286 0.00922 0.01863 0.01869 0.01846 0.01764 0.01708 0.01598 0.01563 0.01502 0.01525 0.01494 0.01511 0.01492 0.01516 0.01519 0.01528 0.0151 0.01482
Canada 0 0.00659 0.01934 ‐0.00466 0.01884 0.01768 0.01735 0.01762 0.01798 0.01858 0.01885 0.01912 0.01901 0.019 0.01877 0.01863 0.01835 0.01817 0.01804 0.01806 0.01821
China 0 0.05924 0.08354 0.08401 0.06837 0.05883 0.05438 0.05163 0.05 0.04815 0.04669 0.04483 0.04311 0.04096 0.03887 0.03659 0.03442 0.03217 0.02995 0.02769 0.02541
Eastern Eur 0 0.01015 0.02302 0.02833 0.04088 0.03887 0.03529 0.03512 0.03297 0.03521 0.03329 0.03396 0.03111 0.03174 0.03062 0.03117 0.03002 0.02957 0.02869 0.02826 0.02768
Former Sov 0 0.00075 ‐0.00726 0.03192 0.04088 0.03887 0.03529 0.03512 0.03297 0.03521 0.03329 0.03396 0.03111 0.03174 0.03062 0.03117 0.03002 0.02957 0.02869 0.02826 0.02768
India 0 0.0258 0.03944 0.0465 0.05048 0.04989 0.04901 0.04807 0.04714 0.04625 0.04538 0.04452 0.04365 0.04276 0.04187 0.04096 0.04004 0.03912 0.03819 0.03728 0.03638
Japan 0 0.03169 0.00968 ‐0.0005 0.01779 0.0186 0.01909 0.01877 0.01858 0.01757 0.01725 0.01646 0.01649 0.01583 0.01565 0.01507 0.01501 0.01479 0.01474 0.01456 0.01444
Korea 0 0.05457 0.03082 0.03339 0.02651 0.02628 0.02574 0.02514 0.02451 0.02402 0.02351 0.02314 0.02276 0.02251 0.02225 0.02206 0.02184 0.02163 0.02138 0.02113 0.02084
Latin Amer 0 ‐0.00304 0.00952 0.016 0.01425 0.01729 0.01828 0.01943 0.01997 0.02211 0.02331 0.0256 0.02668 0.02886 0.03006 0.03141 0.03162 0.03156 0.03087 0.02993 0.02857
Middle Eas 0 ‐0.02257 0.01068 0.01095 0.01064 0.0103 0.01015 0.01105 0.0118 0.01393 0.01505 0.01694 0.01749 0.01908 0.01978 0.02094 0.02113 0.02139 0.02123 0.0211 0.02074
Southeast A 0 0.03977 0.0281 0.01518 0.04722 0.04806 0.04534 0.04416 0.04182 0.04228 0.04063 0.04058 0.03881 0.03884 0.03794 0.03774 0.03664 0.03577 0.03462 0.03358 0.03243
USA 0 0.01674 0.01712 ‐0.00194 0.01882 0.01802 0.01728 0.01702 0.01667 0.01694 0.01677 0.017 0.01671 0.01696 0.01692 0.01719 0.01711 0.01716 0.01708 0.01708 0.01703














































totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop
region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 418765 638729 921073 1033043 1162940 1303919 1452274 1604027 1760929 1924730 2094651 2267483 2440517 2606926 2767958 2924152 3074359 3216382 3349234 3473039 3588334
Australia_NZ 16743 20512 24542 25853 27358 28967 30616 32166 33628 35083 36616 38248 39988 41618 43209 44821 46490 48206 49912 51557 53135
Canada 23148 27707 32313 33896 35786 37864 39997 41982 43804 45593 47479 49521 51745 53851 55864 57859 59893 61988 64087 66123 68068
China 984012 1240759 1436760 1485468 1547998 1611180 1663766 1701131 1730081 1757868 1784749 1806201 1823555 1836118 1850121 1868091 1888280 1910839 1935871 1964846 1998099
Eastern Europe 112197 122167 119082 118409 118600 119047 119161 118593 117769 117159 116953 116955 116983 116705 116456 116582 117203 118372 119960 121872 124072
Former Soviet Union 254445 288827 284833 283391 285962 289410 291894 292867 293882 296109 299505 303147 306780 309615 312733 316789 321884 327641 333771 340229 347060
India 617432 862162 1130618 1214464 1306485 1400175 1490916 1572055 1646717 1721445 1795324 1865353 1932896 1992321 2046114 2095683 2141075 2181932 2218788 2252779 2284622
Japan 111619 123191 127449 126995 126721 125939 124619 122725 120499 118152 115979 114161 113153 111924 110727 109753 109242 109375 110038 111073 112381
Korea 34721 42983 47566 48501 49592 50576 51360 51744 51714 51312 50662 49915 49223 48489 47769 47133 46679 46472 46530 46830 47281
Latin America 320439 438842 552663 584716 620507 657380 693788 727012 757820 786839 814581 840502 865466 888543 910113 930780 951018 971042 990936 1010804 1031147
Middle East 79426 135816 193881 214951 237539 261765 286332 309842 333148 356660 380326 403364 425486 445919 465016 483189 500838 518066 534796 551052 566630
Southeast Asia 464088 656919 863178 932169 1010594 1092630 1175518 1254892 1331651 1407913 1484576 1559839 1633191 1700875 1764571 1825897 1885952 1944513 2000842 2054662 2106248
USA 222047 258393 306653 321639 339190 357665 376099 393217 409429 425561 442385 460319 479433 497996 516230 534512 552966 571326 589066 605720 621137





laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce
region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 0.425 0.44 0.419 0.434 0.446 0.457 0.466 0.475 0.48 0.491 0.497 0.505 0.502 0.5 0.491 0.486 0.475 0.464 0.452 0.446 0.446
Australia_NZ 0.446 0.499 0.51 0.508 0.5 0.491 0.48 0.472 0.464 0.462 0.46 0.46 0.458 0.458 0.455 0.454 0.449 0.445 0.44 0.437 0.44
Canada 0.453 0.542 0.527 0.533 0.53 0.524 0.514 0.503 0.491 0.482 0.472 0.466 0.456 0.449 0.44 0.434 0.427 0.42 0.413 0.408 0.406
China 0.522 0.574 0.609 0.609 0.614 0.62 0.62 0.615 0.603 0.586 0.564 0.541 0.515 0.493 0.474 0.463 0.457 0.456 0.457 0.457 0.448
Eastern Europe 0.506 0.489 0.515 0.514 0.505 0.493 0.477 0.464 0.45 0.445 0.439 0.44 0.434 0.434 0.43 0.432 0.431 0.43 0.427 0.427 0.43
Former Soviet Union 0.502 0.498 0.515 0.509 0.502 0.493 0.485 0.477 0.47 0.462 0.456 0.45 0.447 0.443 0.44 0.436 0.433 0.43 0.429 0.428 0.43
India 0.432 0.43 0.447 0.458 0.468 0.476 0.483 0.488 0.491 0.492 0.49 0.486 0.482 0.475 0.467 0.457 0.447 0.437 0.428 0.422 0.418
Japan 0.502 0.518 0.525 0.515 0.503 0.489 0.476 0.464 0.453 0.446 0.44 0.437 0.434 0.433 0.433 0.434 0.434 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.435
Korea 0.383 0.458 0.606 0.575 0.547 0.522 0.5 0.481 0.465 0.455 0.446 0.44 0.432 0.427 0.42 0.416 0.41 0.405 0.398 0.394 0.393
Latin America 0.347 0.387 0.431 0.436 0.442 0.448 0.45 0.45 0.445 0.441 0.433 0.427 0.416 0.408 0.4 0.397 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.394 0.39
Middle East 0.292 0.285 0.311 0.324 0.343 0.364 0.384 0.402 0.415 0.428 0.435 0.441 0.439 0.438 0.433 0.432 0.428 0.427 0.424 0.422 0.419
Southeast Asia 0.42 0.445 0.463 0.467 0.465 0.459 0.452 0.444 0.437 0.426 0.418 0.408 0.404 0.398 0.394 0.385 0.379 0.371 0.365 0.359 0.355
USA 0.447 0.494 0.508 0.504 0.497 0.489 0.48 0.471 0.462 0.457 0.45 0.447 0.44 0.436 0.431 0.428 0.425 0.422 0.418 0.417 0.416






region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 0 ‐0.00415 0.00911 0.01201 0.01223 0.01233 0.01233 0.01131 0.01238 0.01246 0.01634 0.01976 0.02618 0.0299 0.03398 0.03562 0.03716 0.03704 0.03627 0.03451 0.03233
Australia_NZ 0 0.00621 0.02286 0.00922 0.01663 0.01669 0.01646 0.01564 0.01508 0.01398 0.01363 0.01302 0.01325 0.01294 0.01311 0.01292 0.01316 0.01319 0.01328 0.0131 0.01282
Canada 0 0.00659 0.01934 ‐0.00466 0.01684 0.01568 0.01535 0.01562 0.01598 0.01658 0.01685 0.01712 0.01701 0.017 0.01677 0.01663 0.01635 0.01617 0.01604 0.01606 0.01621
China 0 0.05924 0.08354 0.08401 0.06637 0.05683 0.05238 0.04963 0.048 0.04615 0.04469 0.04283 0.04111 0.03896 0.03687 0.03459 0.03242 0.03017 0.02795 0.02569 0.02341
Eastern Europe 0 0.01015 0.02302 0.02833 0.03888 0.03687 0.03329 0.03312 0.03097 0.03321 0.03129 0.03196 0.02911 0.02974 0.02862 0.02917 0.02802 0.02757 0.02669 0.02626 0.02568
Former Soviet Union 0 0.00075 ‐0.00726 0.03192 0.03888 0.03687 0.03329 0.03312 0.03097 0.03321 0.03129 0.03196 0.02911 0.02974 0.02862 0.02917 0.02802 0.02757 0.02669 0.02626 0.02568
India 0 0.0258 0.03944 0.0465 0.04848 0.04789 0.04701 0.04607 0.04514 0.04425 0.04338 0.04252 0.04165 0.04076 0.03987 0.03896 0.03804 0.03712 0.03619 0.03528 0.03438
Japan 0 0.03169 0.00968 ‐0.0005 0.01579 0.0166 0.01709 0.01677 0.01658 0.01557 0.01525 0.01446 0.01449 0.01383 0.01365 0.01307 0.01301 0.01279 0.01274 0.01256 0.01244
Korea 0 0.05457 0.03082 0.03339 0.02451 0.02428 0.02374 0.02314 0.02251 0.02202 0.02151 0.02114 0.02076 0.02051 0.02025 0.02006 0.01984 0.01963 0.01938 0.01913 0.01884
Latin America 0 ‐0.00304 0.00952 0.016 0.01225 0.01529 0.01628 0.01743 0.01797 0.02011 0.02131 0.0236 0.02468 0.02686 0.02806 0.02941 0.02962 0.02956 0.02887 0.02793 0.02657
Middle East 0 ‐0.02257 0.01068 0.01095 0.00864 0.0083 0.00815 0.00905 0.0098 0.01193 0.01305 0.01494 0.01549 0.01708 0.01778 0.01894 0.01913 0.01939 0.01923 0.0191 0.01874
Southeast Asia 0 0.03977 0.0281 0.01518 0.04522 0.04606 0.04334 0.04216 0.03982 0.04028 0.03863 0.03858 0.03681 0.03684 0.03594 0.03574 0.03464 0.03377 0.03262 0.03158 0.03043
USA 0 0.01674 0.01712 ‐0.00194 0.01682 0.01602 0.01528 0.01502 0.01467 0.01494 0.01477 0.015 0.01471 0.01496 0.01492 0.01519 0.01511 0.01516 0.01508 0.01508 0.01503














































totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop totalPop
region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 412028 630697 919484 1032840 1134742 1225761 1319913 1404323 1493557 1559406 1630097 1683839 1755813 1809448 1864499 1893855 1922680 1937867 1948830 1944503 1928285
Australia_NZ 16909 20532 24548 25835 27057 28226 29387 30430 31400 32164 32819 33278 33647 33809 33832 33652 33363 32961 32509 32029 31592
Canada 23139 27698 32318 33896 35040 35934 36799 37386 37910 38126 38344 38425 38630 38755 38938 39070 39283 39521 39813 40094 40343
China 980561 1223291 1426771 1469426 1511917 1544737 1564310 1574451 1574778 1564877 1548112 1523878 1500563 1473884 1449614 1422749 1399717 1376916 1355263 1328750 1293598
Eastern Europe 112678 122883 119100 118410 117147 115835 114477 112907 110998 109156 106905 104655 101539 98436 94866 91661 88225 85111 82267 80347 79646
Former Soviet Unio 254228 289091 284342 283390 283487 284059 284080 284395 283991 284128 283238 282204 279466 276550 272704 269095 264977 261167 257763 255727 255638
India 606142 849515 1094583 1214464 1291722 1352178 1412225 1456108 1494751 1521585 1544450 1561583 1569149 1569662 1559181 1544504 1519125 1487947 1449540 1411441 1377394
Japan 111469 123478 127773 126995 126369 125521 124121 122841 121335 120020 118428 116732 114698 112501 110071 107461 104726 101995 99478 97414 96155
Korea 35278 42869 48138 48501 48866 48896 48574 48264 47965 47528 47119 46495 46156 45559 45025 44054 43149 42102 41194 40297 39629
Latin America 319222 436676 549919 584391 619954 654891 686786 717081 743913 770226 793205 815184 833139 850658 866087 881779 895362 907541 916824 923083 924592
Middle East 76657 131495 188106 210542 232198 253011 273172 292929 312247 330563 347974 363789 378471 390958 401515 409339 415117 418699 420752 421589 422203
Southeast Asia 474445 666169 875769 955566 1033074 1108389 1180396 1247683 1308968 1364412 1412063 1452295 1482438 1504280 1516383 1520705 1515847 1503409 1483694 1458934 1430679
USA 215079 250181 299730 321704 336265 349627 365110 379007 393314 407363 421860 437135 450656 464450 476574 489725 501034 512070 521816 532323 544015





laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce laborforce
region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 0.425 0.44 0.419 0.434 0.446 0.457 0.466 0.475 0.48 0.491 0.497 0.505 0.502 0.5 0.491 0.486 0.475 0.464 0.452 0.446 0.446
Australia_NZ 0.446 0.499 0.51 0.508 0.5 0.491 0.48 0.472 0.464 0.462 0.46 0.46 0.458 0.458 0.455 0.454 0.449 0.445 0.44 0.437 0.44
Canada 0.453 0.542 0.527 0.533 0.53 0.524 0.514 0.503 0.491 0.482 0.472 0.466 0.456 0.449 0.44 0.434 0.427 0.42 0.413 0.408 0.406
China 0.522 0.574 0.609 0.609 0.614 0.62 0.62 0.615 0.603 0.586 0.564 0.541 0.515 0.493 0.474 0.463 0.457 0.456 0.457 0.457 0.448
Eastern Europe 0.506 0.489 0.515 0.514 0.505 0.493 0.477 0.464 0.45 0.445 0.439 0.44 0.434 0.434 0.43 0.432 0.431 0.43 0.427 0.427 0.43
Former Soviet Unio 0.502 0.498 0.515 0.509 0.502 0.493 0.485 0.477 0.47 0.462 0.456 0.45 0.447 0.443 0.44 0.436 0.433 0.43 0.429 0.428 0.43
India 0.432 0.43 0.447 0.458 0.468 0.476 0.483 0.488 0.491 0.492 0.49 0.486 0.482 0.475 0.467 0.457 0.447 0.437 0.428 0.422 0.418
Japan 0.502 0.518 0.525 0.515 0.503 0.489 0.476 0.464 0.453 0.446 0.44 0.437 0.434 0.433 0.433 0.434 0.434 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.435
Korea 0.383 0.458 0.606 0.575 0.547 0.522 0.5 0.481 0.465 0.455 0.446 0.44 0.432 0.427 0.42 0.416 0.41 0.405 0.398 0.394 0.393
Latin America 0.347 0.387 0.431 0.436 0.442 0.448 0.45 0.45 0.445 0.441 0.433 0.427 0.416 0.408 0.4 0.397 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.394 0.39
Middle East 0.292 0.285 0.311 0.324 0.343 0.364 0.384 0.402 0.415 0.428 0.435 0.441 0.439 0.438 0.433 0.432 0.428 0.427 0.424 0.422 0.419
Southeast Asia 0.42 0.445 0.463 0.467 0.465 0.459 0.452 0.444 0.437 0.426 0.418 0.408 0.404 0.398 0.394 0.385 0.379 0.371 0.365 0.359 0.355
USA 0.447 0.494 0.508 0.504 0.497 0.489 0.48 0.471 0.462 0.457 0.45 0.447 0.44 0.436 0.431 0.428 0.425 0.422 0.418 0.417 0.416






region 1975 1990 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
Africa 0 ‐0.00415 0.00911 0.01201 0.01223 0.01233 0.01233 0.01131 0.01238 0.01246 0.0148 0.01532 0.01697 0.01781 0.01892 0.01917 0.01939 0.01874 0.01752 0.01536 0.01503
Australia_NZ 0 0.00621 0.02286 0.00922 0.01663 0.01669 0.01646 0.01564 0.01508 0.01398 0.01363 0.01302 0.01325 0.01294 0.01311 0.01292 0.01316 0.01319 0.01328 0.0131 0.01282
Canada 0 0.00659 0.01934 ‐0.00466 0.01684 0.01568 0.01535 0.01562 0.01598 0.01658 0.01685 0.01712 0.01701 0.017 0.01677 0.01663 0.01635 0.01617 0.01604 0.01606 0.01621
China 0 0.05924 0.08354 0.08401 0.064 0.052 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.043 0.042 0.04 0.038 0.032 0.03 0.03 0.028 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Eastern Europe 0 0.01015 0.02302 0.02833 0.032 0.02428 0.02374 0.02314 0.02251 0.02202 0.02151 0.02114 0.02076 0.02051 0.02025 0.02006 0.01984 0.01963 0.01938 0.01913 0.01884
Former Soviet Unio 0 0.00075 ‐0.00726 0.03192 0.035 0.02428 0.02374 0.02314 0.02251 0.02202 0.02151 0.02114 0.02076 0.02051 0.02025 0.02006 0.01984 0.01963 0.01938 0.01913 0.01884
India 0 0.0258 0.03944 0.0465 0.04848 0.04789 0.04701 0.04607 0.04514 0.04425 0.04338 0.04252 0.038 0.032 0.03 0.03 0.028 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Japan 0 0.03169 0.00968 ‐0.0005 0.01579 0.0166 0.01709 0.01677 0.01658 0.01557 0.01525 0.01446 0.01449 0.01383 0.01365 0.01307 0.01301 0.01279 0.01274 0.01256 0.01244
Korea 0 0.05457 0.03082 0.03339 0.02451 0.02428 0.02374 0.02314 0.02251 0.02202 0.02151 0.02114 0.02076 0.02051 0.02025 0.02006 0.01984 0.01963 0.01938 0.01913 0.01884
Latin America 0 ‐0.00304 0.00952 0.016 0.01225 0.01529 0.01546 0.01484 0.0147 0.01412 0.0148 0.01532 0.01697 0.01781 0.01892 0.01917 0.01939 0.01874 0.01752 0.01536 0.01503
Middle East 0 ‐0.02257 0.01068 0.01095 0.00864 0.0083 0.00815 0.00905 0.0098 0.01193 0.01305 0.01494 0.01549 0.01708 0.01778 0.01894 0.01913 0.01939 0.01752 0.01536 0.01234
Southeast Asia 0 0.03977 0.0281 0.01518 0.03 0.02428 0.02374 0.02314 0.02251 0.02202 0.02151 0.02114 0.02076 0.02051 0.02025 0.02006 0.01984 0.01963 0.01938 0.01913 0.01884
USA 0 0.01674 0.01712 ‐0.00194 0.01682 0.01602 0.01528 0.01502 0.01467 0.01494 0.01477 0.015 0.01471 0.01496 0.01492 0.01519 0.01511 0.01516 0.01508 0.01508 0.01503













































Appendix C -- GCAM Results Data from new GCAM scenarios 
 
GCAM Results: Regional CO2 Emissions (Million Tons Carbon)
China 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2060 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
PolicyElecNucDelay 2644 2354 2396 2470 2532 2291 1930 1566 591 342 175 38 ‐66 ‐126 ‐173
PolicyElecNucTransDelay 2644 2353 2394 2467 2527 2283 1916 1550 601 350 181 44 ‐61 ‐123 ‐171
PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay 2644 2353 2396 2473 2543 2316 1984 1695 748 436 253 97 ‐26 ‐117 ‐207
Reference 2594 3073 3508 3905 4262 4533 4759 4944 5194 5280 5277 5239 5191 5091 4839
NewReference_Policy 2594 2299 2278 2258 2209 1803 1379 1004 730 464 327 184 70 ‐25 ‐94
USA 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2060 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
PolicyElecNucDelay 1736 1555 1382 1227 1079 779 561 326 387 325 263 201 147 85 0
PolicyElecNucTransDelay 1736 1554 1380 1224 1074 774 556 321 386 324 262 200 146 82 ‐9
PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay 1736 1553 1374 1206 1038 698 395 ‐28 124 106 71 39 20 ‐3 ‐34
Reference 1736 1768 1807 1833 1861 1885 1904 1943 1990 2022 2036 2047 2070 2095 2123
NewReference_Policy 1736 1565 1463 1370 1291 1069 863 660 516 355 273 180 108 46 ‐43
GCAM Results: Global CO2 Emissions (Million Tons Carbon)
Scenario 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2060 2070 2080 2085 2090 2095
Policy 9,932    8,982      8,878    8,774    8,670     7,611   6,553  5,494   4,775   3,836  2,675   2,250  1,825   1,400   
Low_Conv 9,827    10,775   11,691  12,564  13,453  14,212 14,933 15,674 16,593 17,128 17,339 17,346 17,286 17,105 
Reference 9,896    10,994   12,067  13,120  14,200  15,176 16,129 17,152 18,778 20,153 21,258 21,664 21,978 22,145 
High_GDP 9,955    11,128   12,286  13,435  14,628  15,718 16,795 17,957 19,839 21,466 22,782 23,266 23,669 24,148 
High_Population 9,939    11,212   12,485  13,754  15,085  16,411 17,806 19,389 22,284 25,248 28,377 29,969 32,152 33,643 
GCAM Results: Regional CO2 Emissions (Million Tons Carbon)
High Income Countries
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2060 2070 2080 2085 2090 2095
PolicyElecNucDelay 3915 3472 3148 2836 2513 1840 1352 890 1072 965 765 672 571 483
PolicyElecNucTransDelay 3914 3471 3144 2830 2504 1830 1343 881 1071 963 763 668 567 479
PolicyElecNucTransReLiq 3914 3468 3133 2793 2423 1661 1026 269 651 672 518 475 436 460
Reference 3910 4006 4095 4164 4245 4317 4376 4479 4592 4637 4648 4654 4665 4703
NewReference_Policy 3910 3479 3289 3116 2950 2484 2050 1627 1338 1034 751 634 533 434
Low & Middle Income Countries
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2060 2070 2080 2085 2090 2095
PolicyElecNucDelay 6017 5510 5730 5938 6157 5771 5201 4604 3703 2871 1910 1578 1254 917
PolicyElecNucTransDelay 6015 5511 5733 5944 6166 5782 5210 4613 3704 2872 1912 1582 1258 921
PolicyElecNucTransReLiq 6015 5514 5745 5981 6247 5949 5527 5225 4124 3164 2157 1775 1389 940
Reference 5986 6988 7972 8955 9955 10859 11753 12673 14186 15516 16610 17010 17313 17441
NewReference_Policy 5986 5503 5589 5657 5720 5127 4503 3867 3437 2802 1924 1616 1291 966
GCAM Results: Global Primary Energy (EJ)
Scenario 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2095
Low_Conv_Policy 537 588 595 640 687 735 772 809 844 899 928 941 940 938
Low_Conv 537 588 639 693 746 797 844 889 936 1001 1049 1082 1096 1097
NewReference_Policy 537 592 602 655 712 770 819 864 912 998 1066 1125 1166 1188
PolicyElecNucDelay 537 593 600 647 695 742 767 794 828 973 1062 1130 1181 1208
PolicyElecNucTransDelay 537 593 600 647 695 742 767 793 828 974 1063 1130 1182 1212
PolicyElecNucTransReLiqudDelay 537 593 600 646 692 737 758 781 814 971 1060 1130 1183 1220
High_GDP_Policy 537 595 607 665 727 790 844 894 948 1045 1126 1195 1247 1285
Reference 537 592 650 713 775 837 897 956 1019 1127 1228 1319 1386 1412
High_GDP 537 595 657 724 792 860 926 992 1063 1187 1304 1410 1489 1530
High_Pop_Policy 537 594 611 674 742 812 876 939 1010 1148 1285 1439 1621 1704
High_Population 537 594 662 736 811 887 966 1051 1146 1327 1525 1741 1983 2089
GCAM GDP RESULTS (Million1990US$)
Scenario Region 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095
High_GDP Africa 592628 886875 1242670 1661890 2209770 3076440 4461240 6486590 9142000 1.26E+07
High_GDP Australia_NZ 446803 554358 694812 852442 1033250 1225660 1421230 1605720 1783530 2010680
High_GDP Canada 666479 779396 944334 1108630 1297530 1525410 1788850 2103530 2467270 2941640
High_GDP China 1592970 3545740 6424540 1.03E+07 1.51E+07 2.05E+07 2.70E+07 3.56E+07 46854100 5.70E+07
High_GDP Eastern Europe 409212 554520 736627 941739 1239140 1602590 2016620 2540930 3128090 4018490
High_GDP Former Soviet Union 427135 593455 826893 1119600 1517150 2021120 2639030 3410950 4380860 5738250
High_GDP India 522833 1037190 1896310 3248510 5242670 8065880 1.18E+07 1.63E+07 21763900 2.90E+07
High_GDP Japan 4049050 4179920 4682660 5241810 5905600 6643080 7435500 8232380 9075120 1.01E+07
High_GDP Korea 538839 663177 778977 914167 1089390 1296900 1534690 1783890 2045200 2391210
High_GDP Latin America 1919720 2578920 3469360 4516710 5865940 7661970 1.02E+07 1.43E+07 19849700 2.64E+07
High_GDP Middle East 649161 983950 1434730 1985570 2678250 3486900 4422890 5565920 6900660 8416880
High_GDP Southeast Asia 1230630 1979910 3470930 5668770 8780370 1.31E+07 1.91E+07 2.65E+07 35284600 4.58E+07
High_GDP USA 9104140 1.09E+07 1.36E+07 1.66E+07 2.05E+07 2.53E+07 3.11E+07 3.82E+07 46328300 5.69E+07
High_GDP Western Europe 7801260 8631060 1.01E+07 1.16E+07 1.31E+07 1.46E+07 1.64E+07 1.84E+07 20440400 2.33E+07
High_GDP Global 29950860 37831571 50311043 65822838 85538960 1.1E+08 1.41E+08 1.81E+08 2.29E+08 2.87E+08
High_Population Africa 584102 885508 1306040 1835030 2607430 3850690 5849650 8986030 13352000 1.96E+07
High_Population Australia_NZ 451122 560547 709809 877751 1086740 1346370 1644970 1988120 2385600 2.89E+06
High Population Canada 666116 787901 996177 1219050 1499210 1869560 2302560 2821370 3425800 4.20E+06
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High_Population China 1598500 3583890 6618940 1.08E+07 1.62E+07 2.28E+07 3.09E+07 4.23E+07 57767800 7.45E+07
High_Population Eastern Europe 410904 558409 748103 956173 1272380 1699710 2235150 2989070 3961300 5.33E+06
High_Population Former Soviet Union 427508 592401 824714 1103040 1498080 2032010 2718500 3650350 4901250 6.60E+06
High_Population India 530170 1020090 1909950 3349640 5595920 8949920 1.36E+07 1.99E+07 28325500 4.01E+07
High_Population Japan 4033350 4144970 4558720 4949430 5391620 5990410 6703600 7545920 8648710 1.00E+07
High_Population Korea 540977 677191 812735 953736 1111460 1286990 1485720 1726770 2026930 2.45E+06
High_Population Latin America 1921970 2546160 3389800 4363730 5602440 7259240 9623910 1.33E+07 18459800 2.48E+07
High_Population Middle East 645765 961916 1408910 1945850 2636180 3461460 4435180 5701470 7302350 9.22E+06
High_Population Southeast Asia 1240000 1961220 3433810 5620080 8824810 1.36E+07 2.05E+07 2.97E+07 42109700 5.85E+07
High_Population USA 9022130 1.05E+07 1.31E+07 1.60E+07 1.95E+07 2.39E+07 2.92E+07 3.59E+07 43705800 5.33E+07
High_Population Western Europe 7775180 8705960 1.05E+07 1.23E+07 1.44E+07 1.70E+07 2.02E+07 2.41E+07 28768200 3.46E+07
High_Population Global 29847794 37496163 50342908 66218910 87233570 1.15E+08 1.51E+08 2.01E+08 2.65E+08 3.46E+08
Low_Conv Africa 592628 878165 1206410 1581860 2046760 2613570 3256340 3932070 4539050 5.15E+06
Low_Conv Australia_NZ 446803 548937 674627 811550 964484 1121750 1275340 1412750 1538550 1.70E+06
Low_Conv Canada 666479 771776 916883 1055440 1211240 1396260 1605540 1851220 2129050 2.49E+06
Low_Conv China 1592970 3473810 5911660 9031750 1.26E+07 1.63E+07 1.97E+07 2.44E+07 28828800 3.29E+07
Low_Conv Eastern Europe 409212 531267 621682 712644 830458 959450 1086670 1234180 1383100 1.63E+06
Low_Conv Former Soviet Union 427135 576881 708065 859620 1031650 1227710 1442850 1680980 1965340 2.36E+06
Low_Conv India 522833 1027350 1842840 3097150 4903620 7272220 9500670 1.18E+07 13133100 1.49E+07
Low_Conv Japan 4049050 4139010 4546610 4990470 5512880 6080380 6672850 7243710 7829250 8.57E+06
Low_Conv Korea 538839 656741 756512 870628 1017410 1187740 1378260 1570990 1766150 2.02E+06
Low_Conv Latin America 1919720 2553590 3354810 4160950 4983480 5902360 7077350 8745400 10717600 1.24E+07
Low_Conv Middle East 649161 974253 1392710 1889650 2499060 3190200 3967850 4896340 5902900 6.72E+06
Low_Conv Southeast Asia 1230630 1822390 2566050 3447650 4412180 5508400 6723450 7877170 9007550 1.02E+07
Low_Conv USA 9104140 1.08E+07 1.32E+07 1.58E+07 1.92E+07 2.32E+07 2.79E+07 3.36E+07 39970500 4.82E+07
Low_Conv Western Europe 7801260 8546440 9843660 1.11E+07 1.22E+07 1.34E+07 1.47E+07 1.62E+07 17638600 1.97E+07
Low_Conv Global 29950860 37257510 47517619 59390862 73358822 89404940 1.06E+08 1.26E+08 1.46E+08 1.69E+08
Reference Africa 592628 878165 1206410 1581860 2062330 2815650 4004760 5711680 7896200 1.07E+07
Reference Australia_NZ 446803 548937 674627 811550 964484 1121750 1275340 1412750 1538550 1.70E+06
Reference Canada 666479 771776 916883 1055440 1211240 1396260 1605540 1851220 2129050 2.49E+06
Reference China 1592970 3512670 6245180 9848140 1.41E+07 1.89E+07 2.43E+07 3.15E+07 4.06E+07 4.84E+07
Reference Eastern Europe 409212 549213 715629 897352 1158100 1469020 1813000 2240430 2705010 3.41E+06
Reference Former Soviet Union 427135 587775 803321 1066830 1417930 1852670 2372560 3007550 3788340 4.87E+06
Reference India 522833 1027350 1842840 3097150 4903620 7400990 1.06E+07 1.44E+07 1.88E+07 2.46E+07
Reference Japan 4049050 4139010 4546610 4990470 5512880 6080380 6672850 7243710 7829250 8.57E+06
Reference Korea 538839 656741 756512 870628 1017410 1187740 1378260 1570990 1766150 2.02E+06
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Reference Latin America 1919720 2553590 3368380 4299980 5476220 7014730 9193280 1.26E+07 1.71E+07 2.23E+07
Reference Middle East 649161 974253 1392710 1889650 2499060 3190200 3967850 4896340 5952670 7.12E+06
Reference Southeast Asia 1230630 1961080 3372790 5403760 8210530 1.21E+07 1.72E+07 2.34E+07 3.05E+07 3.89E+07
Reference USA 9104140 1.08E+07 1.32E+07 1.58E+07 1.92E+07 2.32E+07 2.79E+07 3.36E+07 4.00E+07 4.82E+07
Reference Western Europe 7801260 8546440 9843660 1.11E+07 1.22E+07 1.34E+07 1.47E+07 1.62E+07 1.76E+07 1.97E+07
Reference Global 29950860 37463900 48860652 62694310 79907004 1.01E+08 1.27E+08 1.59E+08 1.98E+08 2.43E+08
GCAM Population Results (thousands)
Scenario Region 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095
Reference Africa 919484 1134740 1319910 1493560 1630100 1755810 1864500 1922680 1948830 1928290
Reference China 1426770 1511920 1564310 1574780 1548110 1500560 1449610 1399720 1355260 1293600
1 of 1
Reference Former Soviet Union 284342 283487 284080 283991 283238 279466 272704 264977 257763 255638
Reference India 1094580 1291720 1412230 1494750 1544450 1569150 1559180 1519130 1449540 1377390
Reference Latin America 549919 619954 686786 743913 793205 833139 866087 895362 916824 924592
Reference Middle East 188106 232198 273172 312247 347974 378471 401515 415117 420752 422203
Reference Southeast Asia 875769 1033070 1180400 1308970 1412060 1482440 1516380 1515850 1483690 1430680
Reference MLI 5338970 6107089 6720888 7212211 7559137 7799036 7929976 7932836 7832659 7632393
Reference Australia_NZ 24548 27057 29387 31400 32819 33647 33832 33363 32509 31592
Reference Canada 32318 35040 36799 37910 38344 38630 38938 39283 39813 40343
Reference Eastern Europe 119100 117147 114477 110998 106905 101539 94866 88225 82267 79646
Reference Japan 127773 126369 124121 121335 118428 114698 110071 104726 99478 96155
Reference Korea 48138 48866 48574 47965 47119 46156 45025 43149 41194 39629
Reference USA 299730 336265 365110 393314 421860 450656 476574 501034 521816 544015
Reference Western Europe 473526 490863 496156 495146 485052 471984 456467 437248 420708 411450
Reference HI 1125133 1181607 1214624 1238068 1250527 1257310 1255773 1247028 1237785 1242830
Reference Global 6464103 7288696 7935512 8450279 8809664 9056346 9185749 9179864 9070444 8875223
High_Population Africa 921073 1162940 1452270 1760930 2094650 2440520 2767960 3074360 3349230 3588330
High_Population China 1436760 1548000 1663770 1730080 1784750 1823560 1850120 1888280 1935870 1998100
High_Population Former Soviet Union 284833 285962 291894 293882 299505 306780 312733 321884 333771 347060
High_Population India 1130620 1306490 1490920 1646720 1795320 1932900 2046110 2141080 2218790 2284620
High_Population Latin America 552663 620507 693788 757820 814581 865466 910113 951018 990936 1031150
High_Population Middle East 193881 237539 286332 333148 380326 425486 465016 500838 534796 566630
High_Population Southeast Asia 863178 1010590 1175520 1331650 1484580 1633190 1764570 1885950 2000840 2106250
High_Population MLI 5383008 6172028 7054494 7854230 8653712 9427902 10116622 10763410 11364233 11922140
High_Population Australia_NZ 24542 27358 30616 33628 36616 39988 43209 46490 49912 53135
High_Population Canada 32313 35786 39997 43804 47479 51745 55864 59893 64087 68068
High_Population Eastern Europe 119082 118600 119161 117769 116953 116983 116456 117203 119960 124072
High_Population Japan 127449 126721 124619 120499 115979 113153 110727 109242 110038 112381
High_Population Korea 47566 49592 51360 51714 50662 49223 47769 46679 46530 47281
High_Population USA 306653 339190 376099 409429 442385 479433 516230 552966 589066 621137
High_Population Western Europe 471664 499729 527885 550864 573500 599782 624233 652021 685761 720233
High_Population HI 1129269 1196976 1269737 1327707 1383574 1450307 1514488 1584494 1665354 1746307
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